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NEGATIVE AESTHETICS 
Ethan Stoneman, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014 
This study aims to make a rhetorical intervention in the aesthetics of politics and political 
legitimacy. Much of the research on this topic suggests that politics is unavoidably aesthetic and, 
on this basis, conceives of the state’s political legitimacy in terms of the capacity to elicit broad-
based aesthetic approval. What this research has yet to address is the likelihood that members of 
a given society will disagree over what is deserving of aesthetic praise combined with the 
tendency of aesthetic feeling to degenerate over time. These tendencies, I argue, indicate that the 
problem facing political legitimacy is primarily a matter of overcoming a rhetorical crisis in the 
aesthetics of politics. My central idea is that the state can regain aesthetic control by 
circumventing or transcending beauty altogether. This strategy comprises rhetorical maneuvers 
that exploit the emotive power of aesthetics without appealing to beauty itself or inducing in 
citizens their feeling for the beautiful. By interrupting beauty as both a point of contention and a 
source of entropy, these circumventing tactics enable the state to pull off what would otherwise 
remain a pipe dream—the acquisition of aesthetic value without the rhetorical limitations 
imposed by direct appeals to beauty.  
In Chapter 1, I examine how the state employs rhetorical techniques that transform perceived 
aesthetic disturbances into opportunities for engendering and maintaining diffuse subjective 
v	  
adherence to the state. Chapter 2 frames Aristotle’s theory of tragic catharsis as a mode of 
persuasion useful for renewing a community’s political identity and strengthening its 
commitment to the task of constitutional preservation. In Chapter 3, I show how Kant’s 
aesthetics provides a model for conceiving of the sublime as a rhetorical operation that can 
transfigure overwhelming, fear-inducing appearances into an experience of freedom that is 
nevertheless caught up in a relationship of political dependence. In Chapter 4, I look at how the 
state creates and maintains a sense of the Freudian uncanny, exploiting figures of an 
omnipresent, malefic Other to recreate a disposition favorable political legitimacy. I conclude by 
highlighting the implications of these rhetorical strategies for the nature of political order as 
such.   
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CHAPTER 1 – CIRCUMVENTING BEAUTY, LEGITIMATING ORDER 
 
[If] man is ever to solve that problem of politics in practice 
he will have to approach it through the problem of the 
aesthetic, because it is only through Beauty that man makes 
his way to Freedom. – Friedrich Schiller 1794 
 
People lose faith in leaders much more easily than they  
lose confidence in the system. All the indicators that we 
have examined show that the public has been growing  
increasingly critical of the performance of major 
institutions. [And yet there] has been no significant decline 
in the legitimacy ascribed to the underlying political and 
economic systems. – Seymour Martin Lipset and William 
Schneider 1983 
 
Free consent may thus be the antithesis of oppressive power, 
 or a seductive form of collusion with it. – Terry Eagleton 1990 
 
One of the most salient yet often overlooked ideas in the history of political thought is the 
notion that the good or successful polity is the one modeled after beauty. Understood by Aristotle 
as comprising orderly arrangement, proportion, and definiteness (or clarity), beauty has occupied 
a central place in the actual and imaginary organization of society, and for good reason: more 
than any other standard, beauty appears to offer either a universal form of political justice or a 
template for long-term political stability. In either case, however, beauty’s political value—
specifically, its value to the political state—hinges on people’s perception of beauty in the socio-
political order, that is, on their recognition of the polity as a beautiful object, deserving of 
fondness and admiration. From the state’s perspective, then, beauty is at once a constraint on its 
right to rule and a powerful resource. If the state can successfully promote itself as an object of 
beauty and so elicit and control a corresponding feeling for the beautiful, then it virtually assures 
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the popular acceptance and recognition of its authority, specifically, of its legitimacy or 
monopoly right or to make rules and issue commands and to enforce them by coercion against 
the members of its society. If, however, the state cannot effectively demonstrate its aesthetic 
integrity, then it risks becoming an object of reflection and thus opening itself to all manner of 
critique. In the absence of aesthetic anchoring and support, the state’s claim to political authority 
is, like any other proposition, contestable, subject to disagreement. No longer prima facie, the 
state’s authority is subject to controversy.  
Unlike most typical aesthetic objects—whether of art or nature—the state qua political 
object is not perceived directly via the senses but through the mediating effects of language. 
Thus, the state’s claim to beauty is, much like its claim to legitimacy, a rhetorical problematic, 
i.e., something that as a matter of contingency and for the sake of appearance (doxa) could be 
said to invite recourse to the available means of persuasion. In light of the state’s need to secure 
belief in its authority, the invitation to rhetorical action takes the form of an imperative or 
practical necessity. At the same time, given the problematic’s aesthetic and practical demands, 
the state is constrained to seek broad-based consensus, to demonstrate its beauty not to the one or 
the few but to a significant swath of popular opinion and belief, namely, the body politic. As a 
result, state-sponsored agencies tend to forgo rational argument and debate, relying instead on a 
rich collection of non-rational, emotive “persuasives” to induce in citizens their feelings for the 
beautiful—or at least feelings of a positive kind—with the aim of articulating these emotional 
states to the established political order. These persuasive tools typically include a range of 
symbols, rituals, and stories, from statues and monuments commemorating important people and 
events in a nation’s history, to flag-saluting ceremonies and parades, to political myths that 
reinforce belief in a nation’s sacred origins and providential destiny. Rhetorically, they amount 
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to exceptionally efficient persuasive maneuvers, providing maximum impact for minimal 
content. What is more, because such tactics are themselves aesthetic, influencing conscious 
belief through intuition and feeling, they do not easily allow for counter-argument. The overall, 
cumulative effect of these maneuvers is an aesthetic—because perceived to be aesthetic—state. 
Ipso facto, it is a state virtually immune both to rational. Hence, for statist politics, the rhetoric of 
aesthetics provides an extremely useful legitimation strategy, enabling the state to bypass the 
inexpedient and somewhat risky tactics of argument and debate, while insulating it against 
untoward, politically “incorrect” modes of doing and saying.     
All things being equal, the status quo would appear to favor the aestheticization of the 
state. That is to say, on the face of it we could reasonably expect a well-established state to 
succeed in convincing the body politic of its aesthetic (i.e., positive, intrinsic, unassailable) 
value. Indeed, much of the current research in what is typically referred to as the “aesthetics of 
politics” (e.g., Chytry 1989; Eagleton 1990; Ankersmit 1996; Scarry 1999; Kateb 2000; Clifford 
2002; Wingo 2003; Rancière 2004; Docherty 2006; Bronner 2012; and Huemer 2013) tacitly 
supports this expectation, albeit in a variety of ways. What this research has yet to address, 
however, is the likelihood that members of a given society will disagree over what is deserving 
of aesthetic praise combined with the tendency of aesthetic feeling to degenerate over time. 
These tendencies, I argue, indicate that the problem facing political legitimacy is not, primarily, a 
matter of demonstrating rational-legal authority or of implementing a fairer decision-making 
procedure but of overcoming a crisis in the aesthetics of politics (a crisis that is one part 
controversy, one part stasis).  
Given rhetoric’s power both to create homonoia (likemindedness) and to strengthen 
existing commitment, I treat the crisis in the aesthetic of politics as a rhetorical exigence and 
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pose the following question: in securing its claim to political legitimacy, how does the state 
manage the rhetorical problematics of aesthetic disagreement and aesthetic decay? My central 
idea is that rather than appealing to a shared sense of beauty—a maneuver that would likely 
aggravate or at best delay the problem—the state circumvents or transcends beauty, employing 
rhetorical maneuvers that exploit the emotive power of aesthetics without appealing to beauty 
itself or inducing in citizens their feeling for the beautiful. Instead of originating in an intrinsic, 
positive value, this power derives negatively from the perception of an imminent threat to the 
body politic, either to its collective way of life or to the individuals comprising it. In effect, these 
disturbances amount to conditions of rhetorical possibility through which the state can identify 
with the citizenry-at-risk—thereby sharing the role of victim—or, transcending victimage, safely 
(i.e., persuasively and with minimal opposition) reassert its prerogative to rule over the members 
of its society. In either case, the state’s claim to beauty is either overlooked or taken for granted, 
while the question of its authority is either forgotten or indefinitely suspended. Thinking with the 
state, these circumventing strategies, which interrupt beauty as a point of contention and a source 
of entropy, pull off what would otherwise remain a pipe dream—the acquisition of aesthetic 
value without the rhetorical limitations imposed by direct appeals to beauty.   
Collectively, these strategies comprise what I consider rhetorical techniques of negatively 
aesthetic modes of political experience. As I demonstrate in this and the following chapters, they 
constitute a distinctive and unusually powerful means of securing the widespread belief in one 
aspect of the state’s political authority, namely, its political legitimacy.1 The purpose of this 
study is twofold. First, at the conceptual-theoretical level, it aims to introduce the concept of 
negative aesthetics to the interdisciplinary field of political rhetoric and communication and to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Political obligation—i.e., the obligation on the part of the citizenry to obey its government—is the second aspect 
of the state’s political authority.  
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show how the rhetoric of negative aesthetics can further the political end of securing diffuse 
subjective adherence to the political state or polity. Second, it strives to point beyond itself to 
facilitate the identification and critique of certain recurring general features pertaining to the 
ongoing attempts, undertaken by the owners and managers of rhetorical power, to create and 
strengthen a positive consensus vis-à-vis the political legitimacy of the governing regime.  
 I pursue these objectives over the course of five chapters, focusing on three negatively 
aesthetic categories that exhibit something of a family resemblance: the tragic, the sublime, and 
the uncanny. Chapter 1 continues to lay the groundwork for an inquiry into the political ends of 
the rhetoric of negative aesthetics. Following the political philosopher Michael Huemer, who 
claims that “without a belief in authority, we would have to condemn a great deal of what we 
now accept as legitimate” (2013, 12), I examine how the state, in attempting to maintain the 
belief necessary for its legitimacy, avails itself of aesthetics as a means of political rhetoric.2 I 
argue that this legitimation strategy ultimately struggles to succeed over the long-range, 
requiring something stronger than the appeal of beauty. This “something,” I argue, is provided 
by the suggestion of aesthetic violence and the fear to which it is likely to give rise. The aesthetic 
categories of the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny constitute three distinctive yet related 
methods for rhetorically controlling this affective phenomenon.  
Chapter 2 frames Aristotle’s theory of tragic catharsis as both the means and the effect of 
a non-representational rhetorical process, one that, by means of facilitating civic purgation, 
renews a community’s political identity and so strengthens its commitment to the task of 
preserving the constitution. Although the procedure of civic purgation (ostracism) facilitates the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Among libertarians, particularly libertarian anarchists, this emphasis on the rhetorical (cognitive) basis of political 
legitimacy has achieved commonplace status. See also Gerard Casey, who argues, “In order for the state to function, 
the mass of the people has to believe in its legitimacy” (2012, 27), and Anthony de Jasay, who reduces political 
legitimacy to “the propensity of its [the state’s] subjects” to believe that they have an obligation to obey its 
commands (1997, 76). 
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instauration of community ethos, the process is tragic, I argue, not by virtue of its potential to 
effect a purifying purgation but on account of its capacity to clarify, and thereby affirm, the 
grounds for political inclusion (and exclusion). At the same time, however, given the teleological 
status that Aristotle assigns to catharsis—i.e., catharsis as the end of tragic drama—ostracism 
discloses a basic truth about tragic clarification, namely, that catharsis is at once greater and less 
than tragic drama: less because it is a component of tragedy but greater because it is in a sense 
separable from the dramatic art, free to function in other contexts and able to subserve 
heteronomous purposes. Hence, my second argument, which builds on the first, is that the 
rhetoric of tragic catharsis not only identifies a tragic dimension of politics but also dissociates 
the tragic from the domain of tragedy proper, preserving its performative character while freeing 
it from the unique constraints of poetic representation. Thus liberated, the tragic dimension of 
politics allows for the possibility of misclarification vis-à-vis a regime and its constitution. But 
unlike dramatic representation, which may either fail to clarify or clarify in the wrong way, 
political catharsis admits of a strategic use of misclarification, a parallel rhetorical process 
whereby the apparent clarification of one form of government displaces or dissimulates the one 
that is actually in power. As a rhetorical technique of misclarification, the tragic retains its 
preservative function, but with a twist: it now preserves the current regime, indirectly, by 
simulating the appearance or character of another.  
 In Chapter 3, I argue that Kant’s theory of the sublime provides a model for conceiving 
of the sublime as a powerful rhetorical operation that by means of manipulating the imagination 
restores the emotive non-cognitive conditions that legitimate political order on an affective level. 
As I demonstrate, a crucial part of this operation is the transfiguration of overwhelming, fear-
inducing appearances into an experience of freedom that is nevertheless caught up in a 
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relationship of dependence between government and the governed. If the tragic secures consent 
to the prevailing political order by way of strategic appearance, then the sublime ensures such 
consensus by dominating a certain subjective experience, creating a binding force for a relatively 
non-coercive or non-absolutist system of rule. In this regard especially, Kant’s theory of the 
sublime is not only applicable to rhetoric but constitutes a significant gain in the political 
efficacy of the sublime. Over against the possibly alienating effects sublime terror, the Kantian 
sublime exercises control while dissimulating the reality of its dominion. Although Kant’s 
political philosophy favors a republican form of government, the relationship he posits between 
the imagination and reason commits his understanding of the sublime to a vertical power 
structure, in which a hierarchical political order is reified as subjective experience. This 
reification, I argue, amounts to what I refer to as the rhetorical institution of the political sublime. 
And as in the case of the tragic, the political sublime owes its rhetorical effectivity to a precise 
emotive process. But unlike political catharsis, under the influence of the sublime this process 
consists not in a signifying process but in the formalization of an intense mental movement. 
In Chapter 4, I demonstrate how the state exploits the figure of the malefic, alien Other so 
as to give rise to a sense of the Freudian uncanny, specifically, to the emergence of an existential 
fear vis-à-vis the return of superannuated modes of thought. I argue that this existential quality of 
the uncanny, combined with the perceived omnipotence of the figural Other, facilitates an 
imminent shift in political legitimation by state power from the assurance of constitutional 
protection to that of the personal safety state, thereby reducing the state’s political legitimacy to a 
basic policing function. But unlike the rhetorical institution of the political sublime, which 
secures subjective adherence to state power negatively, by means of an implicit promise of future 
success, the figural dimension of the uncanny Other engenders and maintains the specter of an 
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unfalsifiable threat, the reality of which can neither be independently verified nor denied. Hence, 
the procession of uncanny Others and Otherness, I argue, enables the state to nourish and exploit 
an environment of fear, which is equal parts real and neurotic. At the same time, it grants the 
state monopolistic right to determine its own level of unfalsifiable success in combating the 
Other’s incursions.  
 
1.1 LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS 
For better or worse, virtually all Westerners today are creatures of the state. So too, 
increasingly more and more of the world’s population is falling under some form of state-rule. 
What is more, under the aegis of supranational institutions like the UN and WTO, more and 
more of the world’s previously self-determining nation-states are yielding their autonomy to an 
internationalist global state. According to Max Weber’s classic definition, the state refers to a 
compulsory political organization with a centralized government that successfully upholds the 
claim to the monopoly of political decision-making and of the legitimate use of physical force in 
a bounded territory (1946, 78).3 While the concepts of the state and the government are closely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The above definition is a slight reworking of Weber’s definition, which reads: “Today, however, we have to say 
that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” (1946, 78). To be sure, the monopoly of violence is central to political legitimacy. Yet, as a 
number of thinkers since Weber have pointed out (e.g., Simmons 2001; Buchanan 2002; Huember 2013), so, too, is 
the state’s monopoly to make certain sorts of law (e.g. statutory and regulatory law), which, of course, the state 
enforces by coercion against the members of its society. This fairly simple definition of the state, however, conceals 
a basic difficulty in any attempt to provide an exact statement of the nature, scope, or meaning of the state. 
Cudworth et al. argue that there is no academic consensus on the meaning of the state and that any definition is 
politically loaded (2007, 1). And according to Andrew Vincent, “The state is one of the most difficult concepts in 
politics…. One of the most intractable problems,” in scholarly debates concerning the state, “is that there is little 
agreement on what is being studied” (1992, 43). Even the act of defining “the state,” argues Clyde W. Barrow, can 
be seen as part of an ideological conflict—different definitional choices leading to different theories of state 
function, which, in turn, validate different political aims and strategies (1993, 10–11). Nevertheless, the most 
commonly used definition is that of the German sociologist Max Weber, whose definition defines the state in terms 
of organization, rather than function (see Cudworth et al., 2007, 95). On the distinction between organizational and 
functional definitions of the state—i.e., between the state as a set of institutions consisting of definite power 
relations and as a specific function or end requiring a certain institutional ensemble—see Dunleavy and O’Leary 
(1987, 6) and Hay et al. (2006, 10). 
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related, they are distinct. Whereas the state is an abstract entity, a more or less permanent 
organization that functions independently of any particular set of individuals, the government is 
the administrative bureaucracy that controls the state apparatuses at a given time (see Sartwell 
2008, 25; Casey 2012, 12).4 Governments, in other words, are the institutional means through 
which state power is chiefly employed and maintained, while the state is served by a continuous 
succession of different governments (or is interrupted in the event of a sudden, violent, and 
illegal seizure of state power). According to the anarchist anthropologist Harold Barclay, each 
successive government is composed of a specialized and privileged body of individuals who 
occupy the positions of political power and monopolize political decision-making. They are thus 
separated by both status and organization from the population as a whole (1990, 31 ff. cf. 2003, 
11–25). The function of such an administrative bureaucracy is to enforce existing laws and 
legislate new ones, to arbitrate conflicts, and to manage systemic crises. In some societies, 
typically those associated with a monarchical, aristocratic, or plutocratic form of rule, the 
administration is controlled often a self-perpetuating or hereditary class. In others, such as 
representative democracies, the political roles or offices remain, but there is frequent turnover of 
the people actually occupying the positions.  
Although from the perspective of human history, the emergence of the modern state, first 
in Western Europe, and then almost everywhere else, is a very recent phenomenon, the state-
form emerged whenever and wherever it became possible to centralize power in a durable way. 
Indeed, two of the first known states of the Western world, Athenian democracy and the Roman 
Republic, developed in the Greek city-state of Athens around 550 BCE and in central Italy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 On account of its systemic nature, Crispin Sartwell describes the state—with some justice—as both “an external 
representation—the imaginary entity with which other states deal” and “an internal representation—the government 
as embodied in a single phrase, as in ‘The United Kingdom’ or ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo.’ It is a 
personification and a name for the government,” but not the government itself (2008, 31; my emphasis). 
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around 509 BCE, respectively. According to political scientist Brian Nelson, although primitive 
state-forms existed before the rise Athenian democracy, the Greeks of classical antiquity were 
the first people known to have explicitly formulated a political philosophy of the state and to 
have rationally analyzed its political institutions. Prior to this, he argues, states were described 
and justified almost solely in terms of religious myths (2006, 17). On this view, the appearance 
of the state-form is closely related to and accompanied by changes in political thought, especially 
those changes concerning the understanding of legitimate state power.5  
Even excepting the early examples from classical antiquity, the emergence of the modern 
state has meant that the problem of political authority, or legitimate domination, has preoccupied 
political philosophers for roughly the last 500 years. Typically, philosophers, joined now by 
political scientists, approach the subject of legitimacy by posing a series of related questions: 
“Do we need political authority, and, if so, how should it be constituted? Under what 
circumstances, if any, do states wield legitimate political authority? How far are we as ordinary 
citizens obliged to obey the laws they make and follow their other dictates? Should legitimacy be 
tested dichotomously (legitimate versus illegitimate) or on a scale from complete acclaim to 
complete rejection? Can the legitimacy of a political system be judged in terms of subjective 
adherence of the people? Is the support of the majority a valid test of legitimacy?”6 These 
questions, while bearing significant political and ethical implications, are nevertheless distinct 
from the concerns of political efficacy or Realpolitik, specifically of how to secure and maintain 
subjective belief in the necessity if not the normative validity of the prevailing political order. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The classical statement of the modern state is made at the moment of the European state’s liberation from empire 
and church by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan (originally published in 1651). The modern “nation-state” is 
typically dated to the Peace of Westphalia, 1648. 
6 This tradition of inquiring into questions pertaining to legitimacy stems back at least as early as Xenophon’s The 
Education of Cyrus, in which Xenophon demonstrates that successful tyrannies are those that by means of 
legitimacy transformed the brutal power of material force and constraints into recognized authority. 
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From the practical or pragmatic point of view—that of the state’s—the significance of subjective 
adherence consists not in its validity as a measure of legitimacy, that is, not in validity per se, but 
in its effectivity with respect to shoring up the authority of political (state) power. To be sure, the 
state does indeed rely on a form of legitimacy in order to maintain its political dominance. But 
this reliance primarily consists in the people’s belief in the legitimacy of the existing political 
system rather than whether the apparatus of government accords with, say, a consistent and 
agreed upon system of abstract rules and laws.   
The practical consideration of legitimacy, however, poses an immediate problem for 
political authority, namely, the question of how to secure and maintain public belief in and 
support for the state. As the political theorist Jonathan H. Schaar remarks, in a somewhat 
lamenting tone, current definitions of legitimacy tend to dissolve the concept into belief or 
opinion (1981). But regrettable or not, once legitimacy is considered in terms of political utility, 
the pressing question, from the state’s perspective, is how to operationalize authority so that it is 
recognized as authority. For there is an important distinction to be made between the legitimacy 
ascribed to the state by philosophers, advocates, and politicians and that which is (or likely 
would be) effective in obtaining the assent of the people who make up the body politic.7 Among 
the available means by which the state achieves popular consensus, we may identify two fairly 
obvious and basic methods. The first is the use of pure force or executive power. However, as 
Siniša Malešević points out, “coercion in itself is insufficient (and often in the long run counter-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Recently, the political philosopher Michael Huemer has acknowledged that many government policies if not the 
state itself depend on belief in authority (2013, 8–12). Following Ajume Wingo’s notion of “veil politics” (2003), 
Huemer claims that the modern state and its governments “rely on a rich collection of nonrational tools, including 
symbols, rituals, stories, and rhetoric, to induce in citizens a sense of the government’s power and authority,” a sense 
which he considers “emotional and aesthetic rather than intellectual….This sense,” he concludes, “can be expected 
to influence our conscious beliefs through our intuitions” (2013, 116; emphasis in original).   
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productive),” since it tends to create the conditions of resentment leading to sedition (2002, 85).8 
Another option is the appeal to pure authority, like that of the shaman or wise man whose 
disciples follow his (rarely her) instructions without any compulsion. But whereas the use of 
force tends to produce dissent, pure authority simply allows for disobedience. In either case, 
authority is effectively undermined or at least exposed to undue risk.  
In the twentieth century, political sociologists Max Weber and Seymour Martin Lipset 
were two of the first prominent intellectuals to consider seriously the relationship between 
legitimacy and subjective adherence. According to Weber, every state must rely on one or other 
form of legitimate domination to uphold its existence.9 Regardless of the particular form of 
legitimacy, he argues, the authority of any given political order primarily consists in the 
widespread belief of individuals and groups in its normative validity (1978, 212–15). 
Nevertheless, beyond tacitly appealing to the consensual power of the status quo, Weber’s 
concept of legitimate domination merely presupposes belief in the legitimacy of the political 
system. So despite prioritizing belief, Weber cannot (or, at least, does not) account for how a 
particular system might overcome challenges to its legitimacy, nor does he consider the available 
means for resolving a legitimation crisis should one occur. 
Seymour Lipset, while also understanding legitimacy in terms of belief, improves upon 
Weber by focusing on the relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness, arguing that the 
stability of a regime depends on the relationship between these two concepts. On his view, 
effectiveness amounts to the “extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As Condorcet suggested in 1794, as the French Revolution was preparing to yield its place to a new despotism, 
“force cannot, like opinion, endure for long unless the tyrant extends his empire far enough afield to hide from the 
people, whom he divides and rules, the secret of his power and his weakness,” i.e., that real power lies not with the 
oppressors but with the oppressed (2012, 20). 
9 Weber identifies three forms of authority or legitimate domination: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic 
(1978, 215–16). He also implicitly accepts the idea of mixed legitimacy. 
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government” (1959, 77).10 According to Mattéi Dogan, for Lipset, “The relationship between 
legitimacy and the effectiveness of a political system is of crucial importance because the 
presence or absence of one can, in the long run, lead to the growth or loss of the other” (1992, 
123).11 However, like Weber, Lipset’s account ultimately does not address the effectiveness of 
legitimacy as such (i.e., its efficacy in creating and supporting public belief and support), only 
the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy, which is a different, albeit related, matter. 
On Lipset’s view, when faced with a crisis of effectiveness, such as an economic recession, the 
stability of the regime comes to depend, to a large extent, on the degree of legitimacy that it 
already enjoys. Once the crisis has passed, he argues, the effectiveness that had been lost is more 
or less automatically regained. Thus, a loss of effectiveness does not, according to Lipset, result 
in a corresponding loss of legitimacy, at least in the short-term.12 The idea here, shared by other 
political analysts (e.g., Eckstein 1966; Dahl 1971), is that legitimacy, once obtained, is preserved 
by virtue of a reservoir of goodwill and support—what the ancient Greeks calls eunoia—on 
which the system can draw in times of crisis or diminishing effectiveness. But while the 
operative assumption here would appear to be, like Weber’s, that legitimacy is a more or less 
self-sustaining civic phenomenon, Lipset acknowledges the very real possibility of 
delegitimation and the tendency of delegitimated regimes to result in the breakdown of political 
authority. This eventuality is often referred to as a legitimation crisis, and it is the specter of just 
such a crisis that haunts every state, regardless of its form of government or characteristic mode 
of legitimation (see Habermas 1975, 68–74). The self-sustaining reservoir of goodwill, in other 
words, is not necessarily a self-regenerating wellspring of good faith. Popular belief in legitimate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 According to Lipset’s definition, widely accepted, legitimacy is “the capacity of the system to engender and 
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society” (1959, 77). 
11 For an illustration of this relationship, see Lipset’s matrix (1959, 81). 
12 That Lipset does not concern himself with the effectivity of legitimacy as such is reflected in the tendency to 
collapse any distinction between effectiveness or the loss thereof and the perception of relative effectiveness.  
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domination can run dry, and inasmuch as the state is a permanent rather than temporary political 
order its success depends upon keeping up or replenishing the reserves of popular support. Lipset 
and others ultimately cannot account for the processes or mechanisms whereby the state and its 
governments maintain the subjective adherence that ensures the effectiveness of legitimacy 
itself—that is, apart from the effective performance of government, however that effectivity may 
be construed or, more importantly, perceived by the people.13 
 
1.2 AESTHETICS: THE KEY TO LEGITIMACY 
Because of the problematics of effectuating legitimacy, philosophers and political leaders 
have often turned to aesthetics and judgments of beauty as providing both a model of the 
consensual state and a possible means of creating substantive and resilient popular support for 
political order.14 Indeed, the appeal to beauty is so strong, or believed to be, that much of 
Western political philosophy since the Enlightenment, whether guided by practical or moral 
considerations, is driven by what George Kateb refers to as “aesthetic impulses” (2000), by 
which he means the desire either to bring the seemingly non-beautiful or inaesthetic under the 
domain of beauty or to expand beauty’s sphere of influence so as to color aesthetically objects of 
a more practical or moral interest. While such aestheticizing impulses date back as early as 
classical antiquity, they culminate in the Western tradition in the British moral sense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This blind spot regarding the effectiveness of legitimacy also applies to so-called “minimalist” definitions of 
legitimacy, such as the one proposed by Juan Linz. According to Linz, we may define legitimacy in the minimalist 
sense of “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures the political institutions are better than any other that 
might be established and therefore can demand obedience” (1988, 65). The concept of “diffuse regime support” 
developed by David Easton (1965), while conceptualizing legitimacy in terms of the distribution of support and of 
the intensity of that support among the people, does not address the issue of maintaining such a workable 
distribution. 
14 By “aesthetics,” I mean simply the critical or appreciative perception of beauty, conceived as a positive, 
immediate, and intrinsic value, as well as the critique of that perception (i.e., the principles concerned with the 
nature and appreciation of the beautiful). For this definition, I am indebted both to George Santayana’s The Sense of 
Beauty and Monroe C. Beardsley’s “History of Aesthetics.” 
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philosophers of the eighteenth century and the German tradition of aesthetic political philosophy, 
beginning with Johann Winckelmann’s Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums ("The History of 
Art in Antiquity") of 1764 through Jürgen Habermas’ communicative aesthetics in the twentieth 
century.15  
For British moral sense thinkers like Shaftesbury (1999) and Francis Hutcheson (2004), 
aesthetics functions as shorthand for the introjection of abstract reason or rational order by the 
life of the senses, such that the whole of social life is aestheticized.16 What this signifies is a 
social order so spontaneously cohesive that its members no longer need to think about it. On this 
view, a sound political regime is one in which the law of authority is no longer viewed or felt to 
be external to individuals but is lived out through the feelings and senses and experienced as the 
unthought principle of free identities. As literary critic Terry Eagleton, argues, “The aesthetic is 
in this sense no more than a name for the political unconscious: it is simply the way social 
harmony registers itself on our senses, imprints itself on our sensibilities.” So too, “The beautiful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Anticipated by the pre-Socratics’ anthropomorphic philosophy of cosmos (celestial order), the wedding of beauty 
to politics received its first thorough, albeit indirect, treatment in Plato’s political masterpiece, the Republic. Here 
the importance of conceiving politics vis-à-vis beauty is established analogically by means of organic unity: the 
constitution of the ideal political community (the kallipolis or “beautiful city”) corresponds to the organization of 
the healthy body, both of which are arranged harmoniously, as well as pyramidally, according to the specialization 
of their parts, e.g., the head (rulers or philosopher kings), the heart (the auxiliaries or guardians), and the stomach 
(farmers and other craftsmen) (369b-372d, 414b-415d, 423d). Plato’s indictment of poetry, in Book X, is 
symptomatic of a deeper aesthetic—or, in pre-eighteenth century parlance, “poetic”—concern, namely, the safe-
keeping of the beautiful city’s organic unity. Thus for Plato, the greatest evil for a city is that which tears it apart and 
makes it many instead of one, while the greatest good is that which binds it together and makes it one (462a-b). 
Aristotle echoes these considerations, as well as Plato’s expressive mode, when, in the Politics, he imports his 
ethical notion of “due proportion” to highlight the aesthetic/poetic underpinnings of political arrangement (1284b7-
12; see also 1987b, 3). Indeed, it is this poeticized rendering of politics and political community that Friedrich 
Schiller evokes early in his Letters, disparaging “the new spirit of government,” for not rising to higher forms of 
organic existence but degenerating “into a crude and clumsy mechanism” (35). Although not typically associated 
with this tradition, Pieter Duvenage (2003) maintains that Habermas’s work on aesthetic rationality is central to 
understanding his theoretical enterprise of communicative rationality. 
16 Some scholars treat of moral sense theory (also known as sentimentalism) as the empiricist version of ethical 
intuitionism (i.e., the general position that humans possess some type or degree of non-inferential moral knowledge. 
For an appraisal of the British moralists as ethical intuitionists and a defense of ethical intuitionism in general, see 
Michael Huemer (2008). With respect to the connection between the so-called morality and aesthetics, British moral 
sense theorists like David Hume described this so-called sense in terms of an increasing refinement in aesthetic 
sensibility. Belonging to our immediate experience, morality discloses the moral order to us insofar as it possesses 
the unerring intuition of aesthetic taste (see Eagleton 1990, 32 ff.). 
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is just political order lived out on the body, the way it strikes the eye and stirs the heart” (1990, 
37). As such, the aesthetic names the relay or transmission mechanism whereby the law of 
authority is converted into a law that is not a law—or, according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an 
authority which is not an authority (1987).17 Aesthetics thus comes to stand for the ultimate 
binding force of state and society, the essence of which Francis Hutcheson captures in his 
famous aesthetic axiom that beauty consists in “unity in variety and variety in unity” (2004, 28–
30; my paraphrasing). Anchored as it is in our most basic instincts, aesthetics—as sensibility 
(Hume) or the sense of beauty (Santayana)—represents a spontaneously cohesive and consensual 
order, which requires no further legitimation beyond that of its own intrinsic and immediately 
felt value. “Like the work of art,” argues Eagleton, this unity “is immune from all rational 
analysis, and so from all rational criticism” (1990, 38). To aestheticize political order, then, to 
render it beautiful, is to make legitimate domination ideologically effective, that is, pleasurable 
and intuitive, self-ratifying and self-sustaining. For if aesthetics names a process for 
ideologically reconstituting the human subject from the inside—for rooting politics in a 
refashioned subjectivity—then it becomes inconceivable that the subject, once aestheticized, 
could ever meaningfully reject the law of authority (or rationality of law), much less violate the 
injunctions of state power. By subjectivizing authority, aesthetics thus offers a conceivable if not 
actual means of short-circuiting the possibility of disobedience, contestation, and dissent, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Although not a moral sense theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau encapsulates the aesthetic nature of the ideal political 
state in his description of the law of authority. On his view, the most important form of law is the one “is not 
engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens. It is the true constitution of the state. Everyday [sic] it 
takes on new forces. When other laws grow old and die away, it revives and replaces them, preserves a people in the 
spirit of its institution and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that of authority. I am speaking of mores, 
customs, and especially of opinion, a part of the law unknown to our political theorists but one on which depends the 
success of all the others” (1987, 172). Yet as we will see, to the extent that Rousseau’s appeal to public opinion and 
custom fails to consider the possibility of fragmentation or dissent, his vision of an introjected, self-sustaining 
political order is not guarantee order so much as it serves as philosophical deus ex machina. 
	   17	  
translating political order into a form of unthinking convention and social practice, a second 
nature.   
Echoing British moral sense theory, the German tradition of an aesthetic political 
philosophy saw in aesthetics the ideological bonding essential for creating and maintaining the 
ideal of a well-ordered political state.18 In The Aesthetic State: A Quest in Modern German 
Thought, Josef Chytry offers an impressive account of the effort of German theorists over the last 
two centuries to use aesthetics as a common point of departure for a political philosophy.19 What 
primarily attracted these German theorists to an aesthetic political philosophy was the intuition 
that the work of art effects a harmonious integration of its constituent parts. Hence, much like the 
moral sense philosophers, classicists like Herder and idealists like Hölderlin came to view 
aesthetics as the key to achieving social cohesion as well as the model or hegemonic strategy for 
upholding the state. Aesthetics, in other words, designated something other, or greater, than the 
work of art, denoting an instrument or mode for unifying the individual and the state. The work 
of art simply exemplifies such unification and serves as an ideal for the political community. 
Friedrich Schiller, who according to Chytry is the central figure of this tradition, encapsulates 
this ideological view when he writes that “if man is ever to solve that problem of politics in 
practice he will have to approach it through the problem of the aesthetic” (1982, 9). For Schiller, 
the atomization of society could only be successfully counteracted by impulses toward synthesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt, who was very much influenced by this German tradition, and Hegel in 
particular, began his illustrious cultural history of the Italian Renaissance with an aesthetic proposition: namely, that 
wherever the excesses of political egoism and violence is “overcome or in any way compensated a new fact appears 
in history—the State as the outcome of reflection and calculation, the State as a work of art” (1958, 22). 
19 F. R. Ankersmit’s proposes an alternative aesthetic political philosophy, one that he considers to be diametrically 
opposed to the German one. Rather invoking unity as the watchword of aesthetics, Ankersmitt appeals  to aesthetics 
in order to argue “for the brokenness of the political domain” (1996, 18). In opposition to the unification of the 
individual and the state, which also would involve the identification of state and society and of the representative 
and the represented, Ankersmitt defends a kind of aesthetic political philosophy that acknowledges and embraces 
“an irrevocably broken world, a world without tertia, a world whose components are as irreducible to each other as a 
painting and what it depicts” (53). 
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that he considered to be the defining characteristic of the “Aesthetic State” or “Aesthetic 
Society.” It is only in the aesthetic state, Schiller argues, that justice can be done to all the 
faculties of the individual human being, and that these can most completely develop in the fullest 
interaction with others. Commenting on Schiller, Chytry writes: “By promoting empathy and an 
awareness of others, aesthetic sensibility gives rise to the development of a society in which the 
individual becomes, as it were, the state itself” (1989, 85). For the German tradition, too, beauty 
or taste is shorthand for a spontaneously consensual order, aesthetics the language of solidarity. 
“Taste alone brings harmony into society,” writes Schiller, “because it fosters harmony in the 
individual…. [Only] the aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to 
that which is common to all” (1982, 215). At the same time, for the German theorists as a whole, 
this unification is subservient to a project of fundamental ideological reconstruction, of bringing 
society and the individuals composing it into line with the aestheticized and hegemonic state, 
that is, the state perceived as an organic whole, its power recognized as legitimately dominant. 
The question that emerges within this tradition, however, is how the state is to achieve such an 
aesthetic makeover. If, as Schiller contends, the transformation is to come about by means of the 
aesthetic mode of communication, then what, we may ask, are the means available to this mode? 
Of what does it consist? How does it work? What are the mechanisms of control, the likelihood 
of success, the prospects of opposition? The question, it would appear, is not one but many. 
Rather than providing answers, however, Schiller and company leave us wondering.20  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  Miguel Tamen indirectly discusses the rhetoric of Schiller’s “aesthetic or beautiful communication,” arguing that 
for Schiller the expression refers “to the achievements of art and to its mysterious overall quality we now take for 
granted and call ‘cultural value.’” Paying attention to the centrality of “form” vis-à-vis Schiller’s aesthetics, he 
forwards the ironic conclusion that Schiller’s wishes for a beautiful mode of communication are fulfilled “by the 
kind of language most successors of Schiller (including Schiller himself) have opposed” on aesthetic grounds: the 
formalised languages used e.g. by Logic” (1995, 481). Without disagreeing with the logic of this argument, I 
maintain that Tamen’s conclusion does not address the problematic for Schiller of how communication may be so 
aestheticized that it adequately performs the consensual tasks requisite for maintaining the ideal of a well-ordered 
political state.    
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1.3 AESTHETICS: AN EFFECTIVE (& AFFECTIVE) THEORY OF PERSUASION 
Thus, apart from the ambiguity of “aesthetic communication,” for the British moral sense 
theorists and German political philosophers, aesthetics promises to equip the state with an 
effective persuasive theory, one that, in introjecting an abstract theory of rule, appears, ironically, 
to rest on nothing more intellectually reputable than a species of mental taste or subjective 
experience. It is little wonder, then, that political philosophy and science have at times been loath 
to consider seriously the importance of rhetoric with regard to questions of political authority.21 
Nevertheless, as even rhetoric’s staunchest critics admit, the effectiveness of legitimate 
domination—a political system’s capacity to secure and maintain popular support, to be 
politically effective—depends almost entirely on the effective (i.e., persuasive) use of symbols 
and symbol systems.22 That is to say, subjective adherence to and belief in the state as political 
hegemon relies on the suasive and attitudinal functions of language, and these functions are 
typically contra-purposive with respect to teaching on an intellectual level (though, to be sure, 
rhetoric can also be made the object of systematic study). In the Statesman, for instance, Plato’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Bryan Garsten’s Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment, for an examination of political 
philosophy’s at times strained relationship to “the art of persuasion” and a vindication of rhetoric’s importance in 
revitalizing democratic political discourse. 
22 Recently, American rhetoricians have sought to problematize “persuasion” as the end of rhetoric, proposing 
alternative standards for assessing rhetorical effectivity, e.g., epistemic value (Scott 1967), interpellation (Charland 
1987), invitation (Foss and Griffin 1995), re-signification or performativity (Butler 1997), productive interpretation 
(Leff 1997), articulation (Greene 1998b), and tropological play (Kaplan 2010; see also de Man 1979), to name only 
a few. However, with respect only to the autonomous ends of rhetoric—i.e., leaving aside any consideration of the 
heteronomous ends that rhetoric is made to serve, ends that rhetoric invariably does serve—these criteria necessarily 
come to appeal to persuasion or persuasiveness as their ultimate standard of effectivity: e.g., rhetoric invites 
response only insofar as people are persuaded of, come to believe in, the reality of the invitation, regardless of 
speaker/author intent, and allowing for the possibility of negative invitation (provocation).This is not to say that 
rhetoric does not invite, articulate, or involve inventional interpretation, only that persuasion includes these 
functions, subsuming them as different suasive possibilities. In the European tradition, scholars from outside the 
discipline of rhetoric have also begun to rethink rhetoric in terms other than or in addition to persuasion, offering 
highly original yet equally idiosyncratic definitions. A representative sampling might include Levinas’ violent 
conversation (1969, 70), Valesio’s “the functional organization of discourse” (1980, 7), Eagleton’s “the sensuous 
body of a discourse” (1990, 115); Barthes’ “subtly articulated machine” (1994, 16), Foucault’s effective lying 
productive of “a constraining bond” (2011, 14), etc. Although expressing a bias toward the truth-telling philosopher 
as against the rhetor, Foucault’s pejorative definition, I believe, is closest to the mark, at least with regard to the use 
of rhetoric for the ends of furthering the state’s interests.  
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Socrates defines rhetoric as expert knowledge “capable of persuading mass and crowd, through 
the telling of stories, and not through teaching” (304d), while assigning control of such expertise 
to the statesman (304a). Similarly, Aristotle subordinates rhetoric to the science of politics, by 
which he means state management, writing that “Speech based on knowledge is teaching, but 
teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; rather, it is necessary for pisteis [“means of 
persuasion”] and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on the basis of common [beliefs and 
opinion]” (2007, 1.1.12). For only on this basis can the owners and managers of rhetorical power 
ensure, to the best of their ability, maximum impact, both in terms of extent and intensity. In 
keeping with this view, the contemporary historian of rhetoric Renato Barilli argues that rhetoric 
is technē (“technique,” or “art”) in the fullest sense: “the activity it performs is not only cognitive 
but transformative and practical as well. It does not limit itself to conveying neutral, sterilized 
facts…but its aim is to carry away the audience; to produce an effect on them; to mold them; to 
leave them different as a result of its impact,” to reach the emotions “and leave an effect on 
‘experience’” (1989, x).23 From the state’s perspective, then, rhetoric constitutes a potentially 
decisive technē or strategy for maintaining popular belief and support vis-à-vis the legitimacy of 
state power, for strengthening commitment to the status quo. Although consensus may be arrived 
at through means of argument and debate (à la Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), or in the 
context of an “ideal speech community” (à la Habermas 1970), for the state these methods are at 
once impractical and ineffectual—at worst, counterproductive. As Gerard Casey astutely points 
out, “The belief in the legitimacy of the state is all the more effectively planted in the minds of 
its citizens if it is never actually argued for or justified (that might raise doubts) but simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For Plato, technē refers to a rational enterprise, the procedure of which can be explained as contributing to an end, 
in this case, the end of persuasion (e.g., 1987, 465a). The irony of aesthetics mentioned above thus reappears 
apropos of rhetoric, conceived as a rational enterprise for producing potentially non-rational effects. 
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conveyed inchoately as a foundational principle” (2012, 27).24 In terms of persuading a 
population of the state’s political legitimacy, rhetoric’s strength consists in forgoing controversy 
and public debate in favor of persuasive tactics (means of persuasion) capable of exerting 
maximum emotive impact and of exploiting that impact in the service of order.  
Among the available means of persuasion, none is perhaps more subservient to the end of 
political order than the appeal to beauty. Certainly, this intuition has not been lost on the 
practicing political elite, regardless of whether this insight lays claim to irrefutable, objective 
verity. From the U.S. Constitution’s “more perfect Union” to the reappearance in the twentieth 
century of John Winthrop’s image of “a shining city upon a hill” (1630/1838), American 
political discourse has been keen to avail itself of the language of beauty, working either to 
imbue the state with a sense of beauty or to reinvigorate its waning aesthetic appeal.25 We see a 
similar aesthetic impulse in 1930s Germany, in which calls for the restoration of a true “Heimat,” 
the name of a redeemed whole, served as a rallying cry for a nostalgic right that sought its home 
in a national or völkisch community.26 Far from signifying political anomalies, these and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  On	  the	  notion	  of	  foundational	  principles,	  or	  myths	  as	  foundational	  narratives,	  see	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  (1969,	  117–9).	  
25 On January 9, 1961, President-Elect John F. Kennedy resuscitated the phrase “a city upon a hill” during an 
address delivered to the General Court of Massachusetts. President Ronald Reagan used the image as well, on 
several occasions, and to great effect, first, in his impromptu concession speech at the 1976 Republic National 
Convention, then again, in his 1984 acceptance of the Republican Party nomination, and again, in his January 11, 
1989, farewell speech to the nation (see Reagan 2003). Ronald Reagan’s son, Michael Reagan, preserved his 
father’s predilection for this image, titling his 1997 book The City on a Hill: Fulfilling Ronald Reagan’s Vision for 
America.  
26 The aestheticized idea of the Heimat or völk community is of course of a piece with the Nazi project of genocidal 
purification. As Peter Viereck argues, the Third Reich was regarded at the deepest level as the sacred Heimat of the 
unified völk community. Those who were taken to Nazi concentration camps were those who were officially 
declared by the SS to be “enemies of the völk community” and thus labeled a threat to the integrity and security of 
the Heimat (1965). Of course, this is not to suggest that the political appropriation of aesthetics is inherently to some 
degree racist or fascist. Rather, the relationship between aesthetics and fascism is accidental, as is the relationship 
between aesthetics and any system of government or social organization. F. R. Ankersmit, in his work on the 
aesthetics of politics, goes to great lengths to distinguish a democratic or republican conception of aesthetic politics 
from a non-democratic, potentially authoritarian one. On his view, what is unique to the former is the conviction that 
“legitimate power can arise solely in a situation where the distinction between the state and society, between the 
representative and the represented, is as clear as possible” (1996, 53). By contrast, non-democratic conceptions of 
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attempts to aestheticize order suggest a basic human tendency, one that makes possible an almost 
unthinking rhetorical political strategy. In this regard, Homer’s immortal Iliad is testament both 
to the strength and universality of beauty’s unquestioned (and unquestionable), mobilizing 
power: ‘Who on earth could blame them? Ah, no wonder the men of Troy and Argives under 
arms have suffered years of agony all for her, for such a woman. Beauty, terrible beauty!’ 
(3.156–) Notwithstanding Helen of Troy’s untold, mythical beauty—or, for that matter, the 
putative beauty of the völkisch community or of the territorial association “the United States”—
from a rhetorical or pragmatic perspective, what is of principal concern is not whether some one 
or thing is really and truly beautiful, nor is it whether or to what extent an object (real or 
imagined) embodies an abstract standard of beauty. When the end is to create or sustain 
adherence to political order, the principal concern becomes that of persuading a sufficiently 
broad swath of popular opinion that the existing political state is a beautiful one. The exigence, 
then, becomes a matter of eliciting what Santayana describes as “an affection of our volitional 
and appreciative nature”—i.e., the sense of beauty—and of doing so in such a way that this 
pleasure is regarded as or felt to be a quality objectified in the prevailing political order (1955, 
31).27 The advantage of this maneuver is singular, if not obvious. Unlike appeals to morality or 
economic value, neither of which are intrinsically valuable, beauty is an ultimate good, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
aesthetics politics hold to the view that the best we can hope for politically is an identification of state and society 
and of the representative and the represented.     
27 According to the history of aesthetics, the relevant distinction is that which distinguishes a subjective-
epistemological perspective from an objective-ontological one. From the epistemologist’s frame of reference, beauty 
consists, in the first instance, in a positive, intrinsic value, the immediate perception of which is a pleasure, that is, a 
pleasure felt independent of concepts or practical entanglements. Beauty, then, on this view, resides in a subjective 
response, enjoyment. As Immanuel Kant, the most radical proponent of this view, asserts, “beautiful is what we like 
in merely judging it” (1987, 174; emphasis in original). More recently, Santayana has proposed the more moderate 
and, I think, more reasonable definition, which holds that “Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing,” 
i.e., beauty as objectified pleasure (1955, 31; my emphasis). By contrast, the ontological approach to aesthetics, 
which begins in the classical tradition of poetics, maintains that beauty resides in phenomenal, empirical objects or 
their relations themselves, that beauty enjoys a certain independent existence vis-à-vis human perception and the life 
of the senses. A typical example of the ontological approach is Aristotle, who divides beauty into its “main species,” 
or objective qualities: “orderly arrangement, proportion, and definiteness [or clarity]” (1935, XIII.iii.10– 12). 
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pleasurable in its immediate perception, rather than in consequence of the utility of an object, act, 
or event. Beauty is thus unique from both an axiological and rhetorical perspective.  
For that reason, I propose substituting for Schiller’s “aesthetic mode of communication” 
the less ambiguous notion of the rhetoric of aesthetics.28 If aesthetics is to serve the state as an 
effective mode of communication—specifically, an affectively or emotively effective mode—
and if the standard of effectivity is popular belief in and support for the state’s claim to 
legitimate domination, then, in the final analysis, this mode would seem to consist in persuading 
the majority of the state’s inherent beauty. That is, its distinctive rhetorical power would appear 
to reside in objectifying pleasure as a dimension of the established and dominant political order. 
Within these parameters, beauty is employed as a means of introjecting or interiorizing political 
order; of creating affirmative consensus vis-à-vis the system of political rule; of persuasively 
articulating that system with a universal ideal; of mediating between a civil-economic society of 
labor and need, on the one hand, and the ideal of a well-ordered political state, on the other. 
Consequently, the aesthetics of the state circles back to the practical problem relating to authority 
and legitimate domination, namely, that of effectuation. If beauty is a potential means of winning 
over a population, and thereby of securing the effectiveness of the state’s political legitimacy, 
then the question remains, how can the state activate or effectively avail itself of this rhetorical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  By the phrase “rhetoric of aesthetics,” I have in mind something distinct from Steve Whitson and John Poulakos’ 
understanding of the aesthetics of rhetoric (1993; 1995; see also Ayotte et al. 2002). By way of Nietzschean 
aesthetics, in particular those passages in The Will to Power devoted to art (§§ 794–853), Whitson and Poulakos 
highlight rhetoric’s “aesthetic” capacity to transform the limits of signification and forge new vistas of possibility—
of meaning, perception, feeling, and the like. This emphasis, they argue, serves to demonstrate the proper scope and 
function of rhetoric, which, although a productive art in the Aristotelian sense, is not productive of truth or 
knowledge and hence of no epistemic value. In contradistinction, the rhetoric of aesthetics—and, as we will see 
below, of “negative aesthetics”—places emphasis on the rhetorical (i.e. suasive) uses of aesthetics and considers 
aesthetics as a resource or means of rhetorical effectivity. The two perspectives, however (the aesthetics of rhetoric 
and the rhetoric of aesthetics), are more than compatible. Indeed, the rhetoric of aesthetics, as I understand it, 
presupposes an aesthetic understanding or dimension of rhetoric, one that is different from but in conversation with 
the rhetorical ends of aesthetics.  
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power and maintain it once activated? While the idea of beauty seems to yield a gain in 
rendering political legitimacy rhetorically effective, from the standpoint of the state beauty is no 
more than an attractive rhetorical proposition. Still at issue is the practical necessity of 
discovering how to exploit beauty so as to cultivate perceptions and beliefs advantageous to the 
state. This demand, in turn, requires attending to the unanimity, intensity, and duration of 
beauty’s potential, subjective effects. Consideration of these issues shows that the rhetoric of 
beauty runs up against several difficulties, which it inherits from the field of aesthetics—
difficulties that in the domain of political legitimation translate into constraints on rhetorical 
effectivity or the making of political consensus. 
 
1.4 PROBLEMS IN THE RHETORIC OF AESTHETICS 
 The first problem bearing on the rhetoric of aesthetics is at once philosophical-
epistemological and operational: how does one persuade another that a particular object, e.g., the 
state, is beautiful? Beauty, as we have seen, is an intrinsic positive value, a pleasure that is felt in 
its immediate perception. As we have seen, it is an emotion that gives satisfaction, or pleasure, to 
some fundamental need or capacity of the mind. If this is the case, then the pleasure in which 
beauty and aesthetic judgment consist is independent of reason and understanding. For reason 
and understanding, as mental faculties or modes of perception, are logical and rational; they 
presuppose fixed ideas and work to establish new ones. They are thus productive, dependent on 
external ends, and interested in seeing those ends realized. Beauty, in contrast, which works 
solely on and through concept-free feeling, is a purely subjective (aesthetic) mode of perception, 
meaning that beauty and aesthetic judgments of the beautiful are ends in themselves, or 
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autonomous, free of all external ends or purposes, including political agendas.29 None of these 
observations, however, preclude beauty from serving as an accessory or in a dependent capacity 
(see Kant 1987, §16). Ideas and things, insofar as they are precipitated by emotions, can 
incorporate pleasure and thereby acquire what Santayana refers to as an “aesthetic colouring” 
(1955, 70). Although this coloring may be the last quality we notice in objects of, say, practical 
interest, its influence is nevertheless very real. Hence, this coloring effect is not limited to 
judgments of beautiful works of art or natural objects but can extend, equally, to constitutional 
arrangements or state formations. Although the aesthetic love or pleasure felt in relation to a 
political system is usually disguised under some moral label (e.g. love of justice), the essential 
right of any political organization or the belief in such right is purely aesthetic. At the same time, 
however, beauty’s status as a positive, affective value, at once intrinsic and immediate, would 
appear to seal off the sense of beauty from the political effectivity of conventional argument and 
persuasive action in general. For whereas beauty conceived as an idea may allow for the 
possibility of rhetoric’s winning someone over by means of reasoning or conventional argument, 
beauty as subjective sense or objectified pleasure does not. What is more, rhetoric is also 
disabled with regard to preventing one’s falling out of beauty, powerless to revive an affective 
appreciation for an idea or thing that was at one time an object of aesthetic enjoyment.  
 Outside the fictional realm and its dystopian nightmares of mind control, beauty as a felt 
value is not a realistic end of persuasion. Beauty can be communicated, but the nature of such 
communication is purely expressive, the expression, Kant writes, of “our feeling in a given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For that reason, according to Kant, pleasure in an aesthetic judgment would thus consist in a formal 
purposiveness, by which he means, “The consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject’s 
cognitive power, accompanying a presentation by which an object is given” (1987, 68), i.e., “a purposiveness 
without a purpose; a purposeless purposiveness” (73). According to Terry Eagleton, Kant’s reduction of beauty to 
the subjective purposiveness of the presentation of a thing amounts to an ideologically understanding of aesthetics. 
On Eagleton’s view, Kant’s aesthetics is a “heuristic fiction” (1990, 85), “the very paradigm of the ideological (93–
4).    
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presentation universally communicable without mediation by a concept” (1987, 162). Of course, 
this universal communicability is not identical to universal feeling vis-à-vis what is presented, as 
we will see, and aesthetic feeling cannot simply be transposed to a person or persons by means of 
expressive communication, just as it cannot be imposed through persuasion.30 Nevertheless, as 
Santayana flatly states (in keeping with the dreams of aesthetic political philosophy), the 
aestheticization of politics is not only possible but also, insofar as the aim of any political system 
entails securing longstanding, widespread support, necessary. While beauty can function or be 
made to serve as a substantial persuasive force, increasing the likelihood of persuasive uptake or 
assent, suasion to beauty—the rhetoric of aesthetics—is severely limited in its capacity both to 
acquire new converts or to prevent the already initiated from falling out of beauty, regardless of 
domain (politics, art, morality, etc.). The aestheticization of politics, when it occurs, happens 
gradually, over time, entering into and thereby reconfiguring a community’s storehouse of 
common sense and common feeling, becoming, as it were, superstitious—perhaps natural and 
noble, in some cases, but nevertheless superstitious. Regardless of the epistemic claims or status 
of political beauty, the objectification of aesthetic pleasure in the idea of the state does not result 
from intentional practice or grand strategizing. This is not to say that human agency is missing or 
absent, that actual people and groups of people are somehow excluded from exerting influence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 At most, beauty can exert persuasive force by means of what William Fusfield refers to as “reiterative 
compositional strategies” or strategies of communicative display and declaration. Such rhetorical strategies are 
potentially useful for the state’s rhetoric of aesthetics, since they function outside the parameters of conventional 
argument standards such as the argumentative case “a set of reasons and inferences in support of a specified 
conclusion,” in this case the state’s beauty (1997, 134; cf., Anderson 1985). Nevertheless, when concerning the 
aesthetics of politics reiterative rhetoric does not, as Fusfield maintains, increase the likelihood of persuasive uptake, 
if by that he understands the causation of belief. At most, the rhetoric of declaration may strenthen already existing 
commitments to political authority. Accordingly, it would serve one of the particularized functions assigned by 
Celeste Condit to epideictic discourse, namely, that of responding to the exigence of authority, of playing a crucial 
role in processes of communal construction and preservation of authority (1985, 290–91). However, as I argue 
below, the effectivity of reiterative rhetoric in shoring up the aesthetic state is, from the state’s perspective, a 
necessary but insufficient means of combatting the inevitable withering away of beauty and hence of maintaining 
subjective adherence and intensity of support.   
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over the state’s aesthetic refashioning; rather, the assertion merely underlines the accidental, 
involuntary nature of the overall (and ongoing) process itself, which is disclosed by the fact that 
aesthetic consecration is always more than the sum of the individual, collective efforts that go 
into the historical aestheticization of a given political system—whether such efforts are 
considered synchronically, at any given time, or diachronically, through their evolution over 
time.  
 All the same, beauty’s relative immunity from suasion would not pose a problem for 
political authority if not for the variety of states and their governments, on the one hand, and the 
variety of aesthetic sense or taste, on the other. Thus, the second difficulty pertaining to the 
aesthetics of politics concerns the unanimity of aesthetic judgments in connection with the 
objectification of pleasure in the state apparatus. Although epistemologists like Kant and 
Edmund Burke forward an understanding of taste that is at once uniform and universal, both 
acknowledge the very real possibility of discrepancy between individuals’ aesthetic responses. 
Yet each is adamant that aesthetic variability should be laid at the door of individuals, rather than 
of taste, which remains self-identical throughout its manifold presentations or embodiments.31 
Taste itself, in other words, is stable and unchanging, despite the divergence in aesthetic 
response (either according to the subjective history of an individual’s aesthetic judgments or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 To be clear, my decision to highlight the aesthetic judgments of individuals rather than the shared aesthetic sense 
of communities is simply one of convenience. It does not express an underlying preference for or commitment to the 
idea of the autonomous individual. That individuals’ aesthetic judgments may come into conflict with one another is 
entirely consistent with the communal nature of judgment, namely, with the fact that people make decisions not in a 
vacuum but in line with a community’s storehouse of beliefs and values (allowing, of course, for the fact that the 
storehouse itself is conditioned by aesthetic principles). As even the transcendental idealist Kant is forced to admit, 
if only implicitly, communities are not always, or even usually, in agreement with one another; certainly, they do not 
always share the same standards of judgment. However, this should in no way take away from the fact that 
disagreements between communities—whether of aesthetics, morality, or art—affect individuals nor that individual 
judgment within communities is itself prone to variability. Although outside the scope of my argument, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s critique of aesthetics, which he lays out in the first part of Truth and Method, hinges on his success in 
accusing epistemologists like Kant of reducing “the sense of community,” or sensus communis, to the subjective 
universality of aesthetic taste, and thereby of doing away with it (see 19–34 and 41–2).      
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discrepancy in judgment between individuals). Leaving aside considerations of verity, what this 
line of argument underlines is the sheer obstinacy of aesthetic judgments as such, even—or 
especially—judgments about taste itself, i.e., about what constitutes “good” taste. In view of 
such recalcitrance, and much to the chagrin of philosophers hard pressed to defend “a science of 
taste” (e.g., Burke), aesthetic conflicts are practically irresolvable. According to the moral sense 
theorist David Hume, notwithstanding the possibility of “some defect or perversion in the 
faculties,” in matters of taste “a certain degree of diversity in judgment is unavoidable, and we 
seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary sentiments…because there is 
no standard by which they can be [made compatible] (1998, 150). But as we have seen, even if 
there were such a standard it would be incapable of winning over new converts, of creating new 
adherents or subjects of beauty, of eliciting what is not, in some form, to some degree, already 
present in a subject’s body of experience—the feeling or sense of beauty, specifically, the 
objectification of pleasure in the qualities or elements of some object, either of the senses or the 
imagination. Such a hypothetical standard would be therefore useless in the attempt to win over 
new converts, to fashion new adherents or subjects of aesthetic “truth.” For at issue in aesthetic 
conflict is not the idea of beauty per se (e.g., not whether beauty is properly viewed as an 
epistemological or ontological proposition) but beauty as a mode of experience, which, since it 
consists in the immediate perception of intrinsic positive-value, we regard as essential to our 
very sense of being. As feeling beings we are thus unwilling and unable to be persuaded that our 
sense of beauty is incorrect or in any way deficient. From the state’s perspective, beauty’s 
resistance to reason and argument is as effective as it is problematic. It is effective so long as the 
citizenry perceives the state and its governing apparatus as a beautiful socio-political 
arrangement, for then legitimacy is virtually unassailable—disagreement and disobedience, 
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unthinkable; however, it is equally problematic if the state’s claim to beauty fails to create or 
command consensus, since the rhetoric of aesthetics remains powerless to win the hearts and 
minds of the unconverted. Hence, what promises to be the most advantageous means of 
maintaining legitimate domination appears, in the final analysis, to be simply that and nothing 
more: an instrument for maintaining but not creating adherence to the prevailing political order, 
for keeping alive the support of the hardline true believers but not for expanding that base. 
 Unavoidable and irresoluble, conflicts between aesthetic judgments of taste 
simultaneously extend and realize the problem of rhetoric’s inadmissibility vis-à-vis aesthetic 
conversion. In terms of political legitimacy, this foreclosure is particularly problematic: it not 
only precludes the reconciliation of competing judgments of the beautiful but also undermines 
the possibility of reaching compromise. For the recalcitrance of aesthetic judgment is of a piece 
with an inclination toward absolutism, the tendency to regard one’s own aesthetic sensibility as 
embodying the universal standard of good taste. In the domain art, aesthetic absolutism has 
supplied the basis for much of modern criticism, since it is only by virtue of a universal standard 
(so the thinking goes) that the would-be critic can legitimately pass judgment on a work of art. 
But whereas in the domain of art any number of objects may fulfill the absolute and universal 
requirements of taste, in the domain of politics aesthetic sensibility is brought under the control 
of the model. Accordingly, the model of political beauty—the idealized state—appropriates and 
colonizes the universal standard of taste, in every instance that this mode of judgment is brought 
to bear on constitutional arrangements and the attending organizations of society. The 
aestheticized state, in other words, is a singularity, which does not allow for scale; rather, it 
demands universal assent and permitting of variety only insofar as it alone marks the 
convergence of a multiplicity of aesthetical political judgments. While taste may allow for any 
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number of, say, beautiful paintings, politicized taste acknowledges only one beautiful state. For 
that reason, the aesthetics of politics is always a contest for what Kant refers to as “exemplary 
validity,” i.e., the hegemonic struggle whereby a particular content attains to the status of a 
universal (1998, B151; see Arendt 1992b, 84). Just as the aestheticized state remains more than 
the sum of its agential parts, political aestheticization itself amounts to a zero-sum game. Hence, 
the aesthetics of politics entails not only the state’s claim to beauty but also, and necessarily, its 
claim to exemplary beauty, which is a singular hegemonic status. Unlike the disinterestedness of 
the beautiful work of art, the beautiful work of political institution demands exclusive allegiance. 
To perceive a state as beautiful is, in effect, to make the aesthetic but no less political judgment 
that only that state is beautiful, that its form, and its form alone, embodies the political species of 
beauty.32 Like aesthetic sensibility, the aestheticization of the state tends toward absolutism. At 
the same time, this process goes one step further, since, by substituting a singular model for a 
universal standard, it monopolizes the standard (at least in a specific domain, for a particular 
realm of being), thereby acquiring the exclusive determining rights of aesthetic judgments of 
political taste. The aesthetic state is thus an absolutist and totalizing proposition: it is no longer a 
state but The State, or The Aesthetic State.33 The problem with this, however, is that the 
tendency toward totalizing absolutism does not enjoy universal persuasive appeal but remains, 
by its very nature, eternally contestable. As thinkers like David Hume aver, and others such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Of course, the form itself is always already monopolized by a particular content. So for instance, despite the fact 
that the whole of Europe and most of South America consists of liberal democratic systems of government, as do 
many other countries in the world, much of U.S. discourse—official, partisan, and vernacular—persist in describing 
the United States as the last or most important bastion of freedom and civil rights. The widespread appeal of this 
commonly held belief is testament not to any empirically verifiable truth content but to the aesthetic coloring of 
these and other values and their subordination to the aestheticized state. They are rhetorical proofs, in other words, 
of political aestheticization. 
33 On this view, then, it is the prerogative of such a state to decide which of the other existing states have a 
legitimate share in The State’s exemplary beauty and to what degree. Incidental to the agon of geopolitics, those 
states are deemed relatively beautiful that affirm the exclusive right of The Aesthetic State to determine and rank the 
value of all other states. This “dutiful” acknowledgment earns states titles such as “ally” or “client.”  
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Kant imply, this contestation is both unavoidable and irresolvable but through coercive 
measures.  
 In addition to this totalizing tendency, which, with respect to rendering legitimacy 
effective, is likely to end in irresolvable disagreement or stasis, the aesthetic state is at once a 
fragile and temporary one, comparable to the fragile impermanence of goodness and love. For 
those whose sense of beauty accords with the state’s presentation of self, the state registers as the 
objectification of aesthetic pleasure and therefore commands a seemingly spontaneous 
consensual power. Yet, in itself, this rhetorical power—distinct from the power of conversion—
is insufficient to the task of maintaining, consistently, an optimal level of intensity, or quantity of 
support, much less of maintaining the distribution of that zeal among the consensual body politic. 
Inasmuch as beauty constitutes both the means and the end of the idealized state, the rhetoric of 
aesthetics is unable to preserve the very consensus (the homonoia or “likemindedness”) that it 
both engenders and objectifies in the aesthetically representative state. Like the problem of 
unanimity, then, the third difficulty in the aesthetics of politics stems from the rhetorical 
limitations inherent in beauty, i.e., the restrictiveness that aesthetics exerts on suasive action. 
However, in contradistinction to the problem of aesthetic conflict, and the impossibility of 
aesthetic conversion, that of the intensity and diffusion of popular support issues from a failure 
of beauty as such, namely, that while beauty is necessary for power it does not itself contain it. 
Edmund Burke is perhaps the person most responsible for popularizing the political ramifications 
of this defect, writing that “we submit to what we admire, but we love what submits to us; in one 
case we are forced, in the other flattered, into compliance” (1998, 147). Beauty, in other words, 
which on this view appeals mainly to the “domestic” affections of love and tenderness, amounts 
to a vital symbol of free bondage. Yet as Rousseau highlights, the nature of this freedom is not 
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that of consensual compliance to order; rather, it suggests an impossibly lawless lawfulness, a 
destabilizing oxymoron that subjects beauty and, consequently the aesthetic state to a kind of 
ceaseless self-undoing. Instead of maintaining strong belief and consensual adherence to order, 
beauty enervates the affective basis of popular support. Rather than strengthening commitment to 
the state’s political authority, beauty—because it is neither rational nor coercive—allows for that 
commitment to weaken, encouraging by means of inability and license the erosion of its own 
rhetorical effectivity and hence that of the state’s aesthetic grounding.  
 Thus, the aesthetics of politics culminates in the paradox whereby a seemingly 
spontaneous order spontaneously devolves into a state of unfeeling political entropy, 
transforming the consensual body politic into what Burke describes as a people “grown torpid 
with the lazy enjoyment of…security” (1968, 156). Terry Eagleton argues, taking his cue from 
Burke, argues that this failing results in the following, now-familiar, political dilemma: “only 
love will truly win us to the law, but this love will erode the law to nothing. A law attractive 
enough to engage our intimate affections, and so hegemonically effective, will tend to inspires in 
us a benign contempt. On the other hand, a power which arouses our filial fear, and hence our 
submissive obedience, is likely to alienate our affections and so spur us to Oedipal resentment” 
(1990, 55).34 Thus, the final stage of beauty—its best-case scenario—returns the state to its 
starting position, reinstating the problematic of how to make the state’s claim to political 
legitimacy rhetorically meaningful, that is, of how to recreate the subjective conditions 
guaranteeing the state’s legitimate domination over the long-range. Even so, one need not accept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Almost fifty years ago, Rudolf Arnheim turned to the work of art in an attempt to reconcile the contradiction 
between the striving for order in nature and human beings and the principle of entropy implicit in the second law of 
thermodynamics. Owing to the effects of “[d]isintegration and excessive tension reduction (simplicity),” entropy, he 
argued, could best be combatted by the presence of the presence of vital “articulate structure,” [a] high level of 
structural order.” However, while structure on this view would be a necessary prerequisite for art, “What is 
ultimately required,” he added, “is that this order reflect a genuine, true, profound view of life” (1971, 29). How a 
particular political order could simultaneously offer such a vision while avoiding the simplicity demanded by the 
exigence of securing diffuse subjective adherence is unclear.  
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the extremity of Burke’s critique (i.e., that beauty ultimately issues in death) to see the validity in 
the argument that beauty tends to lose its effectiveness and intensity and that the state, insofar as 
its legitimacy hinges on the aesthetic, will likewise suffer from entropy and degenerate over 
time.35 Hence, rather than responding to the eventual crisis, Lipset’s appeal to the state’s 
reservoir of goodwill and Weber’s to a self-sustaining status quo merely beg the question. 
Although the problem of entropy is not, like that of aesthetic disagreement, irresolvable, it is 
unavoidable. What is more, the degeneration is irreversible. On this point, aesthetics and native 
wit are in agreement: beauty fades, irrevocably. While measures exist that can alleviate or 
forestall the decay of beauty, such courses of action ultimately serve only as band-aids, 
makeshift and temporary solutions to inevitable wide-ranging problems, maintaining a prolonged 
state of deterioration rather than providing a workable remedy or effecting a reversal of time’s 
degenerative effects. This applies to cosmetic surgery as well as to the rhetoric of nationalistic 
ceremonies and public display of patriotic fervor.36  
 
1.5 CIRCUMVENTING BEAUTY: THE RHETORIC OF NEGATIVE AESTHETICS 
The might of kings is based on reason and the folly of the 
people; indeed, much more on folly. The greatest and most 
important thing on earth has weakness as its foundation. 
And that foundation is wonderfully sure, since there is 
nothing surer than that the people will be weak. What is 
based on reason alone is very ill-founded, like the 
appreciation of wisdom.  – Blaise Pascal 1670 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 As per the beautiful according to Edmund Burke, which, writes Frances Ferguson, “has been joined with physical 
and political entropy issuing in death” (1992, 52). 
36 Indeed, Plato was the first to compare a certain practice of rhetoric to cosmetics, arguing in the Gorgias that 
“what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation” (465c). Notwithstanding Plato’s primary concern of 
instituting a juridico-legal order that would ensure the moral goodness of the people, the comparison between 
rhetoric and cosmetics is apt, though for a reason entirely different than the one Plato advances. Whereas Plato’s 
criticism assumes rhetorical effecitivity, albeit an immoral and politically destructive one, aesthetic entropy is 
problematic only insofar as the rhetoric of aesthetics is ineffective over the long-range.  
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…scare the hell out of the American people. – Republican 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman 
1947   
 
 In light of these observations, the rhetoric of aesthetics appears to be exceedingly limited 
in what it and its actors can reasonably hope to accomplish, particularly, with regard to the 
instauration and long-term maintenance of a consensual political order whose locus is the state 
and its governing apparatus. Instead of providing a cure-all for problems concerning political 
legitimacy, aesthetic persuasiveness culminates in and must necessarily be reconciled to its own 
unalterable and unavoidable constraints, namely, the irresolution of aesthetic disagreement and 
the irreversibility of aesthetic entropy. In the final analysis, the potential boon that aesthetics 
offers to processes of legitimation—an emotive power immune to argument and rational 
critique—is offset by the byproducts of conflictual stasis and degeneration over time. To be sure, 
the rhetoric of aesthetics remains an attractive mode of rendering political legitimacy effective, 
of engendering and maintaining a well-ordered political state. Moreover, inasmuch as aesthetic 
value is—as both Santayana and, more recently, Elaine Scarry (1999) maintain—intrinsic (i.e., a 
value in and of itself), political legitimacy as a whole, regardless of the particular form of 
domination, necessarily appeals to and grounds itself in the objectification of pleasure, 
irrespective of any consideration to rhetorical effectivity.37 This is significant because it means 
that the aesthetics of politics is not merely the brainchild of eighteenth century Continental 
philosophy, that the invocation of beauty for political ends is not simply a platitude common to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This applies both to the theory and practical work of legitimation. As Davide Panagia has recently demonstrated, 
the aesthetics of politics animates even the dispassionate analytical rigor of John Rawls’ theory of distributive 
justice (2006, 68–95; see Rawls 1999). This necessary implication of aesthetics, by aesthetics, is similar yet distinct 
from Jacques Rancière’s aesthetic understanding of politics. On this view, aesthetics primarily refers not to 
subjective sense or judgments of taste but to the distribution of patterns of perceptual experience, or partitions of the 
sensible world, which determines a mode of articulation between forms of action, production, perception, and 
thought—of being, doing, and saying. Rancière thus aligns himself with the aesthetics of politics only so as to stand 
apart from it, offering a general definition consisting of conceptual coordinates and modes of visibility and 
sayability, which are at once operative in and constitutive of any given political domain (see 1999, 57–9; 2003; and 
Rancière et al., 2012). 
	   35	  
electoral campaigns and encomia for the nation-state. Against the possible charges of esotericism 
or “mere rhetoric,” the axiological primacy of beauty points up the aesthetic tendency of political 
systems and beliefs, which would include both the state (along with the apparatus of 
government) and its processes of legitimation. To the extent that authority is, from the state’s 
perspective, a fundamental exigence, the aesthetic dimension of political order cannot be 
exorcised or displaced by an apparently non-aesthetic constitutional arrangement or rational 
procedure of government. If, as Jacques Derrida claimed in the wake of Soviet Communism, “no 
disavowal has managed to rid itself of all of Marx’s ghosts” (1994, 37), then aesthetics 
constitutes the ineradicable double of politics, now as always. Just as Marxism was and quite 
possibly remains the haunting specter of the new world order (neoliberalism, finance capitalism, 
etc.), aesthetics is the specter that haunts all systems of rule that rely on some form of political 
legitimacy in order to maintain domination over their subjects, that is, all modern and a good 
many pre-modern states.  
 Given this spectral quality, the emerging problematic is the following: how or in what 
ways does the state efficaciously manage the deadlock and decay resulting from its aesthetic 
consecration? Appearances notwithstanding, aesthetics does not resolve the problematic of 
effectuating legitimacy—that is, of engendering diffuse subjective allegiance to an existing 
regime and, then, of maintaining that adhesion at an effective level of intensity. Instead, as we 
have seen, aesthetics only serves to complicate, delay, or aggravate the exigence of securing 
authority through persuasive means. The question remains pertinent and equally pressing even if 
we altogether deny the aesthetic tendency of political legitimacy or qualify the extent to which it 
actually influences subjective adherence and, hence, the effectiveness of legitimate domination. 
As a mode of communication that works through affective, unthinking sensibility—our so-called 
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primordial instincts—aesthetics constitutes a persuasive resource that both haunts and entices 
systems of power. For that reason, aesthetics is likely to be exploited for the purpose of 
maintaining the dominance of a well-ordered political state even if aestheticization as a process 
is not an apparently predominant tendency inhering in a specific political order. Further, while 
aesthetic coloring may be the last quality we notice in objects of practical interest, its influence 
upon us, by means of such objects, is still very real. Constitutional arrangements and political 
systems become aesthetic when they come to be prized in themselves, intrinsically, just as 
intrinsic value is testament to the acquisition of aesthetic coloring. Consequently, the crisis in the 
aesthetics of politics is something that all states will either be forced to confront and deal with in 
some way or simply accept. But acceptance here would amount to a fatalistic resignation to the 
tides of history. In the absence of a rational standard by which to reconcile contrary aesthetic 
judgments and in view of the degenerative tendency of beauty, I contend that the state can 
manage the aesthetic crisis of political legitimacy only by means of circumventing beauty and in 
such a way so as to suspend aesthetics as both a point of contention and a source of entropy. 
Overcoming beauty, then, demands a mode of persuasion that functions apart from aesthetics but 
one whose effectivity does not primarily consist in cogent argument or public debate.  
 With regard to the prevailing political order, circumventing the state’s aesthetic 
dimension requires a model of rhetorical effectivity at least as powerful as that pertaining to 
beauty. Such a model, I argue, is provided by the underside of aesthetics in the form of several 
negative categories, typically expressed as substantivized adjectives, for instance, the tragic, the 
comic, the sublime, the absurd, the grotesque, the uncanny, the pathetic, etc. Variety 
notwithstanding, these categories are consubstantial in that each represents a mode of experience 
suggestive of that which, in the aesthetic domain, comes closest to signifying evil: ugliness. But 
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ugliness is not merely the absence of the beautiful but instead stands for the objectification of 
displeasure or other unpleasantness—in a word, aesthetic violence. Hence ugliness, or the ugly, 
functions as the generic name for any number of aesthetic disturbances, by which I understand 
those phenomena that either interrupt an established aesthetic state or prevent one from taking 
shape. Like the positive value of beauty, ugliness as objectified aesthetic violence is immediately 
perceived and, for a time at least, intensely felt. Consequently, ugliness is also likewise immune 
both to rational critique and to subjective transposition via argument or explanation. Yet it would 
be a mistake to confuse what is a common basis in ugliness for all that is essential to the 
categories. As modes of experience, the categories of negative aesthetics are not states of 
inactivity but entail the productive resolution or transmutation of ugliness. The suggestion of 
aesthetic “evil” is simply an inescapable consequence of laboring with anti-aesthetic material.38 
Separately or taken as a whole, they constitute species belonging to a common genus of creative 
subjectivity, that is, processes or operations for dealing with what would otherwise be merely 
ugly. In this capacity, the experiential categories of negative aesthetics reveal an effective 
persuasive theory that, similar to the persuasive theory of beauty, discloses a technique—
cognitive-transformative-practical—that by means of affective influence produces an 
experiential, subject-shaping effect, which is adaptable for both inner- and other-directed modes 
of communication, i.e., communication that takes either the self or the other as its object or target 
audience. Simply put, the categories constitute modes of creative experience that are suitable for 
persuasive action. What is more, they suggest a distinctive though non-exclusive model of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In this context, the prefix “anti-“ is nearly synonymous with “negative.” My decision to privilege the latter is 
primarily owing to two considerations: first, to distinguish my project and the concept of negative aesthetics from 
Hal Foster’s enormously influential collection, The Anti-Aesthetic, which, despite its rejection of aesthetic 
pretensions to wholeness, harmony, and the self-evidency of value and identity, is neither concerned with the 
political nor grounded in a coherent argumentative framework; second, to indicate that negative aesthetics is not 
antithetical to aesthetics but rather complicates the meaning of aesthetic sense, feeling, and judgment. For that 
reason, I also employ the phrase “quasi-aesthetic/s.” 
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rhetorical effectivity that consists in the strategic modification or persuasive uses of aesthetic 
violence.39 Of course, as in all matters of rhetoric, the strategic ends are themselves extra-
rhetorical.  
 In terms of the state’s legitimacy, the rhetoric of negative aesthetics provides an 
invaluable resource for exploiting an emotive power that while comparable to beauty avoids 
directly appealing to beauty itself and so circumvents the irresolution of aesthetic conflict while 
simultaneously slowing or suspending beauty’s inevitable decay. Because the manifestation or 
perception of ugliness is anathema to something as fundamental (to our subjectivity) as aesthetic 
sensibility, the administration, management, or processing of that aesthetic violence offers a 
powerful strategic means for securing widespread, intense adherence to order, that is, for creating 
and sustaining commitment to the state and its governing apparatus. At a basic level, then, the 
state’s circumvention of beauty by means of negative aesthetics relies on a simple yet effective 
rhetorical strategy: occulting the aesthetics of politics with an imminent threat to the body 
politic, either to its collective way of life or to the individuals who comprise it. Such interposing 
enables the state either to identify with the citizenry-at-risk—thereby sharing the role of victim—
or to transcend victimage and assume a police-like function by means of which the state renews 
its reputation as civil redeemer, guardian of law, order, and life. In each case, the state’s claim to 
beauty is either overlooked or taken for granted, while the question of legitimacy is suspended, 
subjected as it is to a state of exception. Aestheticization is thus secured by virtue of its 
circumvention, preserved through its suspension and its being forgotten. If the rhetoric of 
aesthetics promises to afford the state legitimacy without legitimacy, lawless lawfulness, etc., 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 To be clear, in forwarding this model of rhetorical effectivity, I am not aruging that rhetoric itself is essentially 
negatively aesthetic, i.e., that it should be principally understood in terms the categories of negative aesthetics. 
Rather, I am only arguing that as a means of rhetoric the categories make possible certain strategies or rhetorical 
opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable. 
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then the rhetoric of anti- or negative aesthetics short circuits that process, thereby avoiding the 
pitfalls of a persuasive strategy aimed at eliciting the sense of beauty.  
 Among the range of possible anti-aesthetic legitimation strategies, there are three that, 
owing to a common feature, deserve special treatment and can be said to comprise a distinct 
class: the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny. Unlike other similar strategies (e.g., the comic or 
grotesque), these three rely for their effectivity on what H. P. Lovecraft describes as the “oldest 
and strongest emotion of mankind” (2005, 105), namely, fear. And while this common basis may 
serve as a distinguishing feature vis-à-vis the categories of negative aesthetics, it is even more 
significant in the context of political legitimacy (and, for that matter, political rhetoric in 
general), since, as Aristotle tells us, “the many naturally obey fear” (1999, 1179b12). Yet an 
unqualified use of fear does not guarantee popular acceptance and recognition of the state’s 
authority, at least not over the long-range. To be sure, fear is a powerful emotion, perhaps the 
most powerful. But it is also, and in equal measure, unstable—its effects, unpredictable and often 
difficult to control. Moreover, unmitigated or relentless fear tends to produce the same 
curvilinear effects as outright coercion. Hence Machiavelli’s counsel that “a ruler should make 
himself feared in such a way that, if he does not inspire love, at least he does not provoke hatred” 
(1995, 52) is not limited to monarchies or authoritarian regimes but applies to all types of 
constitutional arrangements. Of course, the most basic means of avoiding such provocation, as 
Isocrates well knew, consists in directing fear outward, diverting it away from the state or head 
of state and toward a common enemy or threat—i.e., in making something other than the state 
the object of fear (see Isocrates 1928b; see also Vitanza 1997, 123–37). There is, however, an 
additional stratagem for capitalizing on the rhetorical value of fear without suffering from the 
disadvantages of hatred, one that can operate independently or in conjunction with mere 
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avoidance. This ploy involves combining fear with or parlaying it into a different emotion or 
affective state (which would nevertheless retain its basis in fear). Consequently, if the rhetoric of 
negative aesthetics is to use fear to its advantage then it must, at the very least, avoid incurring 
the people’s hatred and, if possible, productively transform fear into something that, while not 
totally lacking in fear, operates on a different affective register. With these observations in mind, 
I maintain that the politico-rhetorical strategies designated by the tragic, the sublime, and the 
uncanny—i.e., those comprising a fear-inducing class of negative aesthetics—avoid hatred by 
transforming fear into a potent yet simultaneously complex, even contradictory, mental 
movement.  
 In the following three chapters, I demonstrate how rhetoric both makes possible and then 
avails itself of the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny so as to secure political legitimacy, 
understood as popular subjective adherence to the state. In explicating these conceptual 
categories, I draw on three founders of discourse: Aristotle (the tragic), Immanuel Kant (the 
sublime), and Sigmund Freud (the uncanny). Although this choice is convenient—one major 
thinker per category—it is not arbitrary. In addition to sharing an affective common denominator 
(fear), each category lays claim to what Michel Foucault terms a founder of discourse or 
discursivity, which creates “the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts,” 
thereby establishing “an endless possibility of discourse” (1984, 114). That is to say, Aristotle’s 
Poetics, Kant’s Critique of Judgment, and Freud’s “The Uncanny,” initiate or, in Kant’s case, 
reconstitute their respective discourses of the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny. Other 
possible discourses in the field of negative aesthetics (e.g., the grotesque or the comic) cannot lay 
claim to such foundations, at least not in terms of conceptual development. Moreover, the 
problematic I am addressing concerns the aesthetics of politics, not the history of concepts, and 
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therefore does purport to make any claim on the history of ideas. For that reason, each chapter 
indulges in a certain hermeneutic license regarding the implicit rhetorico-political possibilities 
inhering in each quasi-aesthetic concept. In each of the following three chapters, I proceed 
inferentially, explicating the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny, respectively, in order to show 
how each of these negative aesthetic categories provides the rhetorical means—the distinctive 
yet complementary possibilities—through which the state may circumvent both beauty and the 
counter-productive effects of fear in the ongoing attempt to shore up and instaurate its political 
legitimacy. In so doing, I aim to demonstrate how the rhetoric of negative aesthetics fulfills the 
political promise of beauty, succeeding where beauty tragically fails, that is, in accomplishing a 
non-rational consensus—a lawless lawfulness, a beauty without beauty—mediated by negative 
pleasure and embodied in the political state.
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CHAPTER 2 – CLARIFYING THE CONSTITUTION: 
RHETORIC AND THE TRAGIC DIMENSION OF POLITICS 
 
 
And whether they purge the city for its benefit 
by putting some people to death or else by exiling them . . . 
so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expert 
knowledge and what is just, making it better than it was so 
far as they can, this is the constitution alone we must say is 
correct, under these conditions and in accordance with 
criteria of this sort. … – Plato 360 B.C.E. 
 
Although the villagers had forgotten the ritual and lost the 
original black box, they still remembered to use stones.      
– Shirley Jackson 1948 
 
When in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle refers to rhetoric as an art subordinate (hypo 
tauten) to political science, it would appear as though he is derogating the persuasive use of civic 
discourse, as he does in the Rhetoric when accusing it of dressing “itself up in the form of 
politics” (1.2.7).1 However, in light of his regard for the study of politics, the remark is more of a 
compliment than a disparagement: rhetoric is subordinate to political science (politikē) because it 
assists in achieving happiness for all the citizens of a city. Alongside generalship and household 
management, rhetoric, Aristotle tells us, is one of “the most honored capacities” (1999, 1094b3–
5). His attentiveness to rhetoric focuses on the role of persuasive speech in directing judgments 
affecting life-in-common. Thus, without dismissing Plato’s criticism that rhetoric can and often 
does function as “an image of a part of politics” (1987, 463d), Aristotle articulates and affirms 
rhetoric’s potential to subserve politics, either as an instrument of public policy, by securing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Greek words “hypo tauten” literally mean “under her” (“she” being political science).  
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common good, or as an expression of civic morality, by instructing citizens to virtue (Johnstone 
1980; Halliwell 1996; Hauser 1999; and Walzer 2000).  
So long as rhetoric plays a supporting role with respect to politics, allowing the latter to 
determine its own ends and then facilitating the realization of those ends, Aristotle is willing to 
consider it as “some offshoot [paraphues] of dialectic and ethical studies (which is rightly called 
politics)” (2007, 1.2.7). Referring to this passage, Arthur E. Walzer highlights how, for Aristotle, 
“The [offshoot] metaphor suggests that the character of rhetoric, as an instrument of essential 
civic institutions, is shaped and sustained by the constitution [politeia] and political tradition, as 
inextricable from them as branch is from stem and root” (2000, 43; see also Reeve 1996). Even 
so, to the extent that rhetoric is a political instrument it must simultaneously preserve the 
constitution that gives it its shape.2 Regarding the importance of preservation, Aristotle does not 
privilege a specific type of constitution but values preservation as a good in itself. On his view, 
the constitution is more than a body of principles and precedents according to which a city-state 
is governed; it amounts to the animating force of a city-state, an agency that determines “the way 
of life of the citizens” (1998, 1295a40-b1, 1328b1-2), as well as the governing body, or 
sovereign office (arkhē) (1278b8–10,1289a15–18). For that reason, he argues throughout 
Politics Book V that altering, or modifying, a community’s constitution would threaten to 
destabilize the community as a whole. Hence, while the benefits of public policy and civic 
morality are sufficient to account for Aristotle’s affirmation of rhetoric’s place in civic life, they 
are ancillary to what he sees as rhetoric’s chief political office, namely, preserving the 
constitution, whatever its form and irrespective of its conception of the ultimate end of the city-
state.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Walzer’s argument that Aristotle “called for a rhetoric under the direction of politics” is unassailable (2000, 51). I 
am only drawing attention to the obverse of Walzer’s interpretation, namely, that Aristotle’s offshoot metaphor also 
implies an active understanding of rhetoric vis-à-vis politics.     
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That rhetoric has a role to play in preserving the constitution is fairly evident in the 
Rhetoric, but what this task entails is less obvious. Presumably, it would involve advocating for 
public policy in line with the advantages of preservation—“for all people are persuaded by what 
is advantageous, and preserving the constitution is advantageous” (2007, 1.8. 1–2)—and edifying 
people “in a way that suits the constitution” (1998, 1310a19–20). Yet Aristotle suggests another 
possibility: that rhetoric’s preservative function is to be understood in relation to a constitution’s 
“characteristic forces of corruption,” to wit, those things or tendencies that are opposed to the 
political community’s organizing principle (2007, 1.4.12; emphasis in original). For Aristotle, 
then, the threat of corruption would constitute rhetoric’s most basic political exigence. Although 
(sound) public policy and civic morality can further the end of preservation, neither directly 
addresses the principal demand of preservation—combating forces of corruption. Scholars, 
particularly rhetoricians, have yet to approach Aristotelian rhetoric in a way that frames 
rhetoric’s relationship to politics apropos of the opposition between preservation and corruption. 
But apart from describing the usefulness of certain constitutional topics in deliberative rhetoric, 
the Rhetoric neither elaborates on how nor specifies the conditions under which rhetoric could 
competently respond to the danger of corruption. However, certain of his works other than the 
Rhetoric are suggestive in this regard.  
To begin with, the Politics’ wholesale recommendation of ostracism (1284b3-20) 
indicates that rhetoric could aid in preserving the constitution by facilitating the purgation of 
certain human contaminants—elements that because hostile to a political community’s way of 
life embody its corruptive forces. Nevertheless, civic purgation, or exile, is in itself no guarantor 
of long-term stability; indeed, as Sara Forsdyke has demonstrated at length, the Athenian 
institution of ostracism functioned pragmatically to, among other things, curb the unlimited and 
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violent practice of intra-elite politics of exile in pre-democratic Athens (2005, 149-65). As an 
outgrowth of this function, ostracism surpassed simply placing restrictions on the politics of exile 
to perform what Forsdyke identifies as the affirmative ritualistic function of sustaining political 
identity, or collective unity. In that capacity, ostracism served as a means of instaurating the 
socio-political order, of enacting the (political) community as such: “By collectively determining 
who was to be excluded from the community, the Athenians directly articulated the grounds for 
inclusion, and in doing so reestablished the basis for group membership” (159). In other words, if 
ostracism’s pragmatic effect was to remove unwanted members from the community, then the 
articulation of communal identity and cohesion worked rhetorically to clarify the bonds of 
political friendship (philia) and as a result of that to strengthen the constitution along its affective 
dimension. Part of Aristotle’s genius was to observe how civic purgation, or ostracism, could 
serve not only as a procedure of expulsion but also as an occasion for clarifying the appropriate 
forms of political association and attachment. Yet whereas friendship figures prominently in the 
Nicomachean Ethics and is featured in Book II of the Rhetoric as one of the emotions useful for 
facilitating judgment, clarification enjoys pride of place in the Poetics. Aristotle’s technical term 
for clarification is, of course, catharsis, and together with the pragmatic and symbolic effects of 
ostracism, it, too, indicates, how rhetoric may address itself to the lofty task of maintaining a 
political community’s constitutional integrity. Put another way, when employed in a civic 
context, the concept of clarification, or tragic catharsis, forms the basis for demystifying 
Aristotle’s implicit claim that rhetoric’s foremost political function consists in preserving the 
constitution against forces threatening political corruption. 
With these observations in mind, the present chapter proposes to consider how tragic 
clarification can function rhetorically to further the ends of legitimation. Hence, it goes beyond a 
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rereading of Aristotle’s political rhetoric to inquire into the politico-rhetorical capacity of tragic 
catharsis as such, that is, as conceived as a distinctive mode of negative aesthetics. Aristotle’s 
discourse is nevertheless pivotal, providing the initial framework or conceptual apparatus for 
conducting such an analysis. Thus, beginning with the Politics’ emphasis on preservation and its 
endorsement of ostracism, this chapter argues, first, that Aristotle’s theory of constitutions 
enables a rethinking of the tragic as a means of instaurating political legitimacy. To that end, it 
presents tragic catharsis as both the means and the effect of a non-representational rhetorical 
process, one that, by means of facilitating civic purgation, renews a community’s political 
identity and so strengthens its commitment to the task of preserving the constitution. Although 
the procedure of ostracism facilitates the instauration of community ethos, the process is tragic, I 
argue, not by virtue of its potential to effect a purifying purgation but on account of its capacity 
to clarify, and thereby affirm, the grounds for political inclusion (and exclusion).3  
At the same time, however, given the teleological status that Aristotle assigns to 
catharsis—i.e., catharsis as the end of tragic drama—ostracism discloses a basic truth about 
tragic clarification, namely, that catharsis is at once greater and less than tragic drama: less 
because it is a component of tragedy but greater because it is in a sense separable from the 
dramatic art, free to function in other contexts and able to subserve heteronomous purposes. 
Hence, my second argument, which builds on the first, is that the rhetoric of tragic catharsis not 
only identifies a tragic dimension of politics but also dissociates the tragic from the domain of 
tragedy proper, preserving its performative character while freeing it from the unique constraints 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ostracism, in other words, initiates the tragic process productive of catharsis but only insofar as it contributes to 
and is conditioned by the goal of preserving the constitution. And this, in turn, requires that it first subserve the 
instrumental aim of clarifying the (political) community as such; in itself purgation is not cathartic, regardless of any 
potentially purifying effect it may have on the body politic.  
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of poetic representation.4 Thus liberated, the tragic dimension of politics allows for the 
possibility of misclarification vis-à-vis a regime and its constitution. But unlike dramatic 
representation, which may either fail to clarify or clarify in the wrong way, political catharsis 
admits of a strategic use of misclarification, a parallel rhetorical process whereby the apparent 
clarification of one form of government displaces or dissimulates the one that is actually in 
power. As a rhetorical technique of misclarification, the tragic retains its preservative function, 
but with a twist: it now preserves the current regime, indirectly, by simulating the appearance or 
character of another.  
 
2.1 TRAGIC CATHARSIS: FROM POETIC TO POLITICAL CLARIFICATION 
Aristotle’s definition of tragic drama is remarkable if for no other reason than that it 
posits catharsis as the end, or final cause, of all good tragedies. According to the Poetics’ formal 
definition, tragedy is a representation (mimesis) of a complete action that by means of painful 
and disturbing emotions, especially those of pity (eleos) and fear or terror (phobos), 
accomplishes the catharsis of such emotions (1987a, 1449b25–27).5 Originating in the context of 
medicine or ritual, the term “katharsis” literally means the “cleansing,” “purification,” or 
“purgation” of what is “filthy” or “disgusting” (miaron) (Langholf 1990).6 For Aristotle, when 
the resources of poetic representation are employed to tragic effect, the result is the catharsis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The emancipation of “the tragic” thus differentiates my argument and the focus of this chapter from those recent 
attempts to articulate rhetoric either with tragedy (e.g., Burke 1973; Farrell 1993, 101 – 40; and Crick and Poulakos 
2008) or tragic catharsis (e.g., Walker 2000a; Kastely 2004; and Kenny 2006). 
5 Although Aristotle tends to single out pity and terror as the emotions most appropriate to tragedy, he suggests that 
tragedy stirs other painful and disturbing emotions. For instance, in the Poetics he includes anger (orgē) as one of 
the emotions to be aroused by the reasoning in tragedy (“pity, terror, anger and suchlike”; 1456b1); see also the 
Rhetoric (1.2.8) and Politics (1342a12), where he treats painful emotions as a class, implying that any such emotion 
is capable of aroused in such a way as to produce tragic catharsis. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he expands the list to 
include envy, hate, longing, and jealousy (1105b21).    
6 In discussing the deduction of the best change of fortune, Aristotle alludes to this antithesis, arguing that since 
tragedy “should represent terrifying and pitiable events…it should not show…decent men undergoing a change from 
good fortune to misfortune; for this is neither terrifying nor pitiable, but shocking [miaron]” (1987a, 1452b31–6). 
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painful and disturbing emotions, in particular the emotions of pity (eleos) and fear (phobos). To 
the extent that a given tragedy accomplishes this end it will induce feelings of satisfaction and 
enjoyment in the audience; like the practice of medicine, catharsis leads to pleasure by 
“operating” on the emotions. 
Linguistic origins notwithstanding, contemporary scholars are in general agreement that 
for Aristotle catharsis refers neither to a medical practice designating bodily purgation nor to a 
sense of spiritual purification, or ritual cleansing, but instead acts as a stand-in for a mimetic 
(representational) mode of emotional clarification: “The term catharsis,” argues Ekaterina V. 
Haskins, “can be translated only by a word indicating intellectual illumination rather than a 
release or purging of bottled up emotions” (2004, 52). She continues, “Rather than making us 
sob in pity or tremble with fear, tragedy is supposed to clarify why we should feel these 
emotions” (54). Moreover, as Martha C. Nussbaum argues—taking her cue from Leon Golden’s 
trilogy of essays (1962; 1969; and 1973)—“When we examine the whole range of use and the 
development [of catharsis and related words]…it becomes quite evident that the primary, 
ongoing, central meaning is roughly one of ‘clearing up’ or ‘clarification,’ i.e. of the removal of 
some obstacle (dirt, or blot, or obscurity, or admixture) that makes the item in question less clear 
than it is in its proper state” (2001, 389).7 But whatever the provenance of catharsis, according to 
Aristotle the desired outcome of cathartic learning is to effect a “due proportion” in the emotions 
(1987b, 3), such that audiences come to experience them correctly, namely, “at the right times, 
about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right ways” (1999, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Although Nussbaum and Haskins have recently helped to popularize the “clarification” thesis (vis-à-vis 
“purgation” and “purification”), the interpretation is itself not new. Indeed, in the mid-twentieth century Ernst 
Cassirer (1944) and Erich Fromm (1956) had already assumed “clarification” as the most appropriate translation.  
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1106b22–23).8 Setting aside the issue of the extent to which catharsis is emotional (see Haskins 
2004, 53-4), and of how intelligent emotions are or may be in themselves, what is clear is that for 
Aristotle the pleasure deriving from tragic illumination is one of learning, of moving from a 
particular instance to a universal awareness or inference about certain powerful emotions and 
their importance to inner experience and everyday life. Nussbaum captures this idea when she 
writes, “We could say, then, that . . . pity and fear are not just tools of a clarification that is in and 
of the intellect alone; to respond in these ways is itself valuable, and a piece of clarification 
concerning who we are. It is a recognition of practical values, and therefore of ourselves, that is 
no less important than the recognition and perceptions of intellect. Pity and fear are themselves 
elements in an appropriate practical perception of our situation” (2001, 390-91). By clarifying 
such painful emotions, catharsis affords insight—intellectual, emotional, and practical—into 
pitiable persons, along with their situations, and the terrifying forces and circumstances with 
which they contend or within which they are caught.9  
 Despite the close association of catharsis with tragic drama, Aristotle’s inclusion of 
catharsis in the Politics (see 1341a23, 1341b38–42a28) suggests another avenue for approaching 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Despite the growing consensus among scholars to translate Aristotle’s use of catharsis as clarification, some 
commentators continue to interpret catharsis in terms of a purgative-therapeutic function. As Richard Kearney 
argues, catharsis, according to Aristotle, “literally purges two of our most basic affects—pathos and eleos—until 
they are distilled and sublimated into a healing brew. It might almost be compared,” he continues, “to a homeopathic 
remedy which finds the vaccination or antidote within the disease, turning malady into health” (2007, 52). Certainly, 
he is not alone in this interpretation, and not only with respect to the educated non-specialist. In the Birth of 
Tragedy, for instance, Nietzsche argues that in order to comprehend the supreme value of tragedy, we must 
experience it—like the Greeks did—as “the essence of all prophylactic healing energies” (99). Simultaneously, 
however, he criticized Aristotle for misinterpreting this preventive function—which was also a stimulating power—
in terms of a pathological-moral process deriving from extra-aesthetic spheres of experience (105–106). My opting 
for “clarification” rather than “purgation” or “purification” is not because I necessarily think that “clarification” is 
the “right” translation—that Nussbaum is correct and Nietzsche is wrong—but because “clarification” better serves 
rhetoric in promoting the end of preservation. In other words, my decision is based first and foremost on interpretive 
utility rather than philological fidelity.    
9 In the extant fragments of the Tractatus Coislinianus, Aristotle claims that comedy too accomplishes catharsis; but 
rather than working on such negative emotions as pity and fear, comedy accomplishes the catharsis of laughter 
(1987b, 3.1, 4). While it may seem strange to a modern audience to consider laughter as an emotion, both Aristotle 
and Plato were prone to equate the physical effects of an emotion with that emotion. Compare the Poetics (1453b5), 
where Aristotle talks of tragedians making audiences “shudder and feel pity” instead of merely feeling it.  
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the civic role of catharsis. As Kenneth Burke maintains, “Those paragraphs in the Politics at 
least give reason to infer that the treatment [of catharsis] in the Poetics was not essentially 
different [than its treatment in the Politics].” Such an inference, he adds, would itself warrant a 
move to reconsider tragic catharsis from a political point of view, to reframe catharsis in terms of 
its civic motives (1959, 337).10 In allowing for this reconsideration, however, we would do well 
to bear in mind the following caveat from David J. Depew that, “[One] cannot project the 
catharsis of the Politics onto the theory of tragedy in the Poetics and then read the latter back 
into the Politics, as has commonly been done” (1991, 369), because, “The catharsis of the 
Politics is a psychological effect paradigmatically seen in people who throw themselves into the 
frenzy of Dionysian music” (368). Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to draw inferences 
between these two works with a view to analyzing the potential of catharsis—understood as a 
multivalent mode of clarification, in contrast to the effects of orgiastic revelry—to affirm the 
political community as such. To be sure, Burke perhaps concludes too much by arguing that 
Aristotle’s consideration of catharsis does not admit of radical difference, that his treatment of 
catharsis in the Politics parallels what we find in the Poetics. But this overstatement does not 
invalidate, nor does it undermine, Burke’s prompting to reconsider tragic catharsis from the 
perspective of the Politics or, what amounts to the same thing, to examine the Politics in light of 
Aristotle’s understanding of tragic catharsis. To deny clarification a claim to political 
involvement, based merely on a semantic disjunction in Aristotle’s use of the word “catharsis,” 
would also be to conclude too much. With these considerations in mind, I turn to Aristotle’s 
Politics to demonstrate that his normative theory of preservation, read in light of his endorsement 
of ostracism, provides the basis for conceiving of a political, non-representational perspective on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Presumably, the paragraphs Burke has in mind are those sections in the Politics that focus on the educative role of 
mousikē (1341a23, 1341b38–42a28).  
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catharsis, according to which ostracism, by means of effecting a purifying purgation of the body 
politic, accomplishes the clarification of the political community as such. In other words, rather 
than dismissing outright the possible political valence of poetic catharsis, I propose extending 
this concept to the domain of politics, as explicated in the Politics, in order to examine whether 
and how political activity may avail itself of cathartic clarification.  
 
2.2 ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONS:  
HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, AND THE AXIOM OF PRESERVATION 
Over against the Nicomachean Ethics’ emphasis on happiness (i.e. activity of the human 
soul in accord with excellence over a full life), the Politics prioritizes the constitution (politeia), 
or the immanent organizing principle, of the city-state. As the telos, or final cause, of a political 
association, the constitution establishes both the basis of political rule and the form of the 
(political) community (1274b32-41, 1276b1–11). In order to classify the range of city-states, in 
Politics Book III Aristotle distinguishes between correct and deviant constitutions, using as a 
basis for their separation the degree to which a constitution looks to the common advantage 
(1278b10).11 On this view, the correctness of a constitution consists in its aiming at the common 
benefit, deviance in the use of public office for private advantage (1279a26–31).12 But regardless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In the Rhetoric Aristotle follows Plato’s division in the Republic (544c), enumerating democracy, oligarchy, 
aristocracy, and monarchy (1.8.3), while in the Politics he keeps closer to the traditional Greek view, conceding 
initially that a constitution can be governed by “the one, the few, or the many” (1279a28). He then revises this view 
by adding that each form of rule admits of two types, one of which is correct, the other deviant. The correct form of 
rule by one person is a monarchy or kingship; its deviant form is a tyranny. Rule by the few is an aristocracy if 
correct, an oligarchy if deviant. And rule by the many is correct when it is a polity but deviant when a democracy 
(1998, 1279a33–79b8). Nevertheless, the discrepancy of the exact number of constitutions is less important than the 
qualitative differences between them. 
12 Just what exactly Aristotle means by the common benefit is not altogether clear, though I tentatively accept 
C.D.C. Reeve’s interpretation that the group whose benefit is the common one is composed of all those “who have 
an unqualifiedly just claim to be unqualified citizens of the constitution,” including all their wives and children 
(1998, lxviii). For differing interpretations of how Aristotle understands common advantage, see also Fred Miller 
(1995) and Richard Kraut (2002). 
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of the correct/deviant typology for Aristotle the principal difference between any two 
constitutions is their disagreement over the essence of happiness (eudaimonia), over that in 
which happiness precisely consists. While acknowledging that all city-states aim for happiness as 
the highest good, Aristotle nevertheless maintains that each constitution conceives of happiness 
differently as comprising different means: “it is by seeking happiness in different ways and by 
different means that individual groups of people create different ways of life and different 
constitutions” (1998, 1328a41–28b2). Different political communities, then, by variously 
seeking happiness, will come to adopt different aims or goals, and the notion of living and doing 
well will vary from one constitution to the next.13 Hence, just as Aristotle considers constitutions 
to be irreducible to a common form, so too he sees happiness as marked by variety, 
encompassing “the complete activation of the virtues” (1998, 1332a8–9), in the case of the best 
forms of government (i.e. monarchies and aristocracies), as well as the range of less exceptional 
or qualifiedly good types of happiness that characterize inferior types of regimes (see for 
instance.14  
Owing to these different conceptions of happiness, Aristotle argues that constitutions are 
similarly diverse with respect to political justice (dikaiosunē). For whereas all constitutions agree 
that justice consists in the distribution of equal political goods (citizenship, political office, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Aristotle implies such variance in living well when, in the Politics, he writes that a constitution is “what the end is 
of each of the communities” (1289a14-17). 
14 For the best constitutions—that is, either monarchies or aristocracies (1289a26–32)—happiness is unqualifiedly 
good and blessed (1324a23–25). Because they constitute “a complete activation of the virtues” (1332a8–9), their 
happiness is choiceworthy in itself and self-sufficient (1999, 1097a30–34, 1097a8–9). The goal of a polity, the 
second best kind of constitution, is a similar sort of happiness, though it is more modest and hence more realizable 
for most people and most city-states (1998, 1295a25–40). Oligarchical happiness is mere life, as opposed to living 
well, that is, in accordance with the virtues; oligarchies achieve their goal by pursuing wealth or property (1280a25-
32). Not much better is the goal of democracy, since it also conceives of happiness as consisting in life rather than 
living well (1280a31-32); it differs from oligarchy only slightly in that, instead of wealth or property, it places a 
premium on freedom as such as well as the freedom to satisfy non-rational appetites (1310a29, 1317a40-41, 1258a3-
4; 1999, 1095b14-17). Though Aristotle regards tyranny as a deviant form of monarchy, he describes it as a mixture 
of extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy (1998, 1310b2-7). For that reason, tyrannies achieve their goal in the 
unbridled pursuit of wealth, property, and physical gratification. 
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arkhaï, authority, etc.) to equal people—“equal shares for equal people” (1999, 1131a30–31; see 
also 2007, 1.9.7)—and are united with regard to what constitutes equality in things, e.g. one seat 
in the assembly is equal to any other, they disagree about what counts as equality between 
persons (1998,1280a16–19). Equality, so the thinking goes, must accord with worth; however, 
since the basis of an individual’s political worth is determined by the degree to which that person 
contributes to the happiness for all, and so helps to further the constitution, this basis will be 
different from one political community to the next: “For all agree that the just in distributions 
must accord with some sort of worth, but what they call worth is not the same; supporters of 
democracy say it is free citizenship, some supporters of oligarchy say it is wealth, others good 
birth, while supporters of aristocracy say it is virtue” (1999, 1131a25–29; see also 1998, 
1283a24-26). Notwithstanding certain qualitative differences between city-states and their 
regimes, Aristotle concedes that most (perhaps all) actually existing constitutions are in a simple, 
unqualified sense, in error, that is, incapable of ever correctly distributing political power (1998, 
1301a36–37). But rather than conclude from this that most constitutions are corrupt, Aristotle 
provocatively claims, “[All] dispute somewhat justly” (1283a30; see also 1999, 1134a24-30). 
The same holds true as concerns happiness: few, if any, city-states are completely happy; 
nonetheless, they still enjoy their own paradigms of happiness which give them unity and 
definition.  
Thus, given that non-ideal constitutions may be adequate to their own conceptions of the 
end of the city-state, Aristotle cautions against attempts at constitutional reform, stating that the 
task for legislators and statesmen is to preserve the current state of the political community—
both its form of government and partial political justice—so as to ensure the accomplishment of 
the aims specific to the constitution. Arguing by analogy to physiognomic beauty, Aristotle 
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reasons that just as a hooked or snub nose may deviate from what is best (a straight nose) and 
remain beautiful to look at, so too a constitution may deviate from what is best, yet remain happy 
and just, although not without qualification (1998, 1309b23–30). In support of this relativistic 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of constitutions, Arlene W. Saxonhouse argues, “The greatest 
task for the Aristotelian statesman for whom the Politics is written is not really the establishment 
of a just regime which can combine public and private virtues….The task for the statesman is 
rather how to preserve the current regime” and its constitution (2004, 43).15 And this requires, 
above all else, promoting the community’s paradigm of justice—that which accords with the 
community’s conception of happiness—by means of various legal enactments, educational 
policies, and any number of institutionalized practices. For Aristotle, the final end of non-ideal 
constitutions is not to someday reach the goals set out by monarchies and aristocracies, nor 
should it be the desire of their political leaders or citizens. Rather, what happiness entails and 
justice implies is nothing but the long-term, stable realization of the final end of a particular city-
state, and this means preserving the constitution as it currently exists. As Saxonhouse claims, for 
Aristotle, “Preserving a regime becomes the path to justice, its corruption to injustice” (44). 
Indeed, he regards preservation as advantageous to any constitution, whether correct or deviant, 
simply because it coincides with a community’s principle of political justice. That is why in the 
Politics Aristotle recommends that democratic and oligarchic legislators “should consider a 
measure to be democratic or oligarchic not if it will make the city-state be as democratically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Although Saxonhouse correctly asserts that the opposition that Aristotle establishes is not virtue versus corruption 
but corruption versus preservation, it should be emphasized that in the case of aristocracies political justice coincides 
with the rule of the aristoï, i.e. the best or most virtuous persons. Accordingly, for aristocracies the opposition 
between corruption and preservation is at once an opposition between virtue and corruption. However, regardless of 
the form of government, political justice is capable of serving as a potential if not always effective means of 
preserving the constitution. For a contrasting, less relativistic interpretation of Aristotle’s emphasis on stability, see 
Martha C. Nussbaum, who argues, “We should notice…that Aristotle’s interest in stability in political life is 
tempered by his concern for other social values, such as the autonomy of individual choice and civic vitality” (2001, 
352). While Nussbaum is not incorrect in her observation, her reading is perhaps biased toward Aristotle’s 
idealization of aristocracy.    
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governed or as oligarchically governed as possible, but if it will make it be so for the longest 
time” (1320a1–4; my emphasis). Thus, what is of primary concern to Aristotle is stability, not 
that those in power be motivated by civic virtue to act on behalf of the common benefit nor that 
they cultivate such virtue among citizens. Consequently, for him the corruption of the political 
community is a change in form—a change in or deviation from the constitution—not a betrayal 
of the common good. Or rather, since genuine public interest is equivalent to the preservation of 
the political status quo, corruption consists in a city-state’s transformation from one form of 
government to another, whether from a democracy to a tyranny or an oligarchy to a democracy. 
“That is why,” Aristotle reasons, “legislators and statesmen should not be ignorant about which 
democratic features preserve a democracy and which destroy it, or which oligarchic features 
have these effects on an oligarchy” (1309b35–38). Given the virtual impossibility of ever 
correctly distributing political power, and of ever appeasing everyone’s demands, the type of 
constitution being preserved is irrelevant. For Aristotle, stability is (or ought to be) the primary 
political concern for all city-states; any change to a political community’s organizing principle, 
whether to a “better” or “worse” regime or laterally to a different partial ideal of political justice, 
is corruption. 
Favoring the importance of preservation over against transformation or reform commits 
Aristotle to approving of certain measures advantageous both to strengthening the public’s 
commitment to the ideals of the constitution and safeguarding against what Aristotle in the 
Rhetoric identifies as a constitution’s characteristic forces of corruption. As J. Peter Euben 
comments, for the ancients—Aristotle in particular—political corruption names a disease of the 
body politic: “It has less to do with individual malfeasance than with systematic and systemic 
degeneration of those practices and commitments that provide the terms of collective self-
	   56	  
understanding and shared purpose” (1989, 222–3). But, he adds, “Corruption is not only the 
absence of an element or principle; it may involve the presence of some foreign element that 
debases or undermines the whole” (222). That is to say, for Aristotle conditions conducive to 
political corruption include not only forces inimical to the constitution but also the instantiation 
of these forces in exceedingly powerful persons or associations, whether because of wealth, 
social capital, or any other source of political power (1998, 1284a17-21, 1284b25–33; see also 
2007, 1.4.12). Any type of political superiority, if of a certain magnitude, threatens to disturb the 
stable, long-term achievement of the final end of the community. To disregard increases in 
political leverage or authority incommensurate with the ideals specific to the city-state is to run 
the risk of fostering a nascent political faction which could prove too powerful for the city-state 
and its governing class (1998, 1302b14-16). A likely result of this negligence would be if not the 
total disintegration of the constitution then at least a change in the organizing principle of 
government itself. Aristotle opposes this kind of change on aesthetic grounds as much as on 
political ones: “For no painter,” argues Aristotle, “would allow an animal to have a 
disproportionately large foot, not even if it were an outstandingly beautiful one, nor would a 
shipbuilder allow this in the case of the stern or any of the other parts of the ship, nor will a 
chorus master tolerate a member of the chorus who has a louder and more beautiful voice than 
the entire chorus” (1284b7-12).  
In the interest of maintaining a state of “due proportion,” Aristotle therefore endorses 
wholesale the practice of ostracism.16 Although predominantly an Athenian institution for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In fourth-century Athens, ostracisms were held once a year at a fixed date (the sixth division of the ten month 
political calendar). As Forsdyke reports, “The first step in any ostracism was that the question was put to the 
assembly of the Athenians as to whether they wished to hold one.…If the Athenians decided to hold an ostracism, 
then the actual ostracism took place a short time afterward” (2005, 147–8). In contrast to the violent, pre-democratic 
expulsions among elites, a person exiled by a vote of ostracism was assured that he could return to Athens after ten 
years (the term of exile) with his property intact and citizenship rights restored. For more on the procedure of 
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removing exceedingly “outstanding” citizens from the city-state, ostracism, he claims, could 
prove expedient for all types of constitution, the deviant as well as the correct (1998, 1284b3–
20). According to Forsdyke, “What is important for Aristotle is whether these expulsions are 
done in the interest of the community as a whole” (2005, 275–6; see Aristotle 1998, 1284b21–
22), i.e. whether the purgation of a city-state’s human contaminants is advantageous to stability 
over the long-range. For a city-state like Athens, in which equality is defined democratically in 
terms of the freedom of the dēmos, i.e., “the people,” it is necessary to remove those who are 
outstanding in any form of political strength, especially with respect to wealth and property. For 
fourth century writers in particular, ostracism was almost solely regarded as a means not of 
punishment for wrongdoing but of restoring democratic equality and of recommitting the citizen-
body to its political justice. In the case of Themistocles (exiled 472/471 BCE), ancient literary 
sources interpret his ostracism as a judicious response to his having accrued excessive power. 
Plutarch, for instance, writes, “Well then, [the voters] visited him with ostracism, curtailing his 
dignity and pre-eminence, as they were wont to do in the case of all whom they thought to have 
oppressive power, and to be incommensurate with true democratic equality” (1914, 22.3). 
Making use of Themistocles’ ostracism to rebuke his contemporaries for their civic apathy, 
Demosthenes declaims, “Yet consider how our ancestors castigated those who had done them 
wrong, and ask whether their way was not better than yours. When they caught Themistocles 
presumptuously setting himself above the people, they banished him from Athens, and found 
him guilty of siding with the Medes” (1935, 23.204–5).17 Even though Aristotle does not 
explicitly link his endorsement of ostracism back to the Poetics, it is reasonable to assume that, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ostracism in democratic Athens, see Josiah Ober (1989, 73–5), Mabel Lang (1990, 1–2), and Forsdyke (2005, 146–
9).  
17 Confirming these interpretations, Frank J. Frost states, “So far as we can interpret Themistocles’ actions, he never 
once promoted any policy that would have given the Demos greater power” (1980, 29); see also Lang (1990, 142– 
61) and Forsdyke (2005, 176–7).   
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much like Plutarch and Demosthenes, he considers ostracism to be beneficial to the end of 
political community—expedient to preservation, in his nomenclature—by virtue of its capacity 
to clarify the ideals specific to the constitution.  
If Aristotle’s emphasis on political stability makes possible something like a theory of 
ostracism, it is this: by pragmatically removing certain deleterious persons (human obstacles) 
from the city-state and so symbolically purifying the body politic, ostracism functions 
ritualistically to occasion an affective, clarifying affirmation of the political community as such. 
In poetic-aesthetic terms, the achievement of due proportion vis-à-vis the emotions 
simultaneously parallels and is partly constitutive of a state of political of harmony, i.e., of due 
proportion vis-à-vis the city-state or polis. That is to say, in helping to maintain a community’s 
due proportion, civic purgation provides for the educative end of cathartic learning in a political 
context, namely, to clarify both the organizing principle of the community as well as the 
emotional response necessary to preserving the constitution in its existing state. To the extent 
that catharsis is made to serve an expressly political function, it simultaneously, albeit indirectly, 
subserves the appearance of beauty in politics—the main species of which, according to 
Aristotle, are “orderly arrangement, proportion, and definiteness [or clarity]” (1935, XIII.iii.10– 
12).  For these reasons, ostracism makes possible a distinctively political species of catharsis, 
one that works rhetorically to renew the political identity of a given community and to strengthen 
the citizenry’s identification with the current apparatus of government. In turn, however, these 
politically cathartic effects make possible another kind of rhetorical process: the mīmēsis of the 
appearance or character of a particular type of constitution, an imitation that may take effect 
either in the presence or absence of a regime corresponding to the public identity of the city-
state, along with its putative principle of justice. 
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2.3 THE RHETORIC OF OSTRACISM: ENACTING THE TRAGIC DIMENSION 
Although the practice of ostracism is in some measure itself rhetorical—functioning 
cathartically to strengthen commitment to the constitution—Aristotle’s Politics, when read 
alongside the Rhetoric, admits of a quasi-counterfactual model of ostracism according to which 
rhetoric both facilitates civic purgation and, of equal importance, secures the clarifying effects of 
ostracism vis-à-vis the constitution.18 In the opening sections of the Rhetoric, Aristotle assigns to 
rhetoric the function of upholding the true and the just, of persuading an audience to make 
judgments consistent with these values (1.1.12). But as he emphasizes in the Politics, audiences 
do not judge in vacuo but as citizens belonging to a particular constitution (1297b36-1298a3). 
Hence, when members of a political community address or are addressed by their compatriots on 
matters pertaining to the city-state, they do so—or, on Aristotle’s view, ought to do so—in their 
capacity as citizens, that is, with a view to furthering the final end of the constitution. According 
to Aristotle, rhetoric is a political art only insofar as it contributes to achieving the long-range 
goals of the current constitution or regime. For him, this qualification determines the sole duty of 
deliberative rhetoric: exhortation (protreptic) or dissuasion (apotreptic) in line with what is either 
advantageous or harmful to a given constitution. As he writes in the Rhetoric, “[A deliberative 
speaker] should not forget the ‘end’ of each constitution; for choices are based on the ‘end.’ The 
‘end’ of democracy is freedom, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things related to education 
and the traditions of law, of tyranny self-preservation. Clearly, then, one should distinguish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The model is quasi-counterfactual because, on the one hand, the Athenian procedure of ostracism did not allow 
for a formal debate in the assembly on the question of ostracism, but, on the other hand, there was informal debate 
about who should be ostracized. As Forsdyke argues, “We may imagine that this informal debate among citizens 
took place not only in the theater, but in private (domestic) and public settings (agora) throughout Attica” (2005, 
162). For discussions on the informal transfer of information among the Greek city-state, see Virginia J. Hunter 
(1994) and Sian Lewis (1996).  
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among customs and legal usages and benefits on the basis of the ‘end’ of each, since choices are 
made in reference to this” (1.8.5).  
Ostracism, conceived as a means of redressing an imbalance in the political community, 
and thereby of subserving political justice, would thus fall under Aristotle’s rubric of political 
topics for deliberative rhetoric, specifically, the subject of legislation (2007, 1.4–8) or forms of 
constitution ([Aristotle] 2011, 1423a23). On the importance of this subject, he states, “[It] is 
necessary [for the speaker] to know how many forms of constitution there are and what is 
conducive to each and by what each is naturally prone to be corrupted, both forces characteristic 
of that constitution and those that are opposed to it. By characteristic forces of corruption I mean 
that except for the best constitutions, all the others are destroyed by loosening or tightening [their 
basic principles of governance]” (2007, 1.4.12; see also 1998, 1290a22–29 and 1301b15–20). In 
the event that the superiority of an outstanding citizen is such that either it constitutes a force in 
opposition to the constitution or threatens to corrupt the city-state by loosening its specific ideals, 
citizens are obliged—not by written law but in the interest of preservation—to persuade one 
another, first, to vote in favor of holding an ostracism and, following that, to vote to ostracize 
that citizen whose superiority puts him so at odds with the collective unity and the 
accomplishment of long-term stability.19 Despite the fact that Aristotle does not explicitly relate 
rhetoric to the practice of ostracism, if ostracism is or could be beneficial to preserving the 
constitution, then rhetoric qua political art is perforce implicated in the business of civic 
purgation—ostracism being preceded and in part effected by persuasive speaking. Moreover, by 
helping to remove persons obstructing the community telos, exhortations designed to ostracize 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ostracism in this account would not appear to be effective in countering a force of corruption that threatened to 
“tighten” a constitution’s basic principles of governance. Ostracism is only suitable as a means of preventing a 
constitution from becoming something other than what it is. For instance, it could conceivably help to prevent a 
democracy from becoming a tyranny, but it would be useless in trying to prevent a democracy from becoming too 
democratic. 
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result in the catharsis of the community’s organizing principle, articulating the grounds for exile 
while simultaneously clarifying the collective unity. In this capacity, rhetoric functions as 
something of a rallying cry for the constitution and its form of government, motivating the 
citizenry to preserve the city-state and winning them over to the cause of maintaining the 
political status quo.  
In view of this preservative function, exhortation throws into relief an implicit political 
function of accusation (katēgoria). For whereas exhortation on the whole may frequently make 
use of the rhetoric of accusation, when the aim of exhortation is to bring about a civic purgation, 
accusation will be indispensable to rhetorical effectivity. Not to put too fine a point on it, in the 
absence of accusation, ostracizing exhortations would be unintelligible, or even absurd. To be 
successful, not to say comprehensible, appeals to civic purgation must presuppose not only an 
obstacle to preservation but also the establishment of that obstacle’s magnitude and facticity.20 
Since accusation is therefore necessary to the rhetoric of political catharsis, it, too, will have a 
share both in clarifying the political community and in bringing to the fore the gravity of 
combating forces of corruption. Although this implicit function disturbs Aristotle’s division of 
the deliberative and judicial genres, it simultaneously grants to one of the ends of judicial 
rhetoric (accusation) a political purpose otherwise unavailable. At the same time, it liberates 
accusation from generic constraint having to establish wrongdoing, which Aristotle defines as 
“doing harm willingly in contravention of the law,” written or unwritten (2007, 1.10.3). Insofar 
as ostracism furthers preservation, it is not a penalty for wrongdoing, much less a corrective to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Although Halford Ross Ryan is correct to treat accusation and apology (apologia) as a speech set, arguing that 
“the critic cannot have a complete understanding of accusation or apology without treating them both,” in the 
context of ostracism, in which accusation is not generic but a dimension of exhortation, apology does not afford the 
critic (or historian or theorist) much insight into “the accuser’s motivation to accuse, his [sic] selection of the 
issues,” etc. (1982, 254). On the related topic of the punitive dimension of public apologetic speech, see Adam 
Ellwanger, who argues that public apologies often serve “as ritualistic public punishment and humiliation” (2012, 
309).    
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vice or an incentive to virtue. Rather, it is a mechanism for stabilizing the city-state and for 
articulating and affirming the socio-political order.  
Given that the procedure of ostracism did not provide for formal accusation and defense, 
there are no known examples from the ancient world that would illustrate the relationship 
between ostracism and the rhetoric of accusation. However, the literary exercise Against 
Alcibiades, at one time attributed to Andocides, offers a hypothetical example that demonstrates 
how the rhetoric of accusation could inflect ostracizing exhortations and so help to accomplish 
the end of political catharsis.21 Written in the form of a judicial speech that urges the Athenian 
Assembly to ostracize Alcibiades, the text attempts to establish certain facts of Alcibiades’ 
private and public life to highlight how they are out of keeping with the community’s principle 
of democratic equality. Reproving the (imaginary) audience, in a tone similar to that of 
Demosthenes, the text decries both Alcibiades and the audience: “I am astonished . . . at those 
who are persuaded that Alcibiades is a lover of democracy, that form of government which more 
than any other would seem to make equality its end (13)…. [He] shows the democracy to be 
nothing better than a sham, by talking like a champion of the people and acting like a tyrant, 
since he has found out that while the word ‘tyranny’ fills you with concerns, the thing for which 
it stands leaves you undisturbed” (27). Alcibiades, according to this account, obstructs the 
political community but only insofar as the citizens are unwilling to defend the interests of the 
city-state as such, that is, to support the constitution: “Men of sense should beware of those of 
their fellows who grow too great, remembering that it is such as they who set up tyrannies” (24), 
who show themselves “superior to the community” (29). Only after thus accusing Alcibiades and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Today, Andocides’ authorship is generally regarded as spurious, but even in antiquity the authorship was 
questioned. As Douglas M. MacDowell states, “The best conclusion is that Andocides is not the author, and that the 
piece was written in later times as a literary exercise by someone trying to imagine what a speech at an Athenian 
ostracism might have been like” (1998, 160).  
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appealing to the audience’s sense of civic duty does the text enjoin the Assembly to vote in favor 
ostracizing Alcibiades, though at this point the case made against “the accused” is such that it 
almost renders explicit exhortation superfluous, or, in Aristotle’s language, enthymematic. To be 
sure, although ostracism did not allow for formal debate, either in the Assembly or the courts, we 
may imagine that in other public settings, the agora in particular, appeals designed to ostracize 
would include, as a rhetorical precondition, accusations regarding the quality and extent of a 
citizen’s nonconformity vis-à-vis the current constitution, whatever its type may be.  
In addition to the rhetorical categories of exhortation and accusation, ostracism occasions 
and is conditioned by the clarification of the emotional bonds of political philia. As we have seen 
with respect to ostracism’s affirmation of the constitution, civic purgation is not the end of 
political catharsis but the means both of clarifying the community’s political identity and of 
unifying its citizens around the task of preservation. And this, it will be observed, requires 
inculcating via the emotions a sense of civic responsibility. By persuading one another to 
ostracize a compatriot, citizens clarify both the end of the political community and the nature of 
that which characteristically threatens its stability, i.e. its characteristic forces of corruption. In so 
doing, they supply others with emotive inducements to safeguard the city-state against those 
outstanding persons whose superiority represents a threat to the collective unity, thereby 
clarifying the emotions constituent of civic engagement and hence of political philia. Although 
in the Rhetoric Aristotle maintains that the primary function of emotional appeals is to affect an 
audience’s dispositions so as to make them favorable to the judgment sought (1.2.5), his 
subordination of rhetoric to political science implies another purpose of appealing to an 
audience’s emotions: the clarification of emotional propriety, of which emotional responses are 
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politically appropriate given the constitution and the particular circumstances.22 Intellectually, 
these two functions are compatible; in practice they are virtually coterminous. For in making it 
clear why someone or something should be, say, feared, speakers simultaneously employ fear as 
a means of bringing about the desired judgment. In this way, they give political presence to the 
emotions, conditioning the non-rational appetites in view of their potential to instaurate the 
constitution at an attitudinal level.23 Citizens engaging in the rhetoric of ostracism therefore 
arouse emotions to the effect that their arousal not only facilitates the desired judgment but also 
makes their fellow citizens feel fear or anger or indignation, as Aristotle admonishes, at the right 
times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way 
(1999, 1106b22-23), thus providing for the collective catharsis of that emotion as well as for its 
articulation with the aim of preservation. Emotional catharsis, in other words, enhances the 
catharsis of constitutions—provided that it inspires commitment to the city-state (to its political 
justice and the current regime)—while fostering political philia, viz., the mode of being-together 
qua citizens that the political community affords. 
Despite the potential of all emotions to strengthen a citizenry’s commitment to the 
constitution, the emotions most expedient to this end are those that Aristotle associates with the 
end of tragic catharsis, namely, pity and fear. For this reason, Aristotle’s conception of tragic 
catharsis complements the Politics’ axiom of preservation, rounding off what I have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This interpretation resonates with arguments made by W. W. Fortenbaugh (2002) and Nussbaum (2001, 383) 
concerning Aristotle’s understanding of emotions and emotional appeals. For them, on Aristotle’s view, emotions 
are not divorced from cognition but grounded in rational beliefs about the world. Accordingly, they can be altered 
(e.g., clarified vis-à-vis the advantageous) through reasoned argumentation.  
23 This is crucial for Aristotle and for understanding his overall conception of rhetoric and the limitations of logos. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics’ transition to politics, Aristotle contends that arguments alone are inadequate to making 
most people virtuous and utterly ineffectual with regard to those who “live by their feelings”: “What argument, then, 
could reform people like these? For it is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed 
as a result of one’s habits.” Consequently, he proposes employing other means of moral education, the use of fear in 
particular, arguing that, “For the many naturally obey fear, not shame; they avoid what is base because of the 
penalties, not because it is disgraceful” (1179b11–17).   
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describing, and what we may now designate, as a rhetorical perspective on political catharsis, 
that is to say, the political tragic. According to this perspective, the tragic is not the effect of 
dramatic representation but of a rhetorical process that by means of clarifying the tragic emotions 
instaurates the city-state and its governing regime. (As we have seen, among the available means 
of tragic catharsis, civic purgation is perhaps one of if not the most expedient.) Consequently, 
rhetoric discloses the autonomy of the tragic—conceived as a functional category of negative 
aesthetics and in contradistinction from tragedy proper. Through ostracism, rhetoric activates the 
tragic as a dimension of politics, articulating pity and fear with a mode of intersubjectivity 
appropriate to the constitution and the existing state.   
Notwithstanding that pity appears prima facie at odds with exhortations to ostracism, the 
arousal of pity is uniquely suited to inspire a sense of protectiveness, to motivate those affected 
to dedicate themselves to the task of safeguarding someone or something from injury. On this 
account, ostracizing exhortations would almost necessarily involve the appeal to pity vis-à-vis 
the constitution. As Aristotle defines it, pity is “a certain pain at an apparently destructive or 
painful event happening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might expect himself 
or one of his own to suffer, and this when it seems close at hand” (2007, 2.8.2). Thus, in making 
a case for ostracism, citizens elicit pity for the constitution as a living thing undeserving of harm. 
But this immediately raises a problem, since for Aristotle pity is antithetical to fear or terror, by 
which he means “a sort of pain and agitation derived from the imagination of a future destructive 
or painful evil” (2.5.1). Accordingly, the closer a person’s connection to someone who is 
threatened by unwarranted harm, the more that person’s pity is overcome by dread: “in that 
case,” Aristotle states, “they feel for them as they feel about their own future suffering.” 
Moreover, “the dreadful is something different from the pitiable and [in the case of opposing 
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sides] capable of expelling pity and often useful to the opponent” (2.8.12). This is so, he argues, 
because, “[Things] are fearful that are pitiable when they happen or are going to happen to 
others,” but vice versa when pitiable things happen either to us or to those with whom we feel 
consubstantial (2.5.12). However, given that Aristotle assigns to tragedy the function of 
resolving the antithesis between the “movements” toward (pity) and away from (fear), there is no 
reason to reject the possibility—implicit in the Poetics—that a similar resolution would obtain in 
the realm of civic discourse. As John T. Kirby affirms, “There is [in Aristotle] a poetics of 
rhetoric…as well as a rhetoric of poetics” (1991, 213). This insight into the aesthetic basis of 
Aristotelian rhetoric suggests something more profound than the poetic flourishes of epideictic; it 
points to a mode of spectatorial (i.e., aesthetic) enjoyment that is not merely passive but that 
results from some sort of emotional experience provided by the transfigurative combination of 
pity and fear into something pleasurable.24   
In being persuaded that it would be prudent to ostracize an outstanding member of the 
community, citizens come to experience both pity and fear and to experience them together in 
relation to the constitution. Indeed, the modern expression “fear for”—understood to mean a 
feeling of anxiety concerning someone or thing’s safety and well-being—captures quite nicely 
the coming together of pity and fear in a compound emotion (pity-fear). In the context of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 To be sure, the epideictic language of praise and blame may also stake a claim to the rhetoric of political 
catharsis, serving as something of a civic disinfectant against excess and deficiency, while simultaneously giving 
presence to the standards according to which each citizen is held politically accountable. As a dimension of political 
rhetoric, epideictic can thus function as a prophylactic against those impurities that threaten to overwhelm the body 
politic and weaken its principle, purifying the attitudinal errors hampering a community’s political telos and thereby 
fostering the synanthropos—that is, the being-fellow-human—specific to its constitution. Moreover, in the event of 
a situation demanding civic purgation, epideictic language can also prepare the body politic to perform its ethico-
political responsibility. Somewhat along these lines, Celeste Condit argues that epideictic discourse sustains 
communities by helping them overcome problems that contribute to degeneration and decay (1985). Two of the 
primary ways that epideictic serves this end is by defining and shaping the community: “The community renews its 
conception of good and evil by explaining what it has previously held to be good or evil and by working through the 
relationships of those past values and beliefs with new situations” (291). Taking a more Isocratean approach to 
epideictic, Takis Poulakos shows how epideictic can also serve the opposite dual-function of criticizing and 
transforming the socio-political realm (1988). 
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ostracism, we may observe how these seemingly opposite emotions coincide by reading 
Thucydides’ account of Hyperbolus’ ostracism alongside the faux speech Against Alcibiades. 
Writing on the exceptional nature of Hyperbolus’ ostracism, Thucydides confirms, albeit 
indirectly, that the usual grounds for ostracism were fear of another’s power and reputation, 
stating, “They [the anti-democratic Samians], killed Hyperbolus, one of the Athenians, a 
despicable person who had been ostracized not on account of fear of his power and importance 
but on account of his evil ways and the shame he brought to the city” (1998, 8.73). This passage 
reveals that a person’s failure to achieve excellence (either in character or thought) is not in itself 
threatening to political stability, not deserving of fear and certainly not of ostracism; for that, a 
person’s vice (e.g. ambition or vanity) would have to be coupled with a certain degree of 
political leverage and then parlayed into a form of power incommensurate with the city-state’s 
political justice. In contrast to mere ethical disapproval, fear of another’s power culminates in 
fear experienced for that person or thing to which such power poses a threat. In the political 
realm, what is thus endangered is the political identity of the city-state. Similarly, the writer of 
Alcibiades demonstrates how evoking pity for the constitution entails eliciting fear of inordinate 
political power: “Obedience to the magistrates and the laws is to my mind the one safeguard of 
society; and anyone who sets them at nought is destroying at one blow the surest guarantee of 
security which the state possesses.” And, paralleling Thucydides’ juxtaposition of moral censure 
and political consternation, the author adds, “It is hard enough to be made to suffer by those who 
have no conception of right and wrong; but it is far more serious when a man who knows what 
the public interest requires, acts in defiance of it. He shows clearly…that instead of holding that 
he ought himself conform with the laws of the state, he expects you to conform with his own 
way of life” (19). Insofar as citizens persuade one another to pity the integrity of the political 
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community, to fear for its ethos or way of life, identifying with its principle of justice and seeing 
themselves in terms of its conception of happiness, their pity takes on the emotive characteristics 
of fear, terror, and dread. But because this fear of corruption is felt in relation to the constitution, 
and not in relation to the individual, it strengthens rather than expels pity, refracting it, along 
with fear, throughout the citizenry.  
By way of ostracism, rhetoric’s catharsis of pity and fear overcomes the motivation for 
partisanship, clarifying the bonds of political philia and solidifying the collective unity by 
making the many feel with one another as one. Such emotional bonding is akin to a leap of faith 
in that it requires not only a belief in the community—and a belief of one’s belonging to the 
community—but also a passionate commitment to its preservation and the long-term realization 
of its goals. As Josiah Ober argues, in practice the Athenian procedure of ostracism worked to 
clarify the central message of Cleisthenes’ democratic reforms, which is summed up by the word 
isonomia. According to Ober, “The Athenians of 508/7 might have interpreted 
isonomia…broadly, as ‘equality of participation in making the decisions (laws) that will 
maintain and promote equality and that will bind all citizens equally’” (1989, 75). Rhetoric that 
facilitates ostracism has recourse to this affirmation of being duty-bound, of sharing equally in 
the responsibility to make weighty, perhaps unpleasant, decisions affecting life-in-common and 
of owning them once made. What is more, ostracizing exhortations rely in no small part on the 
efficacy of just such an appeal. That is why the author of Against Alcibiades begins the 
exhortation/accusation by driving home the need for citizens to undertake together the 
responsibility of civic engagement, averring, “I consider it the duty of the good citizen, not to 
withhold himself from public life for fear of making personal enemies, but to be ready to face 
danger for the benefit of the community” (1). Through affirming the obligations of citizenship, 
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rhetoric designed to ostracize clarifies the emotional ties that undergird political association. But 
rather than serving to educate citizens on the definitions or causes of emotions (in the manner of 
Book II of the Rhetoric), rhetoric engenders a way of experiencing emotions as engagements 
with the world, of feeling correctly and of feeling together as friends—not in virtue or pleasure 
or utility but, politically, under the banner of isonomia. To provide a political gloss to Aristotle’s 
common definition of friendship, ostracism fosters a sense of sharing pleasure in preserving the 
constitution and distress when confronted by forces of corruption, “not for some other reason,” 
but because of the nature of political friendship (2007, 2.4.3).25 As a result, citizens gain insight 
into the filial bonds constitutive of political community and commit themselves to the 
obligations that these bonds carry, including the obligation to exile one of the community’s 
members for the sake of the community itself. Rhetoric may in that way help to accomplish the 
catharsis not only of pity and fear but also of political philia, thus affirming the collective unity 
and strengthening the citizen-body’s commitment to the task of preservation.  
Through the civic purgation of persons whose superiority is believed to constitute a threat 
to the constitution, the catharsis of political identity both parallels and diverges from a more 
ancient Greek rite involving the ritualistic killing of the pharmakos, or scapegoat. According to 
René Girard, the ritual aimed “to produce a replica . . . of a previous crisis that was resolved by 
means of a spontaneously unanimous victimization” (1977, 94; see also Derrida 1981, 128–34). 
By recreating, for instance, the conditions of an unpremeditated lynching, the sacrificers hoped 
to reestablish the feelings of social accord necessary to restoring order in the community. Similar 
to candidates for ostracism, “[The] victim,” he argues, “is considered a polluted object, whose 
living presence contaminates everything that comes in contact with it and whose death purges the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 That is, although the collective decision to ostracize may not itself be experienced as pleasurable, the subsequent 
catharsis – of justice and friendship – is a source of aesthetic enjoyment. This owes primarily to the resolution of 
pity and fear.      
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community of its ills” (95). Not surprisingly, scapegoating also accomplishes the resolution of 
contrary emotions: “On the one hand he is a woebegone figure, an object of scorn . . . a butt for 
all sorts of gibes, insults, and of course, outbursts of violence. On the other hand, we find him 
surrounded by a quasi-religious aura of veneration; he has become a sort of cult object” (95). Yet 
despite these similarities—as well as the possibility that ostracism is a rationalized form of the 
scapegoat ritual—the victimization of the pharmakos is a metonymic reduction of “[all] the 
dangers, real and imaginary, that threaten the community,” whereas the pity-feared citizen of 
ostracism is a representation, an exemplar, of a particular force of corruption specific to a 
political community (94; see Burke 1969a). By inducing the emotions of pity and fear, 
ostracizing rhetoric serves to clarify citizens’ political responsibility; it does not function as a 
panacea for social calamities. More precisely, this mode of clarification affirms the importance 
of preserving the constitution and the justice it embodies, and of maintaining the political 
community in a state of due proportion or beauty.  
And yet, despite Aristotle’s emphasis on clarification, rhetoric’s effectuation of the tragic 
in politics entails a certain process of simulation in which the real, actually existing regime is 
eclipsed and replaced by a simulacrum, or appearance, which may or may not coincide with the 
arkhē that ostensibly defines the current regime. Hence the “reality” of political catharsis, and, 
ultimately, of the political community as such, amounts to what the French critical theorist Jean 
Baudrillard refers to as a semiotic “reality effect” (1981, 160), i.e., the world or an aspect of the 
world as it is filtered, processed, and sustained by the play of signs and signifying processes.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Baudrillard’s genealogy of simulacra, which argues, among other things, that the emergence of simulation is a 
function modern information and communication technologies is thus shown to be historically inaccurate (see for 
instance his “The Order of Simulacra”). But according to William Merrin—a charitable critic—for Baudrillard the 
simulacrum is concept meant to refer only to the image and its efficacy. Accordingly it is an ancient concept whose 
influence, albeit variable, appears or is discoverable within the philosophical, theological, and aesthetic traditions of 
every culture (2006, 28 ff.).  
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Aristotle, for his part, was by no means ignorant either of the possibility or the potency of such 
an effect—his concept of “bringing-before-the-eyes” (pro ommaton poiein, or “visualization”) 
referring to an action-based metaphor that allows the hearer to visualize both the action and the 
metaphor it represents (2007, 3.11.1; cf. 3.10.6–7). But the effect of simulation goes beyond 
signifying things engaged in activity (energeia), liberating or dissociating the mode from the 
things of representation, the symbol for the thing symbolized. By signifying a type of political 
experience, the tragic does not attest to the reality of, say, a democratic regime but rather points 
up the rhetorical power of an emotive process, one that is capable of reproducing the appearance 
of a certain political reality and thereby of transforming that appearance into an unquestioned 
category, one that is perceived to be natural and external to the rhetorical process of tragic 
catharsis. For that reason, the tragic in politics cannot be isolated from the possible performance 
of a sleight of hand, that is, from misdirection or, in our terminology, misclarification. In this, the 
politico-rhetorical context, the clarification of emotions and of the constitution does not 
necessarily reflect or represent the material conditions of the political community so much as it 
maintains and reproduces common belief in a common political reality, namely, belief in the 
mode of allocation of the arkhē by which the current regime identifies itself in exercising a 
certain dominion (kurion) vis-à-vis the non-governing elements, the parts or parties, of the city-
state. Hence, in a strange turnaround, Aristotle’s practical-productive philosophy comes to 
resemble the sophistic approach to language, which, among other things, regards linguistic 
power as consisting in the capacity not only to exploit but also, and at a more fundamental level, 
to create and disseminate belief. As a rhetorical effect of the tragic, such belief takes the form an 
active belief in the identification of the political community with its putative principle of justice, 
thus maintaining community values and a common attitude of mind, despite or, rather, because 
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of appearances.27 In view of this productive capacity (to create belief by means of appearance), 
the rhetorical force of the tragic process, its characteristic style, is such that it hypostatizes or 
realizes politics as a purely symbolic constitutional order, one that simultaneously displaces 
politics as a form of distribution in line with a principle of justice. And this displacement occurs 
regardless of whether or to what extent the two “realities” contradict or coincide with one 
another. Insofar as the appearance of, say, democracy, is rhetorically successful (i.e., believable), 
it will render ineffective any accusation to the contrary, any accusation charging that the 
appearance of democracy is illusory, an appearance that, in simulating political reality at once 
dissimulates the real effects of a non-democratic form of rule, the operation of non-democratic 
forms of action, and the sure-footed posture of non-democratic ruling class.28    
The rhetoric of political catharsis nevertheless retains its strategic use-value. That is, 
there is no contradiction here between the politics of preservation and the rhetorical process of 
misclarification. In simulating the dominant characteristic of the community, the tragic function 
of rhetoric persists in its office of furthering political stability over the long-range. It continues to 
foster consensus, or political like-mindedness, shaping and reinforcing the attitudes of mind 
supportive of the regime in power and of political order in general—even if those attitudes are 
conditioned by beliefs that are prima facie in tension with the institutional apparatus of the 
arkhaï and the relationship of mastery played. Political order, the authority of the political 
community, is still rhetorically instaurated. But something else takes place in this symbolic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Perhaps the clearest articulation of this view of creative power of language is that espoused by Thrasymachus in 
his fragment “The Constitution” (Sprague 1972, B1, p. 89–91). 
28 The problematic of distinguishing appearance from reality, although stemming from classical antiquity’s 
opposition between being and becoming, culminates in the modern world in the figure of Nietzsche, who asks, “The 
true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps?...But no!” he replies, “we got rid of the illusory 
world along with the true one!” (2005, 171; emphasis in original). Later, Derrida’s destabilizing practice of 
deconstruction will run wild with this aphorism, translating it into the paradoxical logic of undecidability. See, for 
instance, his “Force of Law” (esp., “the ghost of the undecidable,” 24–26) Indeed, we will turn to a more careful 
consideration of undecidability in the negative aesthetics of politics in the fourth chapter. 
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process of political renewal and in consequence of the misclarifying clarification of the tragic in 
politics; a new possibility opens up for the politics of preservation, one that while in principal 
available to any regime is most fitted to preserving the oligarchical ordering of the political 
community over against the freedom of the dēmos.29 This possibility, which is already implicit in 
misclarification, consists of the strategic use of political catharsis to simulate one regime so as to 
promote the long-term stability of another. Accordingly, the rhetoric of tragic simulation at once 
makes possible and relies for its effectivity on a basic misrecognition of the operative principle 
of governance.  
We can see the how and why of this strategic misrecognition by highlighting that for 
Aristotle the identification of the political community with a principle of justice is as much an 
identification of community “parts,” or parties, with political attributes (axiaï), of which there are 
three: wealth of the smallest number, the virtue of the best, and the freedom that belongs to the 
people. But this materialistic reduction of principles to parts similarly reduces the number of real, 
or determinable, parties. “Aristotle,” writes political philosopher Jacques Rancière, “who is at 
pains in the Nicomachean Ethics and book III of Politics to give substance to the three parts and 
the three ranks, freely admits in book IV and also in The Athenian Constitution that the city 
actually has only two parties, the rich and the poor: ‘almost everywhere the wellborn and the 
welloff [sic] are coextensive.’ The arrangements that distribute powers or the appearances of 
power between these two parties alone…are required to bring off that community aretê that the 
aristoï will always be lacking” (1999, 11).30 Moreover (and more important where rhetoric is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 In other words, this something else transforms the “even if” of contrary attitudes into a resource of rhetorical 
effectivity, strategically rendering an accidental or contingent success. 
30 C. D. C. Reeve’s translation of this passage from the Politics differs slightly: “For among pretty much most 
people the rich are taken to occupy the place of noble-and-good men” (1998, 1294a19–20). For Aristotle’s 
discussion of community in terms of parts and parties, see his Athenian Constitution, in which he defines the 
dēmos—the gathering of men of no position—as those citizens who “had no part in anything” (43). In 
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concerned), this reduction of community parties into a bipolar opposition between the rich and 
the poor automatically grants to the former a rhetorical superiority based on the nature of the 
“remaining” axiaï—and it does this long before and independent of the mass media and present-
day propaganda. Simply put, freedom, the attribute of the people—the position of those who 
have absolutely no other, the poor—is not real in the sense of designating a positive, 
determinable property but is pure invention, an empty property determined negatively by what it 
is not—i.e. virtue and wealth, which in the final count is reducible to wealth pure and simple.31 
At the same time, freedom is not a peculiar attribute of the people, since it is counted as a 
common virtue, belonging to everyone, rich and poor alike. This means, first of all, that 
ostracism, functioning as an instrument of political clarification, cannot contribute to preserving 
oligarchy in the straightforward manner of expelling from the city those persons embodying its 
characteristic force of corruption. To do this, an oligarchical ruling class would have to pull off 
the impossible feat of ostracizing its freest member. But even given the eventuality of ostracizing 
an oligarch on the grounds of his having formed inappropriate connections with the dēmos, the 
purgation would take as its object not the axia of freedom but the act of attempting to create 
sedition. For freedom is not only indeterminable, and thus incapable of being definitely 
ascertained, calculated, or identified, but also non-exclusive, the common of the community, of 
all its parts and parties. Rich oligarchs do not lack freedom by virtue of the fact that the people, 
the poor, lack wealth or position; indeed, oligarchs do not lack freedom at all. Rather, the people 
who make up the people (and who, according to the Athenian Constitution, have no part in 
anything) are simply free like the rest. It is the people’s complete lack of position that makes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Disagreement, Rancière takes liberty with passage, pushing this definition to its logical conclusion to define the 
people as “a part of those who have no part” (14 passim).  
31 Even as an indeterminable property, argues Rancière, the freedom of the dēmos reduced the natural domination of 
the nobility to a domination based solely on wealth and property, transforming their absolute right into a particular 
axia (1999, 7–8). 
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dēmos appear as though it alone may legitimately lay claim to freedom, an appearance that by its 
very nature can be made to work either to the advantage or the disadvantage of the people that 
make up the dēmos.32    
Perhaps counterintuitively, then, Aristotle’s translation of justice into parts and parties 
(elements and credentials) reveals that, in terms of strategic use-value, tragic simulation or 
political misclarification tends to support not democracy but oligarchy. And it does so indirectly, 
by preserving the appearance of democracy. There is, in other words, an apparent twist in logic 
involved in the rhetorical process of political catharsis: namely, that what initially looks like an 
inapplicability of the tragic vis-à-vis oligarchies is for that very reason a means of rhetorical 
effectivity available, uniquely if not exclusively, to a regime grounded in the axia of wealth and 
legitimated by virtue of its dominance over the long-range. Unlike freedom, or virtue for that 
matter, wealth is easily determinable, so much so that it is the lack of wealth that predominantly 
defines not only a free people but also its corresponding form of government. (Conversely, the 
coincidence of good birth and wealth would seem to favor wealth as the invariable determining 
factor.) Since the appearance of democracy fundamentally rests on some form of the negation of 
wealth, or the apparent curtailment of its influence, democracy as a constitutional form that 
shapes a citizenry’s way of life is likewise fairly easy to simulate; in terms of susceptibility, then, 
democracy, for Aristotle, would describe a regime virtually reducible to the play of appearances, 
one whose existence or existential “proof” primarily consists in keeping up democratic 
appearances.33 In other words, the appearance of democracy—through whatever means, e.g., 
institutional, rhetorical, spatial, etc.—can subserve constitutions based on either the principle of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  According to the account given in The Athenian Constitution, the dēmos is composed of those who have no 
position, those who “had no part in anything.” (43). 	  
33 This qualification of democracy is needed in order to distinguish democracy as a constitution from democracy as 
either the practice or principle of social equality—the latter proving itself quite resilient and recalcitrant to non-
democratic systems of government.  
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freedom or the principle of wealth; or, in conjunctional terms, such an appearance can help to 
further both but never at the same time. Ostracism, conceived as the initiating mechanism of 
political catharsis, and, consequently, of tragic simulation, is thus transformed from a democratic 
institution into part of a rhetorical process that is capable of turning democracy against itself by 
means of its own simulated or misclarified appearance. “For politics, writes Rancière (taking his 
cue from Aristotle), “is a question of aesthetics, a matter of appearances. The good regime is one 
that takes on the appearances of an oligarchy for the oligarchs and democracy for the demos. 
Thus the party of the rich and the party of the poor will be brought to engage in the same 
‘politics’” (1999, 74). On that account, sensible oligarchies preserve themselves not by 
combating freedom—a logical absurdity if freedom is, as Aristotle says, a common feature of the 
community—but by simulating democracy, that is, by ostracizing (some of) the wealthy or 
wealthiest parts of their own party.  
In so doing, oligarchies help to reproduce what amounts to the rhetorical basis of 
democracy—namely, its affective and intersubjective conditions of fear, pity, and philia, as well 
as belief in the perceptible reality of a democratic regime and the democratic mode of allocation 
of the arkhaï by which the regime is publicly identified.34 For what the tragic in politics clarifies 
is not the apparatus of government as such, only the appearance of parts and forms of 
government, a constitution in name only. In the event that, as far as the people are concerned, 
democratic appearances win out over a contrastive institutional reality, the community’s political 
identity, and hence the exercise of a certain kurion, will be misrecognized as democratic (see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Through an irony that during the twentieth and twenty-first century has come to define much of our socio-
political reality, the rhetoric of fear tends to create and sustain the conditions that give rise to fear. In that capacity, 
we may legitimately describe it as productively counterproductive and very much so. See Chapter Three on the 
Freudian uncanny for a detailed discussion of how the exploitation and reproduction of fear is essential to 
legitimating and maintaining “the personal safety state.” For a recent study on democracy’s congeniality to 
oligarchy, from classical antiquity to the contemporary era, see Jeffrey A. Winters (2011).  
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Bourdieu 1991, 163–70). Hence, contrary to the modern era’s tendency to associate the 
aestheticization of politics with the rise of fascism—to historicize the aesthetics of politics—the 
tragic dimension reveals an alternative relationship between politics and appearances, one that 
privileges not some form of autocratic rule but the surreptitious preservation of oligarchy; at the 
same time, it shows that the “aesthetics” of politics (i.e., its appearancing or apparency) is tied 
not to the conflict between left and right wing political parties and systems but to that most basic 
political of conflicts, the opposition between the rich and the poor.35 If there is a tragedy here, 
and not merely the tragic, it is that Aristotle’s vindication of the art of civic discourse makes 
possible a technique for manufacturing the believable appearance of democracy in the form of a 
mise en absence, a presence in absence, which is realized and reproduced solely by virtue of the 
democratic instantiation of the pathē of pity and fear, conjoined with the public feeling of 
democratic friendship. All of which presupposes belief in the guiding influence of freedom and 
the preservation, first and foremost, of that belief over against institutional reality. 
So notwithstanding the appearance of a city’s return to a state of “due proportion,” or 
beauty, such keeping up of appearances—democratic or other—does not involve public 
argument or debate over the nature or desirability of the existing political order, over the 
arrangement and proportionality of the city’s parts. Nor does it ensure the coincidence between 
the city’s public image and the actual mode of allocation of the “offices,” or arkhaï, by which a 
regime defines itself. Rather, the city’s image substitutes for the exercise of dominion by the 
city’s dominant element (i.e., supplants the relationship of mastery played out in the institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The argument that the aestheticization of politics is tied to a particular system of government or constitutional 
arrangement was made popular by Walter Benjamin in the epilogue to his “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction.” According to Benjamin, “The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics 
into political life…. Communism responds by politicizing art” (241–2).  
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apparatus). Although the rhetoric of cathartic simulation may continue to defend the true and the 
just, it does so on two different levels of perceptible reality—of “definiteness”—which may or 
may not coincide: (1) the arrangement offices followed by the exercise of political power and (2) 
the simulation of such a configurable function. And this split is totally in keeping with the 
distinction between rhetoric and philosophy. For just as rhetoric designates a domain separate 
from that of philosophy, the political philosophy of preservation remains distinct from the tragic 
dimension or the rhetoric of political catharsis. Nevertheless, it is by virtue of this differentiation 
that rhetoric can further the end of preservation without having to engage directly the question of 
preservation as such and, consequently, of whether what is ostensibly being preserved is as 
beautiful as it appears—is beautiful in the way that it appears to be beautiful. And ostracism, for 
its part, is an effective means not only of preserving order, or its appearance, but also of 
preserving rhetoric’s distance from philosophy. And this is wholly in keeping with Aristotle’s 
axiom that rhetoric concerns itself with “the means” that contribute to a given end but never the 
ends in themselves (2007, 1.6.1).36 As such the political function of the tragic neither involves 
nor encourages deliberation about the possible benefits or disadvantages of preserving one 
regime over against another; nor does it promote the interrogation of whether or to what extent a 
city-state is as it appears to be, as those occupying the offices of the institutional apparatus claim 
it to be. What is more, the tragic emotions of fear and pity, when activated through the institution 
of ostracism, produce an “accidentally” dissuasive effect vis-à-vis inquiries into the politics or 
rhetoric of preservation, an effect made all the more effective because operates, primarily, on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric, of course, is not uncontested. Regarding rhetoric’s relationship to means and ends, 
Isocrates, in his Nicocles, advances an alternative conception, according to which “rhetoric” (i.e., logos politicos) 
does not culminate in the advocacy of predetermined ends but moves to inquire about ends themselves, including 
possibilities not yet acknowledged or disclosed. For it is by means of rhetoric that we “seek light for ourselves on 
things which are unknown” (1928a, 8). 
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level of appearance, and appearances, for better or worse, are exceptionally difficult to disprove, 
virtually immune to falsifiability and the rhetoric of critique.  
 
2.4 THE PERSISTENCE OF POLITICAL CATHARSIS 
Although Aristotle does not relate the Politics’ axiom of preservation back to the Poetics, 
his understanding of catharsis as a multivalent mode of clarification provides a basis for fleshing 
out the political office he assigns to rhetoric: defending a city-state’s constitution against its 
characteristic forces of corruption and thus furthering the realization of its final end, i.e., stability 
over the long-run. Although recent readings of the Rhetoric have provided insight into rhetoric’s 
usefulness as an ethico-political instrument, what has not yet been highlighted is the basis of this 
effectivity, namely, the importance of preservation vis-à-vis corruption. This opposition, I have 
argued, has consequences for Aristotle’s understanding of the interrelationships between not only 
rhetoric and politics but also tragic catharsis. Specifically, it implies a rhetorical process that by 
means of facilitating ostracism accomplishes the clarification, or catharsis, of the political 
community as such (its principle of political justice as well as the bonds of political philia). Thus 
actualized, what I have been calling the tragic dimension of politics achieves both more and less 
than the end of poetic tragedy: less in that political catharsis does not include the representation 
of a single, complete action, but more since, along with clarifying the grounds of political 
belonging, it involves a purifying purgation of the body politic. But rhetoric in this capacity also 
entails a complicated form of identification that clarifies the emotional bonds and hence the 
meaning of political friendship. The result is an instauration of the constitution, whose condition 
is crucial to the long-term stability of the political community and its corresponding regime. 
Kenneth Burke was perhaps one of the first scholars to draw attention to the overlap in Aristotle 
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between rhetoric, poetics, and politics, yet his suspicion regarding the rhetorical impact of tragic 
frames (1969b, 38–41; 1973), combined with his focus on the cycle of guilt-redemption-
victimage (1989), worked against the possibility of his discovering an affirmative capacity of 
political catharsis. As Jeffrey Walker points out, Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric as “a technē 
of emotional katharsis” highlights rhetoric’s role in arousing emotions for the purpose of 
improving the faculty of practical wisdom (2000a, 85). To the extent that pathetic appeals accord 
with what is true and just, citizens engaged in the rhetoric of political catharsis not only assist in 
effecting civic purgations but also serve as agents in the political betterment of their fellow 
citizens, redirecting, reshaping, and reconditioning the emotions—specifically, pity and fear—in 
such a way that they are more likely to be felt at the right time, in the right way, and toward the 
right things. By clarifying the emotions for the purpose of strengthening the political community, 
rhetoric offers instruction in the civic emotions, saying in effect, “Given our constitution, this is 
the appropriate emotional response to the problem we are facing. The situation and our political 
identity oblige us to feel this way so as to make a difficult yet necessary decision.” In so 
affirming the citizenry’s emotional resolve, rhetoric clarifies the conditions under which 
emotions may be considered politically appropriate, and in that moment of clarification rhetoric 
transforms the emotions into an instrument of constitutional efficacy, thereby bridging the gap 
between private feeling and civic responsibility. 
At the same time, however, the conception of rhetoric as a technē of political katharsis 
admits of another type of logic or rationality, one that, although maintaining the true and the just, 
operates at the level of appearances and their play, i.e., of the apparently true, the seemingly just. 
On the one hand, this functionality is prima facie an uncontroversial fact about rhetoric, and, 
what is more, Aristotle’s axiom that rhetoric deals in probabilities (eikota) and signs (sēmeia) 
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and is thus stylistically capable of bringing-before-the-eyes suggests a keen awareness of 
rhetoric’s relationship to appearance (2007, 1.2.14). On the other hand, however, we should not 
read into this emphasis on appearance a philosophical pronouncement on the ontological 
juxtaposition of being-and-becoming, permanence-and-change. If we take seriously the axiom 
that rhetoric is about appearance, then we place ourselves squarely within the realm of purely 
ontic considerations, as opposed to considerations of the nature, property, or conditions of being 
(the so-called real world of things-in-themselves), as well as considerations of “the ontological 
difference” separating being from what Aristotle in the Metaphysics (1028b, 2–7) and elsewhere 
calls “thinghood.” Thus, in separating the play of appearance from practical wisdom, I am 
drawing attention to the possibility that things are not always as they appear, that appearances 
can achieve relative autonomy vis-à-vis the things of which they are appearances or 
representations, and that the relationship between things and their appearances is not easily 
sorted or assessed by the rational ability to decide how to achieve a certain end or to reflect upon 
and determine good ends consistent with the aim of happiness or living well. In the domain of 
politics, belief in the presence of a principle of justice and in the truth of its appearance at once 
presupposes and works to sustain another more basic one, viz., belief in the correspondence of a 
community and regime’s public appearance with the institutional apparatus and the relationship 
of mastery played out in it—i.e., the place and mode of allocation of the arkhaï by which the 
regime defines itself in managing the city and exercising power. Insofar as practical wisdom 
concerns the pragmatic or ethical selection of ends, it does not affect the quality, quantity, or fact 
of these beliefs, does not tip the scales of belief one way or the other. To the extent that practical 
wisdom is a factor in the play of political appearances, it comes into play “after the fact,” that is, 
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in helping to determine whether preservation of the status quo—i.e., what appears to be the status 
quo—is to the advantage of the individual making the decision or the community as a whole.  
 With these considerations in mind, I have also argued that the clarification involved in 
the rhetoric of ostracism, as well as the rhetorical effect of ostracism itself, goes some way 
toward creating or reproducing the appearance of a healthy (or healing) political community. 
And this appearance, I maintain, proves itself capable of functioning and of exerting influence—
of creating its own reality effect or believability—in relative isolation from the goings on of 
government. In this capacity, it also redefines the parameters of risk, clarifying for the citizen 
body the city’s characteristic forces of corruption and inculcating a civic sense of fear and pity 
and a political friendship steeped in both. In so doing, ostracism not only strengthens 
commitment to the constitution, but, just as important, it also liberates the appearance of the 
politeia from the functioning of its institutional apparatus. And the stronger the reality effect of 
this appearance—intellectually, emotively—the more likely that it will supplant the reality of the 
actual operations of government, the authority that directs and maintains the city in accordance 
with the prerogative of the dominant element, “party,” or faction. As we have seen, however, this 
substitution does not imply an ontological privileging of one kind of reality effect over another; 
rather, it signals a conflict of appearances, in which one type of appearance corroborates another 
in the manner of representation. Thus, if in the Politics Aristotle presents readers with mimetic 
katharsis (clarification via representation), then in the Politics, as refracted through the Rhetoric, 
he offers us the prospect of a cathartic mīmēsis (representation via clarification), one that 
clarifies the stuff of politics through simulating the appearance or character of the constitution, 
reinforcing the apparent veracity this appearance by means of the tragic emotions of fear and 
pity. It is thus of little consequence if the emotional clarification accords with constitution-
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specific conceptions of the true and just (i.e., those characteristic of the ostensible constitution). 
Instead, the issue is which principle of justice is truly in force over against the appearance of 
justice and its truth? And practical wisdom is, on its own merits, incapable of providing a reliable 
answer, of sufficiently putting the issue to rest.  
 In this chapter, I have characterized this process, whereby political appearances are 
dissociated from their institutional context, as a potentially misclarifying simulation, arguing that 
the clarification elicited by ostracism allows for the ever-present possibility that the center of 
political authority can be recognized in the form of a fundamental misrecognition, that the 
regime can secure the grounds of affective legitimation by virtue of misclarifying and, for that 
reason, misleading appearances. Indeed, as we have seen, Aristotle recommends the use of 
deceptive appearances as a means of furthering the ends of preservation. That the resulting 
misrecognition could be facilitated and in large part reproduced through the intersubjective 
experience of pity and fear is testament not necessarily to Aristotle’s holistic vision of practical-
productive arts but to the politico-rhetorical effectivity made available by the tragic dimension 
and the forcefulness of simulated appearance. In view of this two-pronged strategy, we may 
justifiably conclude that the political exploitation of the tragic owes its efficacy to the rhetorical 
process of cathartic mīmēsis, while the process itself is legitimated in terms of its political 
expedience vis-à-vis the end of preservation. In a roundabout way, this renews the possibility 
that practical wisdom may stake out a role for itself in the process but only insofar as, given 
certain favorable conditions, it results in the selection of the tragic as a rhetorical means of 
furthering the end of the constitution—whatever kind of constitution it may be.  
In view of this process, community ethos is strengthened, but only if it appears to accord 
with the aims of the ostensible constitution, the putative ethos of the seeming political 
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community. That being the case, one of the most pressing questions to emerge from a critique of 
political catharsis is whether and how it operates in today’s Western democracies. While 
dismissing ostracism as a relic of early experiments in democratic governance is quite 
understandable, the prosecution of certain white-collar crimes provides a kind of civically 
cathartic spectacle that is adapted to current political sensibilities and conditioned by a number of 
interrelated, though not necessarily coordinated, rhetorical acts. Take for example the indictment 
of Bernard Madoff for massive fraud in 2008: at the very least it suggests that, despite the 
absence of state sanctions, Aristotle’s notion of rhetorical catharsis cannot easily be disregarded 
as an archaic practice or antiquarian interest. Nomi Prins’ claim that, “The bloodlust reserved for 
Bernard L. ‘Bernie’ Madoff and the other new villains ultimately only serves to cloak larger 
systemic crimes” (2009, 5), is not a counterargument, even if it is true. In fact, the argument that 
scapegoating a few people who take advantage of financial systems will not lead to reform is 
precisely one of the purposes served by the rhetoric of political catharsis. What remains at issue, 
and what Aristotle enables us to see, is the capacity of rhetoric not to clarify the wrong emotions 
per se but—and this is Prins’ point—to direct them at the wrong objects—if by “wrong” we 
understand that which is in tension with the common belief or public image as to the politeia’s 
characteristic style, i.e., its manner of directing and maintaining the government of the city. For it 
is conceivable, not to say likely, that the rhetoric involved in politicizing the tragic could 
preserve a constitution by clarifying emotions in the “wrong” way, that is, in a way suitable to 
another political system but nevertheless beneficial to the governing class. It becomes possible, 
in other words, to promote a democratic sensibility or habit of mind that, while capable of 
preserving democratic identity and combating forces of democratic corruption, is at the same 
time vulnerable to manipulation by means of the strategic or misleading play of appearances. 
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Work camps and massive deportations, monstrous as they are, are not the only ways of effecting 
political catharsis. From a rhetorical perspective, the most persuasive (or purifying) purgations 
are those that elicit spectatorial enjoyment. The critical purchase implied by such a perspective 
might consist of inquiring into the ways in which rhetoric works cathartically to preserve the 
very power structures that it ostensibly challenges. Aristotle may not approve of this application, 
but he provides the tools necessary for carrying it out.    
What the tragic cannot account for, however—what it cannot absolutely prevent—is the 
possibility that people, even the people, may come to reject or at least grow suspicious of those 
appearances elicited and sustained by instances of government-sponsored ostracism, regardless 
of whether such instances are official or unofficial, regular or irregular. This refusal can assume 
one or two general forms. First, it can emerge as an accusation that the appearances of, say, 
democracy do not correspond to lived reality, however this reality is understood, that, 
appearances and prevailing attitudes notwithstanding, the organization and management of 
collective life does not adequately reflect the way of life that could reasonably be expected given 
the purported constitution. Although the tragic dimension is not amenable to public argument 
and rational debate, the perceived non-coincidence of the allocation and exercise of political 
power with the regime’s public image, including common belief in that image can give rise to 
the resentment attending the feeling of one’s having been duped, which in turn can lead to an 
attitude of non-compliance, disbelief, and discredit with regard to political power and authority. 
Whether there is any merit to such accusations and feelings of resentment is another matter 
entirely. Second, the refusal may arise from the conflict between the desire for a different 
constitution and the aim of preserving the existing order. This possibility, which is independent 
though not exclusive of the charge of simulated appearances, forwards the conviction that 
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another “way of life,” another regime, is possible but, more important, preferable to the current 
state of affairs, real or merely apparent. In either case, the result is more or less the same: a 
potential weakening of a regime’s odds of maintaining consensus vis-à-vis political order and its 
uncontested control of that order, as well as its likelihood accomplishing the end of preservation 
over the long-range. For refusal of the current order not only leads to irresolvable difference and 
political stasis (intellectually if not in practice), but, from the perspective of hegemony, it also 
threatens to create and foster the sedition that will either delegitimate or, worst case, overthrow 
the government. In order to stave off such an eventuality, some other means of securing 
consensus is required, something emotively powerful enough to preclude the emergence, in 
thought, of attitudes hostile to the ruling order. In the next chapter, we will examine how the 
rhetorical institution of the sublime as a kind of dominating form constitutes just such a means, 
advancing on and adding to the rhetoric of negative-aesthetics. For unlike the political function 
of tragic catharsis, the sublime qua form does not appeal to anything as specific, and hence 
contestable, as a constitution. With the sublime, we move into the realm of unadulterated 
emotive force, the dominion of the imagination.    
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CHAPTER 3 – DISCIPLINING THE IMAGINATION: 
THE RHETORICAL INSTITUTION OF THE POLITICAL SUBLIME 
 
Good things and bad come from much the same sources.    
– Longinus 1st century AD 
 
The Sublime dilates and elevates the Soul, Fear sinks and 
contracts it; yet both are felt upon viewing what is great 
and awful. – John Baillie 1747  
 
Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings 
revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent 
some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl 
Harbor. – The Project for the New American Century 2000 
 
  
Like the tragic, the sublime designates a quasi-aesthetic category, a negative species of 
aesthetics, which takes shape within the classical rhetorical tradition. Like tragic drama, it too 
lays claim to an urtext: pseudo-Longinus’ rhetorical treatise, Peri Hypsos—literally translated as 
On Height but more commonly as On the Sublime (or On Great Writing).1 Apparently about the 
principles of good or great writing, the work is also singularly concerned with examining the 
emotive power of language, viz., the sheer power of language and the effects of rhetorical style. 
Longinus organizes his theory of language’s potency around a concept he terms “the sublime,” 
or perhaps “sublimity,” by which he understands a measure of the impact that language 
combining “strong and inspired emotion” with “vigor of mental conception,” or great ideas, has 
on its audiences (1991, 10). Jane Tompkins, in fact, writes that “for Longinus, language is a form 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Despite the uncertainty of authorship, for the sake of continuity with critical discourses and for convenience, I will 
refer to the author of Peri Hypsos as Longinus. The translation I am using, by G.M.A. Grube, opts for the title On 
Great Writing (On the Sublime). 
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of power,” arguing further that his “notion of the sublime is equivalent to a conception of poetry 
as pure power” (1980, 203). This power, Longinus demonstrates, consists in transporting, or 
elevating, both speakers and audiences so as to achieve ekstasis (ecstasy or displacement), i.e., a 
mental state—beyond logos (reason)—of equal parts wonder, awe, and astonishment. On the 
Sublime, then, advances the rhetorical tradition of exploring the sheer emotional power of words, 
a tradition that extends back to Gorgias and to what Thomas M. Conley refers to as the 
“motivistic” model of rhetoric (1990, 23).2 As Jeffrey Walker argues, Longinus’ notion of hypsos 
represents a return to “a basically Gorgianic theory of stylistic suasion” (2000b, 119; see also 
O’Gorman 2004 and Kellner 2005).  
In keeping with the Gorgianic theory of persuasion, the ultimate purpose of On the 
Sublime and of the sources of sublimity is to equip rhetoricians with the means that enable one to 
wield sublime power and to exercise that power over others. As Conley points out, rhetorics of 
classical antiquity—though we may justifiably expand his frame to include rhetorics of any 
period—might be viewed as responses to prevailing political conditions. At the same time, 
however, he argues, they had, and continue to have, “implications for the realities of political 
life,” as well as for political ideals (1990, 20). In view of these implications, the motivistic model 
of rhetoric suggests a vertical, non-democratic structure, one in which the orator who knows the 
art of manipulating hearers may eventually rule over them like a master over slaves—a politico-
rhetorical structure that exerts tremendous influence when it functions well but which is 
nevertheless unstable (and unprincipled). Such a model, both of politics and its rhetorical style, 
stands in stark contrast to that of the more democratic model that appears in the fragments of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 By “motivistic,” Conley understands that model of rhetoric chiefly concerned with the manipulation of the 
audience by means of a process that resembles modern behavioral conditioning by stimulus and response (1990, 6–
7, 20–24).  
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Protagoras and reappears in the surviving rhetorical works of Isocrates and Cicero. According to 
the latter, rhetoric seeks to arrive at homonoia (likemindedness or consensus) and euboulia (good 
counsel) among the body politic and to do so by means of eloquence and the process of public 
deliberation and debate (see for instance, Isocrates 1928a; 1929, 253–9). Fundamentally 
horizontal, the Protagorean-Isocratean model relies on a consensual vision founded on the 
premise that all questions are debatable by equals, so long as (1) the persons debating have 
representative authority and (2) debate occurs within the context of a democratic assembly 
offering a way toward the resolution of collective problems or controversies. Nevertheless, the 
“controversial” model does not for that reason enjoy a monopoly on consensus; it merely 
privileges a certain kind of consensus-seeking process. The motivistic model is also capable of 
creating likemindedness. But whereas the horizontal-controversial model aims at creating 
consensus within a bilateral framework—one in which the relationship between speaker and 
audience is more or less symmetric, in which both sides to a controversy are founded on the 
hearer’s doxa—the motivistic model seeks consensus arrived at within a unilateral, asymmetric 
transaction between an active speaker and a passive audience. In the former, controversy, debate, 
and eloquence are regarded as the only reasonable alternative to force and deception. In the 
latter, no alternative to force and deception is required—nor, technically speaking, is such an 
alternative possible, since persuasion, on this view, is essentially a simple matter of stimulus and 
response, “a sort of sublimated coercion” (Conley 1990, 6). Consensus, then, if it is possible, is 
achieved “motivistically” or emotively by non-rational means. The sublime, as initially 
conceived by Longinus, constitutes one such means. As a rhetorical force, as pure linguistic 
power, the sublime achieves consensus not through securing widespread assent to rational 
propositions, not by means of free and open debate between equals, but by accomplishing a unity 
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of emotive effects. Moreover, according to Longinus the motivistic force of the sublime so 
strong that it can overpower arguments seeking to offset sublime ekstasis. For the sublime, he 
writes, is “like a thunderbolt”—“an irresistible force beyond the control of any audience” (1991, 
4), which, when fully formed, precludes effective rational opposition.   
 Notwithstanding the power of sublime language to elevate and displace, the so-called 
“Longinian sublime” is limited to the extent that its vision of rhetorical power neglects the world 
of material things, including the mind’s interaction with that world. However, beginning in the 
eighteenth century, theorists such as John Dennis, Joseph Addison, and John Baillie began to 
recast the sublime in terms of the transformational power of language—what Addison calls 
“description”—arguing that the sublime emerges at the point where the grand or terrifying object 
is converted into an idea (see Hope Nicolson 1959; Eagleton 1990; and Ashfield and de Bolla 
1996).3 This transformational power thus immediately evokes or blurs into questions of “the 
ontological status of the sublime,” that is, of the sublime’s ultimate grounding or foundation 
(Shaw 2005, 47). In contrast to the Longinian sublime, for many of the eighteenth century 
theorists, the origin or cause of the sublime does not consist in an aspect of language or in 
elements of style; rather, its ontological status is that of an epistemological response engendered 
by means of a linguistically mediated interaction between mind and object, a mediating idea, 
which, according to John Dennis, “transforms the material object, suffusing its…status with 
iconic significance” (1996, 35–6). There is perhaps more continuity than discontinuity between 
Longinus and the eighteenth century’s discourse of the sublime than discontinuity. However, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 According to Joseph Addison, certain sublime phenomena, such as storms, earthquakes, and other disasters, are 
subject to “Descriptions” (1965, 416). By means of Description, argues Addison, the mind is able to compare “the 
ideas that arise from words, with the ideas that arise from the objects themselves.” In the case of, say, hideous 
objects, the cause of pleasure resides in the capacity to reflect on and admire the transformational capacity of 
language, that is, to relish the artistry that can change a threatening phenomenal, empirical object into a mental 
image that no longer “presses too closely upon our senses” (Spectator 418). 
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the eighteenth century, we may perceive the beginning of a change in focus from the production 
of sublime language to the experience of the sublime itself.  
Consequently, these theoretical advances do not result in a severance of ties to the 
Longinus so much as they help to extend and round out his original formulation of the sublime. 
In particular, Longinus’ view of the sublime as a powerful force implying a vertical political 
structure is preserved in Edmund Burke’s emphasis on terror and “natural” hierarchy. Writing in 
1757, the philosopher-cum-statesman Burke claims, in his A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, that the predominant quality of sublime qua 
subjective experience is “whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, 
or operates in a manner analogous to terror” (1998, 86). This stress on the negative aspects of the 
sublime marks the crucial difference between Burke and his post-Longinian predecessors. 
According to Ronald Paulson, whereas someone like Addison regards the sublime as “liberating 
and exhilarating, a kind of happy aggrandizement,” Burke sees it as “alienating and diminishing” 
(1983, 69). However, Burke argues that a contradictory mode of pleasure may nevertheless be 
derived from this unpleasant experience. With the emphasis on the psychological effects of 
terror, Burke’s writing on the sublime constitutes a decisive double shift, recapturing Longinus’ 
sense of sublime power as a kind of mastery or dominion while simultaneously moving the 
discourse of the sublime away from mere linguistic performance toward the mind or faculties of 
the spectator. In effect, this dual emphasis brings the political implications of the Longinian 
sublime to the fore, assigning sublime power to the political end of maintaining a traditional (i.e., 
hierarchical) rule of law and order. For Burke, the sublime crushes us into admiring submission, 
and is thus capable of securing a people’s respect but not its love: “We submit to what we 
admire, but we love what submits to us; in one case we are forced, in the other flattered, into 
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compliance” (1998, 147). As Terry Eagleton argues, Burke sees in the sublime a “virile 
strenuousness,” a power that “rouses our filial fear, and hence our submissive obedience” (1990, 
54, 55). And yet, for this very reason, the sublime presents Burke with something of a political 
paradox. Simply put: as a crushing terror that elicits respect without love, the sublime risks 
creating the alienation and resentment that will undermine the consensual order it is intended to 
support. 
Writing at the heels of Burke’s Enquiry, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment of 1790 
radicalizes Burke’s shift in the discourse of the sublime, while avoiding the political problem of 
an effective yet self-undoing order. Unlike Burke, who while at no point conceding the radical 
possibility that sublimity is simply an effect of language nevertheless acknowledges language’s 
part in playing midwife to what is “conversant about terrible objects,” Kant, in his theory of the 
sublime, makes no special allowances for the effective use of symbolic expression, in effect 
stating that the transformational power of language has little to no bearing on the emergence or 
experience of sublime feeling. Even more radically, Kant excludes objects of experience from 
the provenance of the sublime. In keeping with his project of transcendental idealism, which 
holds that human beings experience only appearances and not things in themselves, Kant 
maintains that the sublime is purely subjective, an aesthetic judgment “whose determining basis 
cannot be other than subjective,” neither dependent on nor concerned with the usefulness or 
existence of an aesthetic object (1987, 44).4 What is more, he argues, aesthetic judgment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 According to Kant, aesthetic judgments are “reflective” rather than “determinative” judgments. In making a 
reflective judgment, the subject seeks to find an unknown universal for given particulars, whereas in making a 
determinative judgment, the subject subsumes given particulars under universals that are already known. As Kant 
puts it: It is one thing to say that “certain things of nature, or even all of nature, could be produced only by a cause 
that follows intentions in determining itself to action”; and quite another to say that “the peculiar character of my 
cognitive powers is such that the only way I can judge [how] those things are possible and produced is by 
conceiving…a cause that acts according to intentions, and hence a being that produces [things] in a way analogous 
to the causality of an understanding” (1987, 280). In the first part of the Critique of Judgment, Kant discusses the 
four possible reflective judgments—the agreeable, the good, the beautiful, and the sublime. These are the only four 
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constitutes a mental faculty, or mode of perception, distinct from either reason or understanding. 
Accordingly, the sublime judgment is not cognitive, not logical or rational; it does not 
presuppose fixed ideas, and it does not work to create new ones. Rather, the sublime works 
entirely through our feelings and is absolutely free of all ends or purposes. Thus, while Burke 
displaces the sublime from an ontological to an epistemological register, Kant pushes the 
implications of the shift to their logical epistemological conclusion. At the same time, he agrees 
with Burke that sublime feeling involves displeasure—e.g., fear and amazement bordering on 
terror. On Kant’s view, the sublime manifests itself not in terms of harmony but of disharmony 
or of struggle between the faculties of imagination and reason. This intra-subjective conflict, he 
argues, while initially giving rise to a sense of displeasure, nevertheless results in the 
reconciliation of reason and imagination, in which the imagination, by striving to attain to 
reason, experiences a sense of freedom, while simultaneously confirming the supremacy of 
reason vis-à-vis both the imagination and the sensible world of which it is a part. For that reason, 
Kant’s radical theory of the sublime avoids Burke’s dilemma of demoralization at the hands of 
crushing terror. With the Kantian sublime, the subject not only undergoes a negative, mediated 
pleasure but also comes to experience the feelings of admiration and respect for that part of itself 
which is supersensible—free to the extent that it is wholly undetermined by the sensible world.  
Kant’s epistemological take on aesthetic judgment would appear to debar the sublime 
from any rhetorical application, including political utility. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I argue 
that Kant’s theory of the sublime provides a model for conceiving of the sublime as a powerful 
rhetorical operation that by means of manipulating the imagination restores the emotive non-
cognitive conditions that legitimate political order on an affective level. As I demonstrate, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possible types of reflective judgment, as Kant relates them to the “Table of Judgments” from the Critique of Pure 
Reason (B95).  
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crucial part of this operation is the transfiguration of overwhelming, fear-inducing appearances 
into an experience of freedom that is nevertheless caught up in a relationship of dependence 
between government and the governed. If the tragic secures consent to the prevailing political 
order by way of strategic appearance, then the sublime ensures such consensus by dominating a 
certain subjective experience, creating a binding force for a relatively non-coercive or non-
absolutist system of rule. In this regard especially, Kant’s theory of the sublime is not only 
applicable to rhetoric but constitutes a significant gain in the political efficacy of the sublime. 
Over against the alienating effects of Burke’s sublime terror, the Kantian sublime exercises 
control while dissimulating the reality of its dominion. Although Kant did not express Burke’s 
loyalist convictions, favoring instead a republican form of government, the relationship he posits 
between the imagination and reason commits his understanding of the sublime to a vertical 
power structure, in which a hierarchical political order is reified as subjective experience. This 
reification, I argue, amounts to what I refer to as the rhetorical institution of the political sublime. 
And as in the case of the tragic, the political sublime owes its rhetorical effectivity to a precise 
emotive process. But unlike political catharsis, under the influence of the sublime this process 
consists not in a signifying process but in the formalization of an intense mental movement.5     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Although the Kantian sublime qualifies as a category of negative aesthetics, in the following explication of this 
concept I remain faithful to Kant’s terminology, which treats of the sublime as an aesthetic judgment. According to 
Kant, reflective judgments of the sublime are to be considered aesthetic because, as in the case of the aesthetic 
judgment of taste, they meet the four conditions described by the “moments.” That is to say, the satisfaction that is 
an essential component of the judgment the sublime must be represented as: universally valid (quantity), 
disinterestedness (quality), subjective purposiveness (relation), and necessity (modality). “For, since judgments 
about the sublime are made by the aesthetic reflective power of judgment,” he writes, “the liking for the sublime, 
just as that for the beautiful,” must be represented “as follows: in terms of quantity, as universally valid; in terms of 
quality, as devoid of interest; in terms of relation, [as a] subjective purposiveness; and in terms of modality, as a 
necessary subjective purposiveness (1987, 100). Nevertheless, the feeling on which sublime judgment is based is, in 
contrast to the feeling of the beautiful, characterized by initial disharmony between the faculties. For that reason, 
Kant regards all judgments of the sublime as presupposing a negative pleasure, even though the judgments 
themselves would positive judgments.   
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3.1 KANT’S “ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME” 
In a brief yet immensely influential treatment of the sublime, the Kant of The Critique of 
Judgment presents the sublime as an intense sensory response that discloses the superiority of a 
rational faculty over sensibility and the imagination. Properly understood, the sublime does not 
refer to qualities inhering in phenomenal, empirical objects of experience; rather it describes an 
affective movement of the mind, an intense feeling of amazement bordering on terror that results 
in a sense of elevation and exaltation. Nevertheless, it is precisely those chaotic, boundless, and 
terrifying objects of phenomenal experience that evoke the feeling (and judgment) of sublimity, 
that is, of reason’s overcoming of the sensible world and of the imagination’s striving to 
represent the unrepresentable: “it is…in its chaos that nature most arouses our ideas of the 
sublime, or in its wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation, provided it displays 
magnitude and might” (99–100). Although these feelings are aesthetic, and therefore feelings of 
pleasure, in a pure aesthetic experience of the sublime, the subject does not feel an unambiguous 
positive pleasure—as in a liking for beauty—but, as a result of the disharmonious relation of his 
or her imagination (or sensible faculty) and reason, feels a mixed, indirect, or negative pleasure.  
In contrast to the experience of beauty, in which the imagination is in “restful” accord 
with the understanding, when undergoing the sublime the mind is agitated, harmonizing with 
itself only by virtue of the contrast between the powers of reason and imagination. Kant 
compares this agitated state to a vibration, describing the mental movement of the sublime as “a 
rapid alternation of repulsion from, and attraction to, one and the same object” (1987, 115). For 
that reason, an object eliciting in us the feeling of sublimity gives us simultaneous pleasure and 
displeasure. “Hence,” Kant argues, “the feeling of the sublime is a feeling of displeasure that 
arises from the imagination’s inadequacy…but is at the same time also a pleasure, aroused by the 
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fact that this very judgment, namely, that even the greatest power of sensibility is inadequate, is 
[itself] in harmony with rational ideas, insofar as striving toward them is still a law for us” (114–
5). In other words, the pleasure of sublimity is negative not only because it involves repulsion 
from an object—a sense of the mind’s being overpowered or overwhelmed—but also because it 
negatively reveals reason’s supremacy over the sensible world, which includes the sensible 
faculty of the imagination. As Kant reiterates throughout the “Analytic of the Sublime,” reason 
humiliates both the imagination and sensibility (e.g., 98, 124, 127, passim). But, he is quick to 
add, the effect of this negativity is the augmentation of positive pleasure, “the feeling of a 
momentary inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is 
all the stronger” (98). Thus, in addition to a simultaneous repulsion and attraction to an object, 
the sublime involves something like a dam-and-release mechanism. Building on Kant’s analogy, 
we could depict this mental movement as an upward-downward vibration, downward because of 
the imagination’s debasement and upward because of the release or outpour of our “vital forces” 
that simultaneously accompanies and is made greater by this humiliation (see Clewis 2009, 61). 
On this view, the sublime is a serious emotion, one that moves us by virtue of a temporary (and 
temporal) blockage to a pleasant awareness of our supersensible nature and the ascendency of 
reason. 
This process of experiencing the sublime does not have to end with the feeling of a mixed 
pleasure that is caused in this way. Having felt this mixed pleasure, the subject can proceed to 
reflect on its true ground, which for Kant is the rational or moral idea.6 And this reflection, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 On the relationship between the sublime and the rational or moral idea, see Myskja (2002, 61–2, 74–7), Gasché 
(2003, 130), Kirwan (2004, 12, 23), and Robert Clewis (2009, 58–61). Gasché and Kirwan maintain that certain 
feelings simply are aesthetic judgments, that feeling and judgment are more or less identical. Accordingly, both 
characterize the sublime feeling as the sublime judgment. In contrast, Myskja and Clewis hold that the basis for the 
judgment of the sublime “is found,” according to Myskja, “in the feeling only” (2002, 158). Unlike the physiological 
changes associated with feelings, judgments possess a propositional character. Certainly, this quality need not be 
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argues, is the judgment that can accompany feelings of sublimity. However, Kant is aware that 
this reflection is not automatic, that the feeling of pleasure does not necessarily lead the subject 
to identify the genuine cause of the sublime experience. When the subject fails to recognize this 
true ground a subreption occurs “in which respect for the object is substituted for respect for the 
idea of humanity within our[selves, as] subject[s]” (114; cf. 209 n.2 and 1998 A311, B368). 
When we call objects themselves sublime, we commit a subreption, since the sublime is properly 
predicated not of the object, or of nature, but of a certain inner experience, one that by means of 
disharmony and frustration negatively presents reason’s independence from determination by 
sensible impulses. For Kant this reveals that the experience of the sublime is based on human 
freedom, specifically, on the rational idea of humanity in our subject and the capacity to resist 
and overcome sensible nature. Rhetorically, one could argue that committing a subreption is to 
think or judge metaphorically, that is, to transfer “the sublime” from the subjective to the 
empirical, phenomenal plane of reference. However, since statements such as “That mountain is 
sublime” attempt to name aesthetically something that cannot be thus named, it is more accurate 
to describe subreption as a species of catachresis, i.e., as a transfer of a term (“the sublime”) 
from one place to another when no actual, proper words exists.7 Although prodigious objects and 
powerful forces may have definitional or “proper” names (e.g., “mountains” or “hurricanes”), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
strictly understood in terms of an assertion or utterance—e.g., in the manner of a speech act. For “judgment,” writes 
Clewis, “can also refer to the response to or experience of something in a certain way,” as in, “I judge a thing to be 
sublime when I experience it as sublime” (2009, 60). Although this sense of “judging” is much closer to “feeling” 
than the two are distinct.      
7 The difference between metaphor and catachresis was clearly defined as early as Quintilian’s discussion of 
catachresis in the Institutio oratoria. Here he defines catachresis (abusio, or abuse) as “the practice of adapting the 
nearest available terms to describe something for which no actual [i.e., proper] term exists” (2002, 8.6.35–36). As 
Patricia Parker argues, “[Catachresis] is a transfer of terms from one place to another employed when no proper 
word exists, while metaphor is a transfer or substitution employed when a proper term does already exist and is 
displaced by a term transferred from another place to a place not its own” (1990, 60). An earlier treatment, 
[Cicero’s] Rhetorica ad Herennium blurs the distinction by defining catachresis as “the inexact use of a like and 
kindred word in place of the precise and proper one.” This view, while not incorrect, does not clearly distinguish 
catachresis from metaphor.  
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they necessarily lack original aesthetic titles. Notwithstanding the potential advantages that 
subreption offers the phenomenology of everyday of experience—that is, subreption as 
shorthand for describing complex mental phenomena and the effects on consciousness of 
experiential objects—the ascription of sublimity to an external thing or object is aesthetically 
catachrestic. Accordingly, we would not be off the mark in describing subreption as an aesthetic 
sub-species of catachresis or an aesthetic instantiation of a rhetorical figure. 
Despite grounding the sublime in an agitated mental movement, Kant readily 
acknowledges that our experience of the sublime is typically a response to an object (or event) of 
nature, one that acts as a stimulus or provocation of sublime feeling and judgment. Moreover, he 
argues that this movement can be set into motion in two distinct ways and thus divides the 
mind’s being simultaneously attracted and repelled into two different varieties of sublimity.8 
Explicitly, he identifies two basic types of aesthetic judgments of the sublime: the mathematical 
(or quantitative) and the dynamical (or qualitative) (§28).9  
Kant begins §25 of the Critique by nominally defining the sublime on the basis of the 
magnitude (i.e., the proportion of space and time phenomena occupy vis-à-vis other phenomena), 
specifically, on the basis of the absolutely large or great: “We call sublime what is absolutely 
large. To be large and to be a magnitude are quite different concepts…. Also, saying simply that 
something is large is quite different from saying that it is absolutely large…. The latter is what is 
large beyond all comparison” (1987, 103). Through our encounter with vast formless objects—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nevertheless, since sublimity is properly predicated of the subject having the experience of the sublime—
specifically, of a subject’s ideas of reason—objective properties are not the primary factor in whether or not an 
object can elicit the sublime.  
9 Recently, however, Robert Clewis has appended Kant’s typology, arguing that there are not two but three basic 
kinds of aesthetic experiences of the sublime (2009). Thus, to the mathematical and dynamical he adds the moral as 
a third type of Kantian sublimity. I return to the idea of a moral sublime below vis-à-vis enthusiasm as a sublime 
mental state. For the provenance of the terms “mathematical” and “dynamical” see Kant’s first Critique (1998, 
B202). 
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say, a boundless, raging ocean, violent volcanoes, thunder clouds flashing with lightning—we 
are led or stimulated to estimate the greatness of their magnitude by reference to the absolute 
measure, namely, infinity as a whole. Indeed, what is truly sublime in the judgment of the 
mathematical sublime is the idea of infinity (the absolutely large) as such. And this idea, Kant 
claims, does not have a standard outside of itself but contains its own standard: “It is a magnitude 
that is equal to itself.” For that reason, “It follows that the sublime must not be sought in things 
of nature, but must be sought solely in our ideas,” in this case, the idea of infinity (105). Yet in 
searching out this standard that is “beyond all comparison,” the imagination as the sensible 
faculty for estimating magnitude, is led into a regress that quickly overwhelms its capacity of 
comprehension; the imagination simply cannot comprehend infinity in a single intuition and 
therefore cannot even begin to represent it adequately. The experience is too great for the 
imagination to “take it all in” at once (see Burnham 2000, 91). But, ipso facto, Kant writes, 
“[This] inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible 
power; and what is absolutely large is not an object of sense, but is the use that judgment makes 
naturally of certain objects so as to [arouse] this (feeling)…” (1987, 106). In other words, the felt 
frustration of the imagination’s inadequacy gives way to a feeling of pleasure deriving from the 
awareness that this inadequacy in respect to an idea of reason exemplifies our ultimate vocation: 
that our supersensible power of reason is superior to sensibility and therefore capable of 
transcending the limitations of the phenomenal world, including those of our finite, phenomenal 
existence (Clewis 1989, 99–100). As recent commentators have pointed out (Guyer 1993; 
Allison 2001; and Clewis 2009), for Kant this theoretical superiority to sensible nature can be 
viewed as a type of negative practical freedom in that it reveals to us or reminds us of our 
independence from determination by sensible nature. For that reason, Kant supplements his 
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initial formula, adding, “Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a 
power surpassing any standard of sense” (1987, 106). For in the encounter with the concept of 
the infinite or infinity, the subject either becomes aware or is reminded of being superior to 
nature by virtue of vocation as a rational supersensible being.10 
In contrast to the mathematical sublime, the dynamical sublime is not grounded on an 
idea of infinity, at least not in any obvious sense, nor is it stimulated by the vastness of objects. If 
the mathematical sublime occurs when we cannot absorb the object, the dynamical sublime 
occurs when we feel awe or fear before an object of overwhelming power. §28, “On Nature as 
Might,” is the only section in the Analytic of the Sublime that deals primarily with the dynamical 
sublime rather than with the mathematical sublime or with some dimension of both forms 
(quality or modality). Here Kant defines might as “an ability that is superior to great obstacles,” 
arguing that it is to be regarded as having dominance if it “is superior even to the resistance of 
something that itself possesses might” (119). From this definition he claims that if we judge 
aesthetically that “nature as a might” has no dominion over us, then we are experiencing the 
dynamically sublime, for like the mathematical sublime, it too reveals our freedom and 
superiority to nature.11 So too, although a powerful natural object initially acts as a stimulus of 
the aesthetic experience, the actual judgment of the dynamical sublime is based on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 There are both psychological and conceptual-analytic arguments for Kant’s articulation of the mathematical 
sublime with negative freedom. For an example of the psychological argument, see Henry Allison (2001, 325–6, 
399 n.42). Compare with Robert Clewis who proposes an alternative conceptual-analytic type of argument (2009, 
64–6). 
11 The outer nature against which the aesthetic subject judges itself superior includes those objects that by virtue of 
their power and might elicit the sublime. Such objects include the range of phenomena that since Thomas Burnet’s 
The Sacred Theory of the Earth (1680–1689) were regarded as exemplifying the sublime—e.g., the brooding 
intensity of the mountain crag, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, a prodigious, raging storm, etc. Indeed, Burnet 
was one of the earliest aestheticians to articulate the infinite with objects that evoke the sublime. See Marjorie Hope 
Nicolson (1959, 210–14). However, as a theorist of “the natural sublime,” Burnet located the origins of sublimity in 
the external world or in the divine, rather than in the supersensible faculty of reason. Of course, for Kant, the same 
objects can be vast and powerful, since sublimity is predicated of the subject and not the properties of objects.  
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supersensible idea of our own reason and on the revelation of its superiority vis-à-vis the sensible 
world. But unlike aesthetic judgments of the mathematical sublime, if nature is to be judged 
dynamically sublime it must involve the arousal fear; it must be represented as arousing fear: 
If we are to judge nature as sublime dynamically, we must present it as arousing 
fear. (But the reverse does not hold: not every object that arouses fear is found 
sublime when we judge it aesthetically.) For when we judge [something] 
aesthetically (without a concept), the only way we can judge a superiority over 
obstacles is by the magnitude of the resistance. But whatever we strive to resist is 
an evil, and it is an object of fear if we find that our ability [to resist it] is no 
match for it. Hence nature can count as a might, and so as dynamically sublime, 
for aesthetic judgment only insofar as we consider it as an object of fear (119).  
Kant’s point in this passage is to distinguish an aesthetic judgment of the sublime—i.e. one 
whose determining ground is subjective—from logical judgments based on concepts. Thinking 
conceptually, one can logically judge an object as possessing might. In order for the judgment to 
be aesthetic, the judgment of the object’s might must be determined by an affective response to 
it, namely, by the amount of fear it would produce in our efforts to resist it.  
To this, Kant adds another fundamental distinction: that the might of nature is 
aesthetically disclosed in one of two ways—either through actual or imagined fear. He writes, 
“We can…consider an object fearful without being afraid of it, namely, if we judge it in such a 
way that we merely think of the case where we might possibly want to put up resistance against 
it, and that any resistance would in that case be utterly futile” (1987, 119–20). Although in 
judgment of dynamical sublimity the object must be imagined or represented as arousing fear, 
the subject cannot actually be afraid when making a judgment of sublimity. Rather, he or she 
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must be disinterested regarding whether or how the object satisfies our desire for self-
preservation, welfare, or happiness (see n4 above). To be sure, we fear whatever overpowers us 
if we try to resist it, and nature counts as dynamically sublime insofar as our capacity to resist it 
is not a match for its power. However, Kant tells us, if one were in an actual state of fear, then 
that person would simply “flee from the sight of an object that scares us, and it is impossible to 
like terror that we take seriously” (120).12 Of course, Kant maintains that judgments of the 
dynamical sublime qua aesthetic judgments involve feelings of (negative) pleasure. Accordingly, 
as in the mathematical sublime, in the dynamical sublime one must become aware or be made 
conscious—via the might demonstrated by nature—of her true vocation as a rational and 
therefore supersensible being. As sensuous finite beings subject (without) to determination by 
natural causality and (within) to sensible impulses, human beings do not possess a power that is 
comparable to nature’s dominion—hence our fear at imagining a situation in which we confront 
something that overpowers our capacity to resist (e.g. God). But as creatures possessing a non-
natural supersensible faculty, we become conscious of our superiority to nature, both within and 
outside us: “Whatever arouses this feeling in us, and this includes the might of nature that 
challenges our forces, is then (although improperly) called sublime” (123).13 Fearfulness is thus 
found attractive insofar as it presupposes and “reveals in us…an ability to judge ourselves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is similar to the way that Aristotle treats the relationship of tragic katharsis to pity and fear: “the poet should 
use representation to produce the pleasure [arising] from pity and terror” (1987a, 1453b11; my emphasis). However, 
as I argued in the last chapter, tragic catharsis may result from rhetorical processes of representation in addition to 
the dramatic representation of a complete action. For a contrast on the relationship between fear and the sublime, see 
Edmund Burke’s Enquiry (esp. Part I, Sections III, VII, and XVIII). For useful commentary on how Kant departs 
from Burke’s thinking on this matter, see Paul Crowther (1989, 108–11). 
13 To experience the dynamically sublime, Kant argues, one must be in a position of safety or one in which the 
subject does not perceive an imminent danger to him or herself. However, this condition is ancillary to the revelation 
of our true vocation as rational supersensible beings, which requires disinterestedness: “Hence if in judging nature 
aesthetically we call it sublime, we do so not because nature arouses fear, but because it calls forth our strength 
(which does not belong to nature [within us]), to regard as small the [objects] of our [natural] concerns…and 
because of this we regard nature’s might…as yet not having such dominance over us, as persons, that we should 
have to bow to it if our highest principles were at stake and we had to choose between upholding or abandoning 
them” (121; cf., 129).  
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independent of nature” (120–21), as well as “our superiority to nature within us, and thereby also 
to nature outside us (as far as it influences us)” (123). Here, as in the mathematical sublime, it is 
not nature as such that is truly sublime but the vocation of our capacity as supersensible beings. 
Although Kant characterizes both the mathematical and the dynamical sublime in terms 
of reason’s ascendency vis-à-vis the phenomenal world, in both types of aesthetic judgment the 
initial disharmony between reason and the imagination eventually gives way to a reconciliation 
that is ultimately satisfying, despite its remaining a negative pleasure.14 This satisfaction occurs, 
he argues, once the imagination has succeeded—albeit through its very failure—in revealing a 
capacity to transcend the sensibly given (the superiority of reason) and/or in disclosing a 
practical power not to be determined by sensibility (practical freedom). In the mathematical 
sublime, the imagination fails to synthesize the manifold of shapes or sensations and thus falls 
short of the ideal of infinity or the concept of the infinite. As a sensible faculty, the imagination 
proves to be inadequate to the law of reason, which demands that “every appearance that may be 
given us [be comprehended] in [an] intuition of the whole,” wherein the absolute whole (infinity) 
functions as a “determinate measure that is valid for everyone [i.e., universal] and unchanging” 
(i.e., necessary) (114). This failure to comprehend a totality of intuitions creates a tension or 
contrapurposive relation between reason and the imagination, the effect of which is a mental 
shock or intense mental movement. This tension not only points to the affective bipolar structure 
of mathematical sublimity but it also reveals the presence of the faculty of reason. Although the 
imagination fails to comprehend infinity as an absolute measure, this failure, by virtue of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Although Kant characterizes pleasure in the sublime as resulting from the simultaneous repulsion and attraction to 
an object, this dam-and-release mechanism is triggered differently according to whether the aesthetic judgment is of 
mathematical or dynamical sublimity—or, in terms of objective properties, according to whether the object eliciting 
the sublime judgment is vast or powerful. In §24, he tells us that in the mathematical sublime the imagination refers 
its agitation to reason as “the cognitive power” (i.e., the faculty of cognition or theoretical reason), whereas in the 
dynamical sublime the imagination refers to reason as “the power of desire” (i.e., the faculty of desire or practical 
reason). Of course, he adds, “[In] both cases the purposiveness of the given presentation will be judged only with 
regard to these powers,” that is, “without any purpose or interest” (101). 
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disclosing the superiority of a supersensible faculty, enables the subject to become aware of his 
or her transcendence and transcendental freedom vis-à-vis the limitations of finite phenomenal 
existence. By contrast, in the dynamical sublime the problem for the imagination is not so much 
that it fails reason—since reason does not demand our refutation of nature’s claim to dominion 
over us as it demands the synthesis of a manifold—but that as a sensible faculty the imagination 
is of a piece with the very sensible nature that is revealed to be transcended the supersensible 
faculty of reason. Here, too, this transcendence reveals or implies a power to overcome 
determination by natural and sensible causes, thereby leading the subject to reflect on the 
supersensible idea of his or her own practical freedom (and possibly other moral ideas as well). 
Hence, in both the mathematical and the dynamical sublime, the imagination’s initial frustration 
is simultaneously experienced as a pleasure arising from our awareness that the imagination’s 
inadequacy (negatively) demonstrates the vocation of our capacity, namely, to make reason 
triumph over sensibility. This does not necessarily mean that reason and the imagination are thus 
permanently reconciled to one another but that the affective nature of the sublime is such that the 
agitation between faculties will tend to resolve itself temporarily in judgments of sublimity.15   
Implicit in this account of reconciliation is that the imagination’s initial failure is 
productive of at least two positive effects. First, argues Kant, in failing either to overcome 
nature’s might or to represent infinity, the imagination undergoes or feels itself extended, 
expanded, or raised up (1987, 105, 121, 129). This experience is different depending on whether 
the sublime experience is mathematical or dynamical. In the mathematical sublime, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 According to Lyotard, this resolution amounts to an impossibility and is a sheer fabrication on the part of Kant. 
Rather than demonstrating the superiority of reason vis-à-vis the imagination, the conflict between the faculties 
confirms the inadequacy of the imagination and reason to each other. Inasmuch as the imagination is a faculty 
belonging to the sensible world, this intra-subjective conflict is also, he argues, a conflict between the material world 
of objects and the mind. What happens in the sublime is nothing short of a crisis, a “violent disproportion,” in which 
we witness the differend, i.e., the straining of the mind at the edges both of itself and of its conceptuality (1994, 234, 
237, 239; see also 1988, 12 and 21–2).  
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expansion is caused by reason’s demand for the infinite, which the imagination, however much it 
is extended, cannot reach or comprehend in a single intuition. In dynamical sublimity, the 
extension owes to the fact that the imagination recognizes the capacity of certain powerful 
objects to humiliate our capacity to resist their might. It does this by means of “exhibiting those 
cases where the mind can come to feel its own sublimity,” that is, by presenting various cases in 
which our sensible being feels threatened by such superior force or power (121). Despite these 
differences—or, despite the different reasons for this expansion—in both the mathematical and 
the dynamical sublime the extension of the imagination counts as a type of freedom, since the 
imagination feels a kind of freedom in trying to transcend its own limitations. The aesthetic 
judgment of the sublime “strains the imagination to its limit, whether of expansion 
(mathematically) or of its might over the mind (dynamically), and it strains the imagination 
“because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly transcends the domain 
of nature (namely, moral feeling)” (128). For that reason, the experience of the sublime is an 
admixture of fascination and horror, on the one hand, and elevation, uplift, and exaltation, on the 
other. Second, the ultimate harmony (via initial conflict) between the imagination and reason 
reveals, as we have seen, the presence and superiority of the faculty of reason. Thus indirectly, 
the imagination’s failure shores up reason by promoting its aims. It enables the subject to 
become aware of his or her practical freedom, that his, his or her transcendence or transcendental 
freedom. The imagination serves the interests of reason through its sacrifice, “in return for which 
it reveals in us an unfathomable depth of this supersensible power, whose consequences extend 
beyond what we can foresee” (131), i.e., by making the mind aware of its rational superiority to 
sensibility and intuition.  
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Given this interplay between reason and the imagination, Kant argues that the sublime’s 
bipolar, positive-negative structure is not simply made up of either a positive valence that merely 
attracts or a negative one that only repels but that it combines both aspects in a feeling of 
“admiration or respect” (1987, 98). For Kant, respect in general refers to the “feeling that it is 
beyond our ability [as natural, finite beings] to attain to an idea that is a law for us” (114). 
Reason, as that which contains the idea of independence from determination by natural and 
sensible causes, arouses respect by virtue of the imagination’s inability either to fulfill reason’s 
demand for infinity or to resist whatever is an evil for us. Reason is thus revealed as the source of 
what is worthy of respect, namely, a law. In that capacity, Kant tells us, reason serves as one of 
the sources of the (negative) satisfaction that is felt in the sublime, if not the primary source. 
According to Žižek, respect would thus appear to account for why an object evoking feelings of 
sublimity gives us simultaneous pleasure and displeasure: such an object “gives us displeasure 
because of its inadequacy to the Thing-Idea, but precisely through this inadequacy it gives us 
pleasure by indicating the true, incomparable greatness of the Thing, surpassing every possible 
phenomenal, empirical experience” (1989, 203). This importance notwithstanding, Kant also 
tells us that satisfaction in the sublime involves the feeling of amazement or astonishment 
(Verwunderung), as he writes, an “amazement bordering on terror,” “horror,” and “a sacred 
thrill” (129).16 For Kant, astonishment encapsulates the forceful, striking movement of the mind 
in which the sublime consists; more so than the feeling of respect, amazement characterizes the 
feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers followed immediately by an outpouring of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Edmund Burke also associated the sublime with astonishment. In the Enquiry, Burke claims that the sublime in 
nature causes astonishment, which is “that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some 
degree of horror…the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence 
reason on that object which employs it…. Astonishment…is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; the 
inferior effects are admiration, reverence and respect” (1998, 101). As we see in this passage, Burke also associates 
admiration and astonishment.  
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them that is all the stronger (1987, 98). It is an affect—that is, an intense, fleeting feeling—but 
one felt in consequence of the dam-and-release mechanism that is initiated when one attempts to 
represent or imagine vast and powerful objects. Specifically, it is an affect that occurs “when we 
present novelty that exceeds our expectation” (133; cf. 242–3).17 As John Usher writes roughly 
three decades before Kant’s Critique, the power of the sublime is such that it “takes possession 
of our attention, and all our faculties, and absorbs them in astonishment” (1996, 147). However, 
Kant quickly dissociates admiration from amazement, describing admiration as “an amazement 
that does not cease once the novelty is gone” (1987, 133; cf. 243), one “that keeps returning” 
even after the disappearance of the “doubt as to whether one has seen or judged correctly” 
(243).18 According to Robert Clewis, “When an event unexpectedly goes against one’s 
expectations, which are ordered by general rules, one is initially astonished [i.e., amazed] or 
wonders about it, and this astonishment often turns into admiration” (2009, 186). But whether 
the sublime elicits amazement as such or admiration as a peculiar type of amazement (prolonged 
and perhaps calmer), the sublime remains a mental shock. What sets it apart as an affect is its 
tendency to persist even when the initial doubt about one’s judgment or perception subsides. 
Along with the feeling of respect, it describes the affective nature, the intense feelings, 
comprising the felt experience of both the mathematical and dynamical sublime. 
In addition to the feelings of respect and admiration that accompany the imagination’s 
being elevated, Kant identifies aesthetic enthusiasm as a mental state characteristic of sublime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a more thorough account of the distinction between amazement and admiration 
18 Similarly, Longinus argues, “We might say of all such matters that man can easily understand what is useful or 
necessary, but he admires what passes his understanding,” or, in Kantian terms, the faculty of representation (1991, 
48). Whereas being convinced of the truth of something is usually within one’s control, amazement or admiration is 
the result of an irresistible force beyond the control of any audience.  
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experience.19 As with the feelings of respect and admiration, enthusiasm is a feeling or affect that 
can be rendered aesthetically sublime: “it is a straining of our forces by ideas that impart to the 
mind a momentum whose effects are mightier and more permanent than those of an impulse 
produced by presentations of sense” (132). On this view, enthusiasm partakes of the tensions and 
intense movements that characterize sublime experience as such. As an affect, it exhibits the 
mental agitation of attraction-repulsion, dam-and-release, which is felt in consequence of 
encounters with vast or powerful objects. As Slavoj Žižek points out, enthusiasm is “an example 
of purely negative presentation,” i.e., the “successful presentation by means of failure, of the 
inadequacy itself” (1989, 204). In contrast to respect and admiration, there is a sense in which 
enthusiasm is sublime in itself; more precisely, aesthetic enthusiasm is at once a component, or 
affect, of the sublime and a form of sublime in its own right (see Clewis 2009, 183–94).20 
Meaning to say that it, too, helps make up the negative pleasure that constitutes satisfaction in 
the sublime. Although Kant nowhere makes this explicit, it is an implication of the above claim 
that enthusiasm, when aesthetically instantiated, amounts to a straining of our forces. Whereas 
respect and admiration are merely felt in consequence of certain judgments or perceptions, in 
enthusiasm the imagination is un-reined, unbridled (zügellos), as it is in both the mathematical 
and the dynamical types of sublimity. However, just as these types of aesthetic judgment enlarge 
or expand the imagination vis-à-vis reason’s demand for totality or the imagined presentation of 
a mighty force or superior power, enthusiasm encourages the imagination to try to represent an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kant’s conception of aesthetic enthusiasm is distinct from that of practical enthusiasm, which Kant describes as 
having to do with desires, intentions, and agency (1978, 158; cf. 228–9) and which may be closer to our ordinary 
understanding of enthusiasm than aesthetic enthusiasm.   
20 Robert Clewis has recently made the case for considering enthusiasm as an instantiation of what he considers “the 
moral sublime,” a third type of sublimity that he appends to the mathematical and dynamical. However, compare to 
Lyotard’s account of the incommensurability of morality and the sublime in terms of his concept of the differend 
(1994, 224–39). 
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unrepresentable idea of reason through its own image, ideas such as God or the republican form 
of government.21  
Indeed, it is aesthetic enthusiasm that, as we will see, simultaneously links the sublime to 
politics and frustrates the desire to establish or maintain deliberation as a viable means of doing 
politics. For as Kant maintains, the intense, bipolar structure of the sublime is such that it not 
only frustrates and encourages the imagination but in so doing also threatens to overwhelm 
reason and the careful consideration required by the promotion of prudential ends. Although the 
imagination ought to remain under the rule of reason, which gives the imagination its very 
expansion, sometimes it does not; sometimes reason is overwhelmed or co-opted by affect in the 
guise of reason. As Kant reminds us, affects, particularly those tied to the feelings of sublimity, 
are ambiguous. Enthusiasm can enlarge the imagination, but it can just as easily “exclude the 
sovereignty of reason” at least momentarily. 
 
3.2 THE POLITICS OF THE SUBLIME 
In a series of lectures given in 1970, Hannah Arendt provocatively claims that if there 
exists a political philosophy in Kant, “then it seems obvious that we should be able to find it…in 
his whole work and not just in the few essays that are usually collected under this rubric” (1992a, 
31). In reconstructing this “hidden” philosophy, she privileges certain topics that she considers 
central to the third Critique, which, she maintains, are of “eminent political significance” (14), 
specifically, the particular, the faculty of judgment, and the sociability of man (Geselligkeit). On 
her view, the interrelation of these concepts point to a kind of cosmopolitanism wherein the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Throughout his corpus, Kant highlights two examples of aesthetic enthusiasm: that of the Jewish law (Exodus 
20:4) prohibiting the fashioning of graven images of the divine and the idea of the republic that occupied the 
European imagination before, during, and after the French Revolution (on the latter, see Huet 1994; Neculau 2008; 
and Clewis 2009, 200–15). 
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public realm is constituted “by the critics and the spectators, not by the actors or the makers” 
(63), that is, by those who form judgments or reflect upon human affairs—in community with 
others and according to the standard of perpetual progress or peace—by those who decide, “by 
having an idea of the whole, whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made” 
(58). These perspectives of the spectator and progress coincide in the seeming contradiction of 
Kant’s assessment of the French Revolution, which combines both an almost boundless 
admiration for the French Revolution with an equally boundless opposition to any revolutionary 
undertaking on the part of the French citizens. According to Arendt this tension results from the 
clash in Kant between the principle according to which one should act and the principle 
according to which one should judge. “What constituted the appropriate public realm for this 
particular event,” she argues, “were not the actors but the acclaiming spectators,” those who 
judge according to the standard of progress rather than, say, the sensory ideal of happiness (61). 
From this reflective or aesthetic point of view—that of the disinterested spectator who thinks and 
judges and publicly—the event’s importance lies precisely in its opening up new horizons for the 
future, viz., in the realization of the idea of a republic form of government—and in the revelation 
(in the present) of undisclosed possibilities involving the securing of rights established by a just 
government. 
Aside from the Critique’s potential importance to reconstructing Kant’s implicit political 
philosophy, his understanding of judgments of sublimity has bearing on the aesthetic 
significance of certain political events—of the French Revolution, to be sure, but also of any 
object that could elicit the kind of mental shock that attends the sublime’s simultaneous feelings 
of attraction-repulsion, pleasure-displeasure, and so on. Although the “Analytic of the Sublime” 
was published in the year following the outbreak of the French Revolution, Kant’s formal 
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assessment of the event did not appear until the publication five years later (1795) of “An Old 
Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?” (Part Three of The Conflict 
of Faculties). Without explicitly framing the event in terms of the sublime (mathematical or 
dynamical), he describe the spectators’ enthusiasm as an intense mental movement: 
The revolution of a gifted people which we have seen unfolding in our day may 
succeed or miscarry; it may be filled with misery and atrocities to the point that a 
sensible man, were he boldly to hope to execute it successfully the second time, 
would never resolve to make the experiment at such cost—this revolution, I say, 
nonetheless finds in the hearts of all spectators (who are not engaged in the game 
themselves) a wishful participation [or exaltation] that borders closely on 
enthusiasm, the very expression of which is fraught with danger; this sympathy, 
therefore, can have no other cause than a moral predisposition in the human race 
(302). 
As Arendt points out, the emphasis here is on the spectators, not the actors, the practical 
outcome, or the actuality of the Revolution, e.g., from the burning of the Bastille to the execution 
of the royal family and the bloody conflict between the Girondins and Jacobins. From a political 
standpoint, what matters to Kant is only the status of the Revolution as a supersensible idea of 
reason, that is, its emergence into history as a signal of moral progress. According to Robert 
Clewis, “The onlookers’ enthusiasm functions not as intuition that schematizes or represents a 
concept, but as a phenomenal hint of a moral predisposition...and thus of human freedom” and 
the idea of progress (2009, 174). In other words, their enthusiasm reveals itself as grounded on 
the right to a republican constitution that would protect the rights of the citizens and prevent the 
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political freedom of a citizen from being limited unjustly either by an individual ruler or the 
State.  
However, of equal importance in this evaluation is the sublime mental movement that 
characterizes this enthusiasm—this “wishful participation” bordering on enthusiasm. As Philip 
Shaw remarks, in some contrast to Arendt’s liberal interpretation, Kant is “not so much 
interested in the politics of the Revolution, as in the feeling it arouses in its spectators” (2006, 
86). Indeed, since the Revolution as idea cannot be represented as a whole by any object or 
sensible intuition—since it cannot be given sensual form—it at once frustrates and stimulates the 
imagination to rise above the level of experience, or sensible realm, and to take flight in 
enthusiasm (Clewis 2009, 173–76, 191–4; Shaw 2006, 80, 86–88; and Huet 1994). Like the 
Jewish commandment not to make graven images, the Revolution encourages enthusiasm as the 
unboundedness of the imagination, combining the supersensible idea of transcendental (political) 
freedom with feelings of both elevation and exaltation, without which it would not be a feeling 
of the sublime (Kant 1987, 109). The imagination is thus enlarged but only by virtue of its 
inadequacy to represent the idea of freedom. Or, put otherwise, in failing “to attain to an idea 
that is law,” the imagination experiences freedom or partakes of the idea of freedom by way of 
the feeling of respect. Accompanying this (negative) satisfaction is the fear-inducing power 
demonstrated by the Revolution itself as aesthetic “object.” For the enthusiasm of the 
“uninvolved public looking on” expresses not only respect for the idea of a republic but also an 
enthusiasm “fraught with danger.” Nevertheless, the spectators feel and express their enthusiasm 
without actually participating in the event, and thus without actually being afraid, even though 
the situation or political atmosphere is capable of arousing fear, whether of persecution, 
ostracism, or death. This would seem to qualify the Revolution—or, to be precise, the feeling it 
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arouses—as an instance of dynamical sublimity: as an aesthetic response to fear-inducing power 
(that of the revolutionaries), the Revolution reveals or implies a power to overcome sensible 
nature, expanding the imagination not only, via enthusiasm, by demonstrating the impossibility 
of granting sensual form to supersensible ideas but also by encouraging the onlookers to refute 
the event’s claim to dominion over their being, that is, to feel themselves as transcending the 
limits imposed by their own sensible embodiment (see Crowther 1989, 146–7).22 What is more, 
in this overcoming of corporeal pain, or fear pertaining to the finitude of sensible being, the 
onlookers come to feel the peculiar kind of amazement that Kant describes as admiration 
(Bewunderung). And this admiration, which persists long after 1799, is felt both for the rational 
capacity to transcend sensible impulses and nature and for the ideas (Ideas) of freedom and 
progress that enter into the historical arena under the banner of the Revolution. 
Despite the historical and philosophical significance of Kant’s aesthetic interpretation of 
the Revolution, his articulation of the sublime with this political event stands in stark contrast to 
another, equally notable, aesthetic gloss of the Revolution. Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, published the same year as the Critique, not only repudiates the political 
efficacy of the Revolution but also—and more important for our purposes—denies the event any 
basis in sublime feeling. Availing himself of his earlier work in aesthetics, Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757), Burke sets out to 
reclaim the sublime for the purpose of constitutional preservation, distinguishing between (1) the 
false, or revolutionary, sublime and (2) its true, constitutional counterpart under the British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For contrasting views on how to qualify the sublimity of the Revolution, see Bjørn K. Myskja and Robert Clewis. 
Myskja characterizes as sublime the revolutionaries’ acts, claiming that their enthusiasm would be an instance of the 
dynamical sublime (2002, 300); whereas Clewis regards the idea of the republic as sublime and characterizes 
enthusiasm for that idea as an instance of what he terms “the moral sublime” (2009, 191–4). See also Neculau 
(2008), whose reading is comparable to Myskja’s, and Marie-Hélène Huet’s eclectic essay (1994), which reads the 
Revolutionaries’ anxiety about the nature of representation through the lens of the Kantian sublime. 
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system—between the pernicious inflation of revolutionary discourse and the “natural” 
hierarchies embodied in the British constitution. Although Burke vacillates on whether the 
“radical” sublime is false because it is ridiculous, and therefore neither serious nor terrifying, or 
because the misrule and excess exhibited by the revolutionaries is truly terrifying, truly 
threatening to a stable social order, in either case the revolutionaries’ actions do not result in 
admiration (see Furniss 1993, 135–7 and Shaw 2006, 63–70).23 What appalls Burke is that the 
unfettered energy of revolutionary zeal should be permitted to upend the beauty of social 
concord “the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle, and obedience liberal, which 
harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a bland assimilation, incorporated into 
politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society” (1968, 171). Under the British 
system, by contrast, “the spirit of freedom” is tempered by “an awful gravity”—the true, loyalist 
sublime—which preserves “the pleasing illusions” of domestic peace and social harmony: “This 
idea of a liberal descent inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity, which prevents that 
upstart insolence almost inevitably adhering to and disgracing those who are the first acquirers of 
any distinction. By this means our liberty becomes a noble freedom. It carries an imposing and 
majestic aspect” (121). In the event that the spirit of freedom is not thus tempered and the 
revolution is allowed to overcome the minds of men “grown torpid,” the sublime degenerates 
into a mere “stage effect” (156), propped up by outbursts of “exultation and rapture” (93). But as 
critics both recent and past have argued, Burke’s attempt to assert the integrity of a loyalist 
sublime versus a revolutionary sublime—and to reduce the latter to a dramatic or textual 
performance—reflects a struggle to maintain the boundaries between words and things (see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Tom Furniss, a sympathetic reader of Burke, provides the following rationalization: “Consider Burke’s dilemma. 
On the one hand he must portray the Revolution as ridiculous so as to maintain ‘a certain ironic distance.’ Yet, at the 
same time, he must persuade his readers that the Revolution is ‘sheer terror because it will not keep its “distance”’ 
(1993, 135). 
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Ferguson 1992, 135–7). The emphasis on “stage effect,” in other words, exposes a fault line 
within the discourse of the sublime, such that the distinction between the true and false sublime 
no longer applies; or more exactly, the distinction reveals its own insecurity by pointing up the 
tension between two opposing discourses, loyalist and revolutionary. What Burke fails to 
mention but what his own arguments imply is that each discourse is capable of producing a 
reality effect, that is, of being made real through language, argument, and interpretation and thus 
“true” in its effects. This, in turn, undermines the authority of Burke’s own Reflections, since it, 
too, is just one more discourse in search of an audience to confirm its “truth.” As Thomas Paine 
astutely argues, “I cannot consider Mr Burke’s book in scarcely any other light than a dramatic 
performance; and he must, I think, have considered it in the same light himself, by the poetical 
liberties he has taken of omitting some facts, distorting others, and making the whole machinery 
bend to produce a stage effect” (1995 [1791], 110). Of course, what Paine fails to observe is that 
all discourse, loyalist and revolutionary, is equally performative. The separation of the false 
sublime from its authentic counterpart is impossible to sustain, or, more precisely, their line of 
separation points up the fact that it could always be differently drawn—that it could always be 
demonstrated or made to be otherwise. 
This struggle in Burke’s writings between the sublime object and its discursive 
performance points up a similar tension in the Kantian sublime, one that also extends to his 
aesthetic interpretation of the Revolution. For Kant, the apparent tension is not so much between 
words and things as between phenomenal objects and the supersensible power of reason. 
According to Philip Shaw, in the case of the French Revolution, “the feeling for the sublime 
dimension of progress is brought about only within the context of an empirical event…. We can 
[thus] conceive of freedom only in the context of history, which amounts to saying that concepts, 
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such as freedom, cannot, in the end, be extracted from real-world experiences…. The sublime 
belongs to the sphere of reason, yet it is manifested through real world objects, such as oceans 
and mountains, and real-world events, such as storms and political revolutions” (2006, 87). 
Kant’s stipulation that strictly speaking there is no such thing as the sublime object, while 
anticipating this criticism, merely displaces this tension to the initial conflict between the 
faculties of reason and the imagination. As the deconstructionist Paul de Man argues, the 
problem is more serious than the co-implication of the conceptual and the material. On his view, 
“We are clearly not dealing with mental categories but with tropes and the story Kant tells us is 
an allegorical fairy tale” (1990, 104–5). As such, the model that Kant uses to articulate the 
supersensible is not properly speaking philosophical, “but linguistic,” describing “not a faculty of 
the mind…but a potentiality inherent in language” (95), specifically the metaphoric capacity of 
substitution and exchange.24 From this perspective, Kant’s sublime reading of the French 
Revolution amounts to just one more story of an event in European history, an alternative story 
to the one that Burke tells—where the inflationary discourse of the revolution opposes the 
authentic, loyalist sublime of tradition, hierarchy, and social accord. Consequently, the veracity 
of Kant’s political allegory is likewise a stage effect, dependent upon its capacity to produce 
reality effects, upon whether, how, and to what extent it is accepted, believed, and felt to be true. 
That Kant tells a very different story than Burke is however incidental to the “expressive 
uncertainty” that haunts them both (Burke 1998, 103). In either case the origin of the sublime is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Commenting on this interpretation by de Man, Andrzej Warminski maintains that the (mathematical) sublime 
should be seen in terms of “a familiar metaphorico-metonymical tropological system of substitution and 
exchange...a bordered-off intuition which amounts to an impossible metaphor of infinity, and, as impossible…a 
blind metonymy or, better, a catachrestic positing” (2001b, 967; cf. 2001a). Jean-François Lyotard provides a 
different rhetorical reading of the Kantian sublime, one that makes use of a figure of thought, the antistrephon, to 
interpret rather than debunk the model. Referring to the interplay between the imagination and reason, he writes, 
“The process consists in displacing the examination of judgment from its (negative) quality to its (assertive) 
modality: you say that…is not, but you affirm it. The modus of a proposition is in effect independent from its 
content, the dictum (1994, 128).  
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exposed as residing not in empirical objects but in mental states. So too, the emphasis in both is 
not on empiricist renderings of the sublime but on the analysis of sublimity as a mode of 
consciousness. Although neither Burke nor Kant concedes the radical possibility that sublimity is 
an effect of language, the priority that each assigns to the mind of the spectator seems to affirm 
this as a possibility. At any rate, the emphasis on the spectator doubles back on the philosophy, 
undermining the interpretive authority that would seek either to secure for an event a basis in the 
sublime or to dissociate it altogether from any sublime effect. In Kant’s case, de Man concludes 
the story of reason’s triumph over the imagination is shown, in the last instance, to be dependent 
on a linguistic structure “that is not accessible to the powers of transcendental philosophy” 
(1990, 97).  
Although other twentieth-century critics, mainly poststructuralists, argue that Kant’s 
analysis of the sublime contains a pressure point that reveals the dependency of consciousness on 
the transformational power of language, this kind of immanent critique does not take us much 
further than the text itself (despite its yielding novel interpretations of the Kantian system).25 
Such interpretive interventions, while highlighting the instability of meaning within the structure 
of the sublime, fail to hit upon the crux of the matter, namely, of how this uncertainty has 
implications for civic discourse and the interpretation of events affecting life-in-common. 
Otherwise stated, critics like de Man, in pointing to the rhetoricity of Kant’s analysis, are 
concerned only with rhetoric’s “nuts and bolts”—tropological maneuvers and figural 
displacements, along with the range of ambiguities inhering in the sublime qua linguistic system. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Jacques Derrida, for instance, argues that Kant’s philosophical “system” of the sublime is a double operation, 
“both limited since what is presented remains too large [in the case of the mathematical sublime]…and unlimited by 
the very thing it presents or which presents itself in it,” e.g. the concept of infinity. But, he concludes, the limit as 
such “does not exist” for the simple reason that it has no supersensible or extra-discursive origin (1987, 144–5). 
According to Derrida, the sublime in Kant’s philosophy is produced a structural blip or necessary accident. For other 
similar interpretations of Kant’s theory of the sublime—i.e., those focusing on its entanglement with language and 
the ambiguity this entails—see Jean-François Lyotard (1989), Lacoue-Labarthe (1993), and Jean-Luc Nancy (1993). 
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The benefits of this mode of rhetorical criticism aside, this approach fails to consider the 
rhetorical implications of this rhetoricity. In other words, it neglects to relate this rhetoricity 
back to the ontological assumption that, according to Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, has informed the 
history of rhetorical theory since classical antiquity: “that man is, by nature, subject to and 
capable of persuasion” (1998, 23). The technical aspects of rhetoric—figures and tropes—are 
therefore ancillary to language’s capacity to produce a persuasive or impressive effect on its 
audience. What is more, Campbell reminds us via Kenneth Burke, the rationale for persuasion 
consists in “the need to create unity, to overcome the division to which man is, by nature, heir” 
(28). As Edmund Burke was well aware, language succeeds, and succeeds imperfectly, by means 
of “conveying the affectations of the mind from one to another,” of fostering the congregation of 
minds through affective experience (1998, 104).  
Hence, from a rhetorical perspective, how or why Kant disagrees with Burke over the 
aesthetic meaning of the Revolution is less important than the simple fact of their disagreement. 
For each interpretation is an implicit request for agreement, an attempt by means of conveyance 
to reduce uncertainty and establish the affective “reality” of the event. If tropes and figures have 
a role to play in this process, it is conditional on their capacity not to create but to reduce 
uncertainty, to make ongoing sense of appearances that, according to Thomas Farrell, “admit to a 
tension between their stability and ‘the shifting way in which they appear’” (1993, 27).26 As a 
method, he argues, rhetoric “engages modalities of appearance insofar as they admit open-ended 
themes involving emotion, conviction, and judgment” (25). And this points to the more profound 
sense in which Kant’s application of the sublime in “An Old Question” is rhetorical: as 
persuasive performance it attempts to negotiate the stability of aesthetic judgments of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 On the use of synecdoche for rhetorical, i.e., persuasive, effect, see Ned O’Gorman (2008). Although O’Gorman 
employs the figures synecdoche and metonymy to analyze the sublime in presidential discourse, I argue in the next 
chapter that these figures are also operative in the rhetorico-political uses of the uncanny. 
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sublime and the apparent formlessness of the Revolution itself. Moreover, in writing not only 
about but also for the spectators (or anonymous reading public), Kant endeavors to create an 
affective experience that would yield such reflective judgments, to offer a provisional, but 
engaged, sense of meaning vis-à-vis a changing complex of appearances. However, as Burke’s 
counter-statement reveals, this engagement is conditioned at the outset by the possibility of 
contention and controversy. Indeed, the situation could not be otherwise. If the Revolution were 
incontestably sublime—if its sublimity were not in some way contingent or merely probable—
then there would be no pressing reason to request another’s assent to and approval of that 
sublimity. That it is contestable points up the rhetorical dimension of Kant’s aestheticized 
approach to political philosophy. To return to Hannah Arendt, who introduced this section, “The 
validity of these [aesthetic] judgments never has the validity of cognitive or scientific 
propositions…. Similarly, one can never compel anyone to agree with one’s judgments—‘This is 
beautiful’ or ‘This is wrong’…one can only ‘woo’ or ‘court’ the agreement of everyone else…. 
And in this persuasive activity one actually appeals to the ‘community sense’” (1992a, 73). 
However, as should be evident, the sublime does not elicit judgments of beauty or taste. The 
negative pleasure it affords is much more serious and complicated than beauty’s charms and 
delights, its rhetorical effectivity, if it has one, more powerful. For these reasons, the sublime 
does not have recourse to the same persuasive appeal as the beautiful; it requires something other 
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3.3 NEITHER MONSTROUS NOR HORRIFIC: 
THE POLITICAL SUBLIME AS RHETORICAL FORM 
In contrast to aesthetic judgments of taste—the judgment by which an object is declared 
beautiful—sublimity is not grounded in the notion of common sense (sensus communis). 
Regarding this ground, John Poulakos argues, “In the idea of common sense Kant locates not 
only the principle of judgments of taste but also the necessary condition for universal 
communication. According to him, all judgments of taste and all attempts to communicate such 
judgments presuppose a common sense, an abstract and intangible fund of sensibilities in which 
all people participate by virtue of their communal status. As such common sense provides the 
larger context within which judgments of taste are possible and communicable” (2007, 347; see 
Kant 1987, 87, 159–62). But things are quite different with respect to aesthetic judgments of the 
sublime. For although the pleasure we take in the sublime is, according to Kant, “a feeling of our 
supersensible vocation,” there is “no justification for simply presupposing that other people will 
take account of this feeling of mine and feel a liking when they contemplate the crude magnitude 
of nature” (1987, 158). Lyotard, writing on the communication of this sublime feeling, writes, 
“There is no sublime sensus communis” (1994, 228; cf. 1989, 402ff.). Whereas the demand of 
taste is ‘immediate’ and universal ‘apart from a concept,’ the sublime needs the mediation of a 
concept of reason— viz., “freedom as absolute causality”—that is felt subjectively (231). The 
Kantian sublime remains an aesthetic judgment but has its ground in the (moral) idea of human 
freedom. Accordingly, the sublime both presupposes and is in a position to reveal this ground as 
negative practical freedom—freedom as independence from determination by sensible impulses 
or as the capacity to resist and transcend the sensibly given.  
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Yet, at the same time, Lyotard maintains, the sublime demands to be communicated.27 
Like the judgment of taste, it, too, lays claim to universal validity, though apart from the context 
of the sensus communis. As Robert Clewis argues, vis-à-vis the Revolutions’ revelations of 
freedom under the idea of a republic, “Everyone who views the events from an aesthetic 
perspective is required (though not expected) to agree.” The sublime judgment, he argues, “is not 
to be expressed by just one or two spectators, but is required of ‘all’ cultivated, informed, and 
disinterested spectators of the event” (2009, 174; see also Arendt 1992a, 52–8; Lyotard 1989, 
401–5; and Lyotard 1994, 226–31). Kant’s own “An Old Question” reveals if not the necessity 
then the tendency to make the attempt at communicating sublime feeling. The same holds true of 
his competitor’s Reflections. However, the absence of a sensus communis corresponding to such 
feeling is testament to the difficulty in securing the universal validity of sublime judgments. 
Regardless of the possible philosophical limitations of Kant’s idealism—that is, the extent to 
which the sublime is dependent on language and materiality—the disagreement between Kant 
and Burke over the aesthetic valence of the Revolution points to the problematic of establishing 
consensus on matters pertaining to judgments of the sublime. Consequently, if there is something 
about (or behind) the sublime that demands to be communicated, then this something is at once 
irreducible to a concept or “Idea” of reason and other than reason’s (allegorical) rise to 
supremacy. Rather, it amounts to the demand to overcome division or, in Kant’s language, the 
demand to bridge the gap between universality as requirement and the likelihood of particularity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 According to Lyotard, “The demand comes to sublime feeling from the demand to be communicated inscribed in 
the form of the moral law [respect], and this latter demand is authorized by the simple fact that the law rests on 
the…Idea of freedom…. Far from being ‘immediate’ like the demand of taste [or beauty], far from being a 
universality ‘apart from a concept’…the universality in question in sublime feeling passes through the concept of 
practical reason. If one does not have the Idea of freedom and of its law, one cannot experience sublime feeling 
(1994, 231).  
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and difference—both the particularity of discrete phenomenal objects and of the disparate 
judgments elicited by potentially fear-inducing and awe-inspiring objects. 
From a rhetorical perspective this tension between the universal and the particular is less 
an aporia—less a requirement of reason—than a provocation, yielding what Farrell via Aristotle 
refers to as “a rhetorical mood of contingency,” by which he understands the unsettledness of 
appearances wherein differences crystallize in opposing directions (1993, 27).28 To the 
presupposition regarding the mind’s changeability via persuasion, Aristotle appends the further 
condition that rhetoric is concerned only with, or only ever seriously engages, those things that 
could be otherwise—“that seem capable of admitting two possibilities” (2007, 1.2.11). However, 
if we grant to Kant the separation of the sublime from a community’s storehouse of shared 
sensibility, then this provocation to rhetoric would seem to reproduce the problematic of 
overcoming division. In terms of Lloyd Bitzer’s notion of the rhetorical situation (1968), the 
sublime’s divorce from commonly held beliefs (ta endoxa) would appear to constitute a 
constraint on rhetorical effectivity. For Aristotle, as for the whole of the Western rhetorical 
tradition, all rhetorical appeals are grounded in ta endoxa. 29 “Acquired by virtue of one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 On Farrell’s view, the contingency of appearances is of rhetorical value because it facilitates “propitious conduct 
and judgment” (1993, 27). While that may be true, an action or manner of acting can only qualify as propitious vis-
à-vis a specific end or purpose. Farrell acknowledges this axiom, if only implicitly, holding that the 
advantageousness of contingency consists in making possible, by means of rhetoric, the re-presentation of 
“appearances shared by assembled human beings…in the guise of a practical consciousness which guides and 
legitimates collective human conduct.” Thus, rhetoric and appearances are propitious, he argues, in relation to “the 
continual reinvention of human agency, which, in turn, offers some preliminary construal of their ethical possibility” 
(32). Presumably, they are or could be propitious with regard to different ends. But on this point, Farrell’s advocacy 
for a certain ethics of rhetoric—specifically, a rhetorically inflected model of Habermas’ universal pragmatics—
conflicts with his theoretical-descriptive account of rhetoric as a method for engaging contingent appearances. As I 
argue below, the contingency of appearances is also advantageous for the state and the end of instaurating political 
legitimacy. In this scenario, Farrell’s preferred ends of renewed human agency and ethical possibility are either 
contrapurposive to that of the state or at the very least radically modified.  
29 Even Farrell, in trying to carve out rhetoric’s place among language arts, argues that rhetoric “approaches 
appearances through the interpreted lens of interested common opinions (endoxa)” (1993, 31). Nevertheless, as I 
argue below, the political sublime constitutes an attempt, enacted by means of rhetoric, to form and frame 
appearances “in excess” of endoxa. 
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participation in a community of people,” writes Poulakos, “these beliefs function as invisible 
criteria that regulate the audience’s judgments regarding the reasonableness of an argument, the 
desirability of a proposed course of action, or the elegance of an oration” (2007, 348). This 
includes, he argues, the appeal to one’s sense of beauty. Without this basis for appeal, the 
sublime is, prima facie, at a disadvantage relative to the effective—i.e., rhetorical—
communication of judgments of taste; without a sensus communis the sublime does not merely 
admit of two possibilities it potentially multiplies them, exacerbating the unsettledness of 
opinion and frustrating the attempt to offer a provisional, affective sense of meaning vis-à-vis the 
shifting ways in which certain empirical, phenomenal objects appear. In the absence of doxastic 
appeal, what could be a provocation for overcoming division, or opposing judgments, comes to 
resemble an obstruction to rhetoric and threatens to forestall the possibility of instituting division 
in the first place, not to mention the search for approval, the request for agreement, or the attempt 
to secure consensus.  
Notwithstanding the differences separating judgments of taste from judgments of the 
sublime, the communication of beauty indicates how this negative constraint on communicating 
the sublime—i.e., its divorce from the sensus communis—can function as a condition of 
possibility. As Poulakos argues, the communication of beauty “cannot proceed via arguments 
seeking to prove that something is beautiful…nor can it proceed from arguments seeking to 
establish practical benefits…. Rather, it is to reveal one’s felt delight in the encounter with,” say, 
a beautiful flower, “and, at the same time, to request the other person’s assent to and approval of 
the flower’s beauty” (2007, 349). Instead of appealing to reasoned argument—e.g., claim, 
evidence, and warrant—for Kant, the revelation or disclosure of beauty appeals to a shared 
capacity for beautiful feeling, as well as to a shared, communal sensibility, a “common sense,” of 
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what counts as such a feeling. Presumably, this is what Arendt has in mind when she writes of 
wooing or courting the agreement of everyone else, of the persuasion involved in appealing to a 
community’s sense of beauty —namely, that “consent on aesthetic matters can be secured [only] 
by appeals to feeling,” i.e., via pathos as a mode of persuasion (Poulakos ibid.). The sublime, as 
an aesthetic feeling, is in this way linked to the communication of judgments of taste. For 
whatever else it may be—allegory, structural blip, happy accident, mediated pleasure, etc.—the 
sublime is first and foremost an intense feeling or mental shock. Hence, whereas the beautiful is 
communicable by means of subjective revelation—i.e., revealing one’s felt delight in a judgment 
of beauty—the sublime cannot be similarly communicated but instead must be instituted as 
mental movement. Instituting this movement, then, is the sublime’s unique provocation to 
rhetoric, while the institution itself constitutes a mode of rhetorical effectivity. Or, to recall 
Edmund Burke, it is the sublime as “expressive uncertainty” that provokes rhetoric as response, 
viz., the heightened contingency that attends appearances demonstrating either overwhelming 
power (nature’s dominion) or overpowering formlessness (the absolutely great). Hence, the 
tension in Kant between consciousness and the transformational power of language is not only a 
philosophical problem nor is it merely a rhetorical/structural effect; rather, it designates a 
condition of rhetorical effectivity, that which enables the institution or persuasive 
communication of the sublime as mental movement: the transformation of fear-inducing 
appearances (objects and events) into experiences of freedom, the transfiguration of what might 
otherwise be perceived as monstrous or horrifying (or ridiculous) into an admixture of fear and 
exaltation.30  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This transformation, of course, may first involve inducing fear—with fear itself seen as a rhetorical effect. 
Nonetheless, the sublime proper (i.e., the Kantian sublime) consists in pleasure’s mediation by displeasure, that is, in 
the simultaneous feeling of repulsion and attraction.  
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If, as Farrell claims, rhetoric’s method is to make ongoing sense of appearances—to 
engage “modalities of appearance” that are ambiguous or equivocal and incomplete in their 
particularity—then the rhetoric of the sublime does not so much make sense of appearances, 
does not so much make them intelligible, as it employs them so as to transcend the parameters of 
common sense and, along with them, the logics of rationality and prudential interest.31 Like the 
beautiful, the sublime points to a mode of feeling. But since the latter cannot presuppose 
common sense, and therefore cannot simply appeal to common feeling and sensibility, it must 
work to create and sustain the conditions of assent via affective unity or fellow feeling (com-
passion). Over against the disclosure of beauty, the communication or rhetoric of the sublime 
names the institution of the sublime itself, signaling at once a communicative mode of 
overcoming sensible determination and an emotive process for exacting consensus. But rather 
than appealing to commonly held beliefs, consensus in the sublime—or the sublime qua affective 
agreement—involves transcending the sensus communis itself.32 This is at once a constraint on 
the rhetoric of the sublime and a boon to the sublime’s rhetorical power: it is a constraint since 
overcoming is “required,” but it is an advantage because, if successful, such overcoming 
promises to unify a broad swath of commonly held yet conflicting beliefs, interests, value, etc., 
and to do so expediently, without the strictures of reasoned argument and debate. The irony, of 
course, is that the sublime’s rhetorical efficacy consists in expedience but an expedience that is 
independent of public deliberation and quite apart from the prudential selection of means-to-end.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 I readily acknowledge that this is at some odds with the purposes to which Farrell attaches to rhetoric. See above 
note. 
32 Indeed, according to Ned O’Gorman, this is the function of Longinus’ notion of the rhetorical sublime: “the 
overcoming of a practical and deliberative orientation towards public discourse” (2006, 892; see also O’Gorman 
2004).  
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Adding to this expedience is the affective nature of the sublime as a mental movement 
possessing form. Not only does the sublime transcend endoxa but, as we have seen, it also 
constitutes an emotive force, one that is predicated on the bipolar structure of pleasure-
displeasure, or displeasure’s mediation of pleasure. As Žižek states, “Above all…Beauty and 
Sublimity are opposed along the axis pleasure-displeasure: a view of Beauty offers us pleasure, 
while ‘the object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the 
mediation of displeasure’ [Kant]. In short, the Sublime is ‘beyond the pleasure principle,’ it is a 
paradoxical pleasure procured by displeasure itself…. This means at the same time that the 
relation of Beauty to Sublimity coincided with the relation of immediacy to mediation—further 
proof that the Sublime must follow Beauty as a form of mediation of its immediacy” (1989, 202). 
Despite the obscurity of Žižek’s prose, what this passage clarifies is the sublime’s grounding in a 
mediated form of pleasure. As George Santayana writes, the sublime is one of those “species of 
aesthetic good” which seems to please via the transformation of negatively felt value into a 
positive one (1955, 125). As we have seen, in Kant this transformative mediation consists in a 
damn-and-release mechanism, the inhibition of our vital forces followed by their outpouring, 
humiliation and ascendency. But Žižek’s emphasis on form underscores something else, namely, 
the possibility of the sublime’s being instituted or put into force—the sublime as a formal, 
mediating operation. Yet, given the affective nature of the sublime, which, as Lyotard reminds us 
is “Violent, divided against, itself…simultaneously fascination, horror, and elevation” (1994, 
231), the sublime as form must describe a specific type of subjective configuration.  
Writing outside the history of the sublime, Kenneth Burke provides a definition of form 
that encapsulates both the structure and strength of this aesthetic violence. On his view, “Form is 
the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite. 
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This satisfaction…at times involves a temporary set of frustrations, but in the end these 
frustrations prove to be simply a more involved kind of satisfaction, and furthermore serve to 
make the satisfaction of fulfillment more intense” (1968, 31; my emphasis). This understanding 
of form not only rearticulates the possibility of instituting the sublime but also highlights the 
emotive force of such institution. Form frustrates desire by postponing satisfaction but in so 
doing ultimately intensifies the resulting pleasure. The aesthetic pleasure of the sublime is thus 
distinguished from that of beauty in terms both of quality and intensity. So even though the 
sublime cannot avail itself of the spontaneous consensus afforded to the revelation of beauty, the 
sublime as mediated pleasure—as form—promises to yield maximum rhetorical impact by 
means of a vital register of aesthetic effect. Even if Kant’s sublime is nothing more than a story 
(à la de Man), this does not deprive it from producing real aesthetic effects: respect (law), 
admiration (amazement), and enthusiasm.33 Here, again, we see how a deficiency on 
communicating the sublime can be parlayed into a powerful resource: the sublime is capable not 
only of transcending endoxa, capable of expanding the psychic borders of a collective identity, 
but also, with respect to the rhetoric of beauty, of producing a superior emotive force. And both 
of these capacities reinforce the sublime’s resistance to counter-statements or counter-
movements. As a rhetorical force, Longinus tells us, the sublime is more powerful than the 
charming turn of phrase or the convincing argument, as “an irresistible force beyond the control 
of any audience” it dominates, masters the hearer (1991, 4, 24).34  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Philip Shaw commenting on Edmund Burke’s position writes, “That such a fabrication should compel its readers 
to embrace a coherent political position, for King, Church and constitution, a position with real effects in the real 
world, is no doubt astonishing but not all that surprising” (2006, 71). 
34 As Longinus’ seventeenth-century translator Nicholas Boileau-Despréaux writes, “The sublime is not strictly 
speaking something which is proven or demonstrated, but a marvel, which seizes one, strikes one, and makes one 
feel” (quoted in Lyotard 1991, 97).  
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At the same time, however, this irresistible quality throws into relief the political stakes 
involved in rhetoric’s instituting of the sublime. In contrast to the reasoned arguments of 
deliberation and debate, and in contradistinction to the allures of beauty, the agon characterizing 
sublimity constitutes a zero-sum game. Just as the category of the political consists in the friend-
enemy distinction, the sublime recognizes only winners and losers, hoarding rather than sharing 
its spoils. Given this aspect, it is little wonder that Lyotard views a politics of the sublime as 
leading to “terror and massacre” (1989, 409) or that in the modern era the articulation of the 
sublime has become hegemonically linked, both positively and negatively, with fervent and 
forceful political action—in Kant and Burke, to be sure, but also in the works of Joseph de 
Maistre, Thomas Paine, Friedrich Schiller, George Sorel, George Bataille, and others (see 
Goldhammer 2005).35 This tendency has led some theorists and critics to deprecate the 
employment of the sublime in politics. Donald Pease, for instance, writes, “Despite all the 
revolutionary rhetoric invested in the term, the sublime has, in what we could call the politics of 
historical formation, always served a conservative purpose” (1984, 275). Ned O’Gorman, while 
largely agreeing with Pease’s assessment, lays stress on the rhetorical tendency of the sublime to 
serve such a univocal political purpose, arguing that the sublime “tends to grant political power 
to the owners and managers of rhetorical power,” thus often helping to “reify rather than 
challenge dominant power” (2006, 905).  Indeed, rhetoric is never a matter of necessity, never 
fulfills an “always.” Inasmuch as the power of the sublime derives from rhetoric’s aesthetic 
effectivity, the political purpose with which the sublime can be aligned is (necessarily) a matter 
of probability contingency; that is, the politics of the sublime is a matter of “fixing” appearances 
so that they accord with a certain vision of order and of maintaining this fixity over the long-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Nevertheless, Lyotard does allow for what he refers to as “an aesthetic of the sublime in politics” (1992, 85). This 
aesthetic, he argues, would work on the understanding that for “Ideas, there are no presentable objects—there are 
only analoga, signs, hypotyposes” (84). 
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range. The opposition between Kant’s “An Old Question” and Edmund Burke’s Reflections as 
emblematic of this rhetorical axiom as it is of the division between liberal (or republican) and 
conservative perspectives.  
Although this contingency does not do away with the sublime’s conservative tendency, 
its capacity to grant or deprive power signals the continued need for existing regimes to colonize 
or establish control over the production of sublime effect. Political valence aside, “Sublimity,” 
argues James McDaniel, “is…not just an aesthetic category concerning the commerce between 
form, matter, and idea; it is a political category concerning power.”36 Whereas Lyotard, Pease, 
and O’Gorman see this power as grounds for dismissing the political valence of the sublime—
O’Gorman going so far as to refer to the political sublime as “an oxymoron”—what McDaniel 
remind us is that politics, whatever else it may be about, concerns power, since it is constitutes a 
mode of experience by means of which “we are forced into a relationship of admiration” or 
respect (2000, 54). Consequently, the nature of sublime effect suggests a virtually automated 
technique of consensual power, one that in reconciling our creative powers maintains them in a 
hierarchical arrangement in which reason is not only superior to the imagination but also 
respected and admired. Thus, without equating sublime force with political power, we can say, 
along with Salim Kemal, that the sublime as an aesthetic category promises to “promote a unity 
between individuals on the basis of their subjectivity” and to do so forcefully—violently—
without wooing and without reasoned debate, establishing a community of feeling subjects who 
are linked by ineffable reciprocity of affect and aesthetic judgment (1986, 76). But this 
community in no way bears the horizontal markings of egalitarianism. As a function of vertical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See also Terry Eagleton, who argues over against poststructuralists like Lyotard and Derrida that rather than 
seeing the sublime only in terms of “a point of fracture and fading, an abyssal undermining of metaphysical 
certitudes,” we should also leave open the consideration of how the sublime “operates as a thoroughly ideological 
category” (1990, 90). 
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reconciliation—one involving the feelings of respect and admiration—the sublime indicates the 
aesthetic basis of political order as such, the affective legitimation underwriting consensual 
subordination to a system of rule. But even though this consensual power is nearly automatic in 
its effects, the sublime as foundation of such effects is not. Inasmuch as the sublime is a matter 
of political contingency, it names the struggle over who or what can lay claim to the role of 
reason. Consequently, the sublime’s efficacy in strengthening commitment to a given regime 
hinges on its ability to convince the governed that the system of rule, and that system alone, 
possesses the requisite power to submit formlessness to form, to demonstrate superior might, or 
to represent the unrepresentable.  
Nevertheless, given the contrapurposive relation between reason and the imagination, the 
State’s entitlement to ascendency, its “proof of reason,” is won out not through the assertion or 
convincing display of power (much less by means of argument) but as a result of the 
imagination’s failure to resist and overcome determination by reality. But this failure does more 
than reveal a cognitive incapacity; it creates feelings of disharmony and displacement. As Terry 
Eagleton astutely puts it, “the sublime is a kind of anti-aesthetic which presses the imagination to 
extreme crisis, to the point of failure and breakdown, in order that it may negatively figure forth 
the Reason that transcends it” (1990, 91). If in judgments of beauty we ascribe to an object a felt 
harmony of our own creative powers—“the consciousness,” according to Eagleton, “that we are 
at home in the world” (1990, 85)—then in the case of the dynamical and mathematical sublime 
we are, as Joshua Gunn and David E. Beard put it, unsettled and threatened, made to feel not at 
home but homeless, painfully aware of our finitude (2000, 275). Colonizing the sublime in the 
service of order is thus, in the first instance, a matter of prefiguring that order’s dominance by 
bringing about a crisis in the imagination. And this crisis consists both in the subject’s feeling 
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out of joint internally, with itself, and externally with regard both to the demands of reason and 
the sensible world. In this way, the relationship between governments and the governed more 
than parallels that between reason and the imagination. For just as the ascendency of reason is 
inscribed in the imagination’s failure to transcend the sensible nature, so too, the superiority of 
governments is inscribed in the inadequacy of the imagination to rise above the world of needs 
and desire and attain expert knowledge. Political authority, in other words, relies on the inability 
of the governed to choose the good solutions that will solve societal problems, to comprehend 
the state of things (the “givens”) and cipher the dictates of objective necessity. Notwithstanding 
that every system of rule presupposes this inability, political authority cannot assume that the 
governed sufficiently understand their limitations. And, of course, this is no more than a 
euphemism for the governing maxim that the ruling order cannot simply bank on humility or 
submission on the part of the governed but must create or at least facilitate the circumstances 
under which the population comes to understand and accept its inferiority. Indeed, what Kant 
misses in his controlled enthusiasm for the French revolutionaries is that the revolution, along 
with the support it inspires, is not so much a stimulus for the sublime as it is made possible by 
the political order’s failure to effectuate sublime feeling and judgment. If the sublime may tend 
to support, as O’Gorman argues, the dominant order, then it does so by prefiguring that order’s 
ascendency, and this can only happen by dominating or humiliating the population by means of 
the imagination. Rhetorically, this debasement of the imagination functions much like a 
prolegomenon or proem to the politicization of the sublime, pave the way for the articulation of 
this capacity to a governing intelligence. In terms of Burke’s notion of form, it prefigures the 
superiority of reason by negatively recalling and then postponing satisfaction in one’s appetite 
for harmony and accord—both within oneself and with respect to one’s felt relationship to the 
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world. However, to the extent that this recollection is caught up in the process of instituting 
aesthetic legitimation for ruling order (or aesthetic coloring), it is always already caught up in a 
system of political representation—one that is to varying degrees hierarchical and grounded in 
the conventional symbols and structures of authority. The institution of sublime form does not 
begin with elevation but with an aesthetic crisis resulting from the imagination’s inferiority in 
relation to the demands of reason as well as to the so-called demands of necessity or, 
aesthetically, what Kant calls the determination of sensible nature. That is, political control over 
the sublime demands that the system of rule produces or reactivates the affective conditions that 
enable or justify hierarchy, and this requires the domination of the governed by means of the 
imagination. 
Given this prefiguration by means of failure, the articulation of reason with political order 
requires that the state first demonstrate this failure by persuading the population of its rational 
inadequacy. Such demonstrations proceed by eliciting this deficiency in connection with the 
inability of the governed either to grasp the totality of things, in the case of the mathematical 
sublime, or to resist and overcome something that possesses dominion, in the case of the 
dynamical. That is, the savings gained in merely having to demonstrate inferiority is 
counterbalanced by the exigence of having to accomplish this failure by means of humiliating the 
imagination with respect to fear-inducing objects and events. Rhetorically, then, the range of 
chaotic, boundless, and terrifying objects of phenomenal experience are not obstacles but 
constitute a species of “the available means of persuasion.” But this persuasion, as we have seen, 
is one that shares little in common with the rhetoric of argument and debate, coinciding instead 
with techniques of a purely motivistic, borderline coercive, nature. When tied to the ongoing 
project of political instauration, the mathematical and dynamical forms of sublimity amount to 
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something other than aesthetic modes of experience: they are two distinct but overlapping types 
of strategies for creating a community united by the repulsion that it feels toward objects of 
overwhelming formlessness and/or overpowering might, as well as the subsequent repulsion felt 
toward the community itself, which forms the basis for its self-understanding. This repulsion, as 
we have seen, is characterized by a sense of estrangement, humiliation, and inadequacy, by the 
feeling of displacement occasioned in part by the qualities of certain phenomena but also by the 
strategies whereby these qualities are highlighted, fixed, and made to appear as if they are 
insurmountable for the population of the governed. As instruments of political consensus, fear-
inducing objects create or renew the conditions of affective subordination by eliciting the pain of 
inadequacy and incompletion, the displeasure of unassuaged desire—of failing to submit 
formlessness to totality or to demonstrate a capacity superior to the power of dominion—the 
humiliating awareness of ignorance and inferiority. Consensus is thus cemented around the fear 
of a society grouped around the idea of what amounts to a protectionist police state. At the same 
time, this consensus creates a community of sentiment that, all things are considered, is nothing 
more than a community of fear. Nevertheless, this fear for certain empirical, phenomenal objects 
translates into respect or admiration for that which is revealed to possess a superior power. In 
this way, the sublime is not simply a rhetorical means of securing political order; it is a strategy 
of realpolitik, specifically, of practicing a politics of fear while disguising the fact.     
In the brief history of the twenty-first century, such humiliation of the imagination, and of 
the citizenry, is not the exception that proves the rule but the rule itself, the affective or 
rhetorico-aesthetic standard of political legitimacy. How else to understand like the apocalyptic 
coverage of September 11, 2001, and in the ensuing weeks, or the running commentary provided 
by news reporters, talking heads, government officials, and the like? The round-the-clock 
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bombardment of overpowering images accomplished nothing short of the debasement of a 
population, activating the social imaginary only to demoralize its inadequacy. By continuously 
exhibiting the devastating effects of sheer violence, the authorities and their media constructed, 
in Kant’s language, a power “superior to the resistance of something that itself possesses 
power”—that is, the imagination of the governed, or what in academic parlance is 
euphemistically referred to as civil society. As a result, the citizenry was made to feel not only 
helpless but also humiliated, held captive to a vision machine that fixed the appearance of 
devastation as an act of terror and a declaration of war, a matter to be handled by the technocratic 
operators of military power and counterintelligence.37 The situation was more or less the same 
with respect to the events leading up and surrounding to the US Congress’ passing in 2008–2009 
of “TARP” (Troubled Assets Relief Program) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009.38 Although the object of terror changes, from terrorism to “the economy,” the framing 
and the message remain virtually the same: “the givens and solutions of [the problem] simply 
require people to find that they leave no room for discussion, and that governments can foresee 
this finding which, being obvious, no longer even needs doing” (Rancière 2010, 1). In both 
instances, the object of fear—being at once too powerful and too chaotic or formless—is such 
that nothing can be done except what the state and its apparatus of government are already doing. 
At least this is the implicit message. And yet, the government does not have to prove its claim to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 On the rhetorico-political effects of 9/11 qua spectacle, see Paul Virilio’s Ground Zero and Retort’s Afflicted 
Powers (esp., 16–37). 
38 Although the so-called bailout did not enjoy the widespread, intense enthusiasm that could easily be observed in 
the effort to eradicate Islamic-fundamentalist terrorism in the Middle East, we should keep in mind that the bailout 
was only ever possible by virtue of the reliably obliging US taxpayers. To be sure, the dependable assistance was 
given begrudgingly. But its very facticity reveals the presence and effectiveness of sublime respect as much as the 
absence or attenuation of enthusiasm. For a recent and critical look at the intensive history of the bailout and its 
ongoing aftereffects, see investigative journalist Matt Taibbi’s “Secrets and Lies of the Bailout.” Despite the 
righteous indignation that fueled the short-lived Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, the public exhibition of anger 
and resentment was isolated or at least concentrated in the financial sectors of major US cities. The major political 
institutions, though not loved, were merely respected, while the complicity of the state as a whole was, for the most 
part, respectfully ignored.  
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reason, does not have to convince the population that the determination of reality is its exclusive 
province. Because the establishment enjoys the “benefit of assumption,” its ascendency is 
inscribed in the demonstrated inadequacy of the population; that is, the dominance of order is a 
function simply of the imagination’s failure either to represent the unrepresentable or to resist 
and overcome dominion. The articulation of order with reason simply results from the negative 
revelation that says in effect that the system of rule is solely accountable for all the forms of 
security against threats the are themselves multiform, whether terrorism, the economy, or even 
the weather. If such annexations carry any propositional content, it is simply the presupposed 
virtue of all governments, democratic or not, namely, that only political authority possesses the 
necessary rationality to pronounce on the state of things as well as to determine both the 
appropriate and the standards determining what is appropriate in the given situation. Ironically, 
then, the sublime’s transcendence of common belief and opinion culminates—as it does in the 
tragic—in the restoration of a core political belief: the necessity of the state and its apparatus of 
government. 
Although this crisis in imagination prefigures the ascendency of order as reason, 
something else is required to ensure a population’s affective commitment to order or—what 
amounts to the same thing—the consensual subordination of the governed to their government: 
in a word enthusiastic approval of hierarchy as such. In the absence of coercion or force, 
submission to political authority entails the controlled elevation of the dominated, or the 
expansion of its so-called “vital forces.” Hence the rhetorical efficacy of sublime form—its dam-
and-release mechanism— which, by temporarily inhibiting the forces of the imagination, “leads 
to their outpouring that is all the stronger.” Unlike the sublime affects of respect and admiration, 
enthusiasm results not from the presentation of inadequacy as such but from the imagination’s 
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subsequent collaboration with sublime form, viz., the imagination’s identification with reason’s 
ascendency (see Edmund Burke 1968, 58–9). In large part, this imaginary participation is 
provided by the democratic principle of free and popular decision, which is proclaimed sovereign 
over the people’s choice of its governors and thus regarded as the legitimating principle of all 
democratic regimes. In representing the demos, government speaks and acts on behalf of the 
people, as a “We,” activating the conditions under which the so-called represented identify with 
those words and deeds and, consequently, with the proposed solutions to societal problems. 
Nevertheless, this collaborative expectancy, or vicarious elevation, must itself be made subject to 
vertical control, and this requires not simply humiliating the imagination but disciplining it so 
that the imagination’s subsequent upward movement—the release of its vital forces—is rendered 
dependent on the substitution of political order for the capacity of reason. In other words, the 
state, if it is to create and sustain the affective conditions fostering assent to state rule, must 
establish what Michel Foucault calls “a constricting link between an increased aptitude and an 
increased domination.” According to Foucault, this articulation points up the essence of 
discipline: increasing certain aptitudes or capacities of the body while reversing the power that 
might result from this increase, thereby severing that power from its corporeal origins and 
turning it into “a relation of strict subjection” (1977, 138). In the case of the sublime, however, 
this increase pertains not to the physical capacities inhering in the materiality of things but to the 
affective forces of feeling and judgment. Following the prefiguration of order, then, is the 
mediation of pleasure, the elevating collaboration by means of form, whereby the imagination 
feels itself reconciled with the capacity of reason, if only temporarily. While such reconciliation 
aids in supporting the sublime affects of respect and admiration, it goes one further by 
engendering enthusiasm for the fact of political hierarchy as such. If respect and admiration stem 
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from failure, and the presentation of inadequacy, enthusiasm for subordination results from the 
identification with the governing order that is believed to be capable of determining the dictates 
of objective necessity.  
At the same time, however, if this identification with order is to reinforce rather than 
undermine a system of rule, then the population’s pleasure in overcoming the world of needs and 
desires—its freedom via sublime form—must be controlled by an articulatory practice that 
preserves the fundamental alterity between governments and the governed, even as it elicits 
affective participation on the part of the governed. Perhaps the most expedient tactic for 
simultaneously elevating and disciplining the imagination consists in articulating fear-inducing 
objects with a complete political exigence.39 Although political exigences can take any number 
of forms, the most powerful (rhetorically, aesthetically), politically advantageous, and ubiquitous 
is what George Kateb describes as the demand “to preserve or advance a distinctive culture or 
way of life” (2000, 8).40 Unlike the plurality of specific, potentially satisfiable demands—such as 
the demand for higher wages or gender equality in pay—the demand for preservation does not 
speak to any discernible material interest; rather, it is a universal demand, which functions as an 
empty signifier to cancel or collapse a plurality of different interests into a chain of equivalences 
(see Laclau 1996, 36–46). Hence, the widespread support for “preservation”—its efficacy— 
results from a universalizing-equivalential kind of articulatory gesture, since, as Ernesto Laclau 
argues, “It is only by privileging the dimension of equivalence to the point that its differential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 By this I mean an exigence that is at once engendered and resolved by the same system of rhetoric, that that same 
complex of rhetorical production may both create and respond to the same exigence. On the idea that an exigence 
can be caused or made possible by rhetoric while simultaneously eliciting or requiring rhetoric as a means of 
resolution, see Scott Consigny (1974), who synthesizes the opposing views of Lloyd Bitzer (1968) and Richard E. 
Vatz (1973). 
40 Although Kant does not attach great importance to preservation, Edmund Burke regards the sublime as an 
antidote to socio-political dissolution. France Ferguson, commenting on Edmund Burke’s political juxtaposition of 
the beautiful with the sublime, argues that “After the beautiful has been joined with physical and political entropy 
issuing in death, the importance of the sublime in exciting the passions of self-preservation becomes apparent” 
(1992, 52).  
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nature is almost entirely obliterated” (1996, 39). But in contrast to the operation of hegemony, 
whereby a particular demand becomes “the locus of equivalential effects” (43)—i.e., becomes 
the stand-in for the universal—the demand for preservation constitutes a pregnant nothingness, 
as unifying as it is empty, a rhetorical black hole that is virtually immune to concrete 
representation but not for that reason inefficient.41 What enables this wide-ranging, centripetal 
function is that the necessity implicit in preservation does not appeal to commonly held belief or 
opinion, does not encourage the weighing of alternative courses of action, but elicits an emotive 
response, one that is rooted not in the rationality of the emotions but in an ontological anxiety 
concerning finitude and alterity. George Bush’s slogan of September 20, 2001, that “These 
terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life” is exemplary in this 
regard (Washing Post), as is the joint statement from 2008 by John McCain and Barack Obama 
describing their shared view that “The effort to protect the American economy must not fail” 
(Zeleny 2008).42 Articulating this urgent need—whether in connection with eradicating terrorism 
or saving the so-called new economy—amounts to a triggering of the dam-and-release 
mechanism that is necessary for the institution of political sublimity. At the same time this 
articulation prevents this double-movement from occurring independent of an awareness of the 
State, which substitutes for the supersensible faculty of reason. The work of rhetoric, then, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Again, this “un-occupied” universality is at odds with Laclau’s understanding of the hegemonic mediation of the 
universal with the particular. Slavoj Žižek, for instance, in explicating the efficiency of hegemony, argues, “[Each] 
apparently universal ideological notion is always hegemonized by some particular content which colours its very 
universality and accounts for its efficiency” (2008, 204). “The same goes for every universal ideological notion: one 
always has to look for the particular content which accounts for the specific efficiency of an ideological notion” 
(205). Although I am not interested in considering whether or to what extent “preservation” is an ideological notion, 
I am tacitly arguing that the rhetorical efficiency of a universal demand—which is perforce a rhetorical efficiency, if 
it is an efficiency at all—does not in every case rely on what is regarded as a “typical” representation of that 
universal. Indeed, the argument that “typicality” accounts for efficiency is to put the cart before the horse, or to 
commit an hysteron proteron, since it begs the question of how a particular content becomes (is made) typical.  
42 That promise, which was not limited to US elected officials but included representatives throughout the 
industrialized (or post-industrialized) world, resulted in the pouring trillions of dollars, euros, yen, etc. into the 
financial system. “And when that response proved too feeble,” writes Greek economist Yanis Varoufakis, “our 
presidents and prime ministers…embarked upon a spree of nationalizing banks, insurance companies and car 
manufacturers that put even Lenin’s post-1917 exploits to shame” (2013, 2).  
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consists not so much in persuading individuals to view certain objects or events as horrifying but 
to interpellate them as victims, as political subjects belonging to an endangered mode of 
existence. As a result, this maneuver mediates a double transference: it simultaneously projects 
the ontological anxiety over finitude onto a political ethos while interiorizing a political threat as 
though it appertained to one’s social and, by extension, one’s natural being. But it accomplishes 
something else, too, something that results from this transference but is not reducible to it: the 
colonization of sublime form and the affective instauration of political order. While the exigence 
of preservation elicits affective outpouring, the proposed measures or good solutions provided by 
“democratic” governments are not the preserves of free choice but of the necessity of things—
and only the state possess the expert knowledge, or rational capacity, to choose the good 
solutions that will solve the problems of political finitude. In the politics of the sublime, freedom 
is simply the misnaming of necessity.  
As a capstone of the political sublime, this process, whereby the institution of sublime 
form is brought under political control, is cinched by the naming of the sublime object or event, 
i.e., what Kant describes as a subreption. As the final maneuver in the institution of sublime form 
for political ends, subreption ascribes the sublime to phenomenal, empirical objects of 
experience rather than to the mental movement. In so doing, it substitutes the names for things 
and, ultimately, the names as things for sublime experience. To the extent that such naming is 
successful, i.e., inasmuch as the name is hypostatized and comes to serve as a stand-in for the 
affective experience, it appropriates for itself, in abbreviated form, the power of sublime 
experience. In philosophical discourse, subreption of “the sublime” is usually tacit—a practical 
shorthand descriptor for a somewhat complicated affect. In the domain of politics, however, the 
sublime subreption is at once explicit and strategic. Although the substantivized adjective “the 
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sublime” is seldom encountered in political rhetoric, names meant to recall sublime feelings are 
quite common, at least as common as the institution of sublime form. Indeed, such names serve 
not only to elicit the sublime but, in so doing, to control, indefinitely, the discursive parameters 
for treating of what are, in effect, sublime objects. Indeed, subreptions such as “9/11” and “The 
Bailout,” or, before them, “Pearl Harbor” and “The New Deal,” help to reveal an archaeology 
not of knowledge but of rhetorical effectivity (see Foucault 1972).43 What these and other similar 
epithets disclose is the relative success or failure of attempts to conceal while simultaneously 
exploiting the subjective basis of the sublime, of attempts to objectify, or realize, the 
persuasiveness of form in a name that requires little else than its continual invocation. The effect 
of such names and naming is nothing less than the fixing of appearances already fixed by virtue 
of sublime form, and this capping effect is the reason why subreption rounds out rhetoric’s 
institution of the political sublime. For it renders the sublime “thing,” the sublime interpretation 
of that thing, incontestable, enabling and irrationalizing the emotional gestalt of fear, awe 
bordering on terror, enthusiasm, and respect by making it “right” and indisputably so. 
Nevertheless, given that sublime form is instituted and accomplished hierarchically via the 
ascendency of authority or executive power, this objectifying maneuver simultaneously works to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This is closely related to Michael Calvin McGee’s notion of the ideograph, i.e., an ordinary language term found 
in political discourse. It is also refers to “a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular 
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal” that “warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which 
might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily 
recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable” (1980, 15). On a speculative note, I propose the following 
analogy: a (political) subreption (e.g., 9/11) is to an ideograph (global terrorism) what a proper noun is to a common 
noun. However, whereas the distinction between types of nouns is one of relative uniqueness the relationship 
between subreptions and ideographs is also causal. That is to say, subreptions have the power to generate new or 
resignify existing ideographs. While, as noted above, the effect of such ideographic subreptions may be the 
assurance of what Farrell calls “propitious conduct and judgment,” the advantage may be at cross-purposes with “the 
people” and the democratic ideal of a self-determining or autonomous society. As McGee asserts: “The end product 
of the state’s insistence on some degree of conformity in behavior and belief, I suggest, is a rhetoric of control, a 
system of persuasion presumed to be effective on the whole community.  We make a rhetoric of war to persuade us 
of war’s necessity, but then forget that it is a rhetoric—and regard negative popular judgments of it as unpatriotic 
cowardice” (6). Propitious, indeed. 
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shore up those very same symbols and structures of authority and to justify the outpour of its 
vital forces, the reassertion of its ethico-political vocation: “freedom.” And this simply means 
that the interpretation or subreption of an event as sublime is more than an act of framing. It is an 
enactment; the act of framing is at once the construction of the frame itself. That is, the making 
sublime is the sublime, but a key component of this making is, of course, concealing this fact—
which is actually two: 1) that the sublime is man-made artifact and 2) that the product consists in 
the process, which is then erected and preserved as a living fossil, a potentially ever-renewable 
form of rhetorical energy. 
 
3.4 THE LIMITS OF FORM 
In this chapter, I have focused on the question of whether and how the sublime, 
conceived as an intense mental movement or negative pleasure, could function rhetorically to 
shore up affective support for the prevailing political order, and of whether in so doing the 
sublime could either avoid creating or in some way mitigate the countervailing effects of 
alienation and resentment. In answer to this two-step-question, I turned to Kant’s “Analytic of 
the Sublime,” arguing that his theory of the sublime lends itself to the following interrelated 
themes: the institution of the sublime as a rhetorically formalizing operation; the disharmony and 
eventual reconciliation of the faculties of reason and the imagination; and the transformation of 
overwhelming and overpowering appearances into an experience of transcendental freedom. In 
addressing these themes, I argued that the Kantian sublime, which includes two species of 
sublimity (the dynamical and the mathematical), subserves the preservation of the existing 
political order by reifying the hierarchical system as subjective experience, by reproducing the 
inegalitarian relationship of the governed to a higher political authority in the interplay of the 
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imagination and reason. And yet, as I have shown, this argument itself raises the further question 
of how, given the autonomy of sublime experience (i.e., the independent and pleasant awareness 
of reason’s ascendency, of our own supersensibility), a system of rule could colonize the sublime 
such that the experience of freedom is felt as a function of the prevailing order. For the owners 
and managers of rhetorical power, this appropriation requires a rhetorical maneuver that would 
short-circuit the free play of the imagination and reason and in such a way that the governing 
apparatus could annex to itself or serve as the stand-in for reason—thus, surreptitiously 
anthropomorphizing the faculty as Governmental State Reason. As I argued, this can be 
orchestrated by fixing fear-inducing appearances so that they appear to threaten not the sensuous 
finitude of individual subjects but a collective way of life—whatever individual subjects may 
suppose that to mean. Laminating this colonizing sequence is the proper naming of such 
appearances, what Kant terms subreption, whereby a name like “Pearl Harbor” serves as a 
cleanup or whitewashing device that dissimulates the act of rhetorical institution while 
simultaneously constituting an automatically renewable source of future political mobilization 
and continual assent to hierarchical rule.  
In contrast to the tragic, what is perceived to be at risk in the sublime fixing of 
appearances is not the collective identity of a politeia, or constitutional way of life, but a bare, 
generic way of life, only minimally determined and even then by other empty signifiers such as 
citizenship or purchasing power. What is more, the quantity of such “empty” threats is greater 
than those that are hegemonized by a particular political identity, and in two respects: first, the 
universal appeal of a generic way of life is virtually all inclusive, covering the broadest possible 
swath of public sentiment; second, affective responses at the individual level are maximally 
intense (demoralization acting as the limit beyond which the maximum begins to undo itself à la 
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Burke’s crushing terror). These gains in rhetorical effectivity protect sublime institution from the 
kinds of resistance that jeopardize the political utility of cathartic mīmēsis, since what is 
perceived to be at risk of destruction is not limited by one’s political preference or commitment 
to a particular form of government. As a blank slate upon which people project whatever they 
hold most dear—e.g. relationships, quality of life, hopes and aspirations, etc.—“way of life” 
does not easily admit of opposition. Although both the tragic and the sublime are fundamentally 
non-rational models of rhetorical effectivity, the sublime is, overall, more resistant to critique. 
Nevertheless, as a rhetorical operation in the service of hierarchy, the sublime discloses 
its own characteristic weak spots. This weakness is subsumable under the heading of the limits of 
form. The pleasure of the political sublime, which is to say the accomplishment of the sublime as 
formalized mental movement, consists in no small part in the anticipation that the humiliation of 
the imagination—and of the people—will resolve itself in a moment of vicarious triumph and 
exaltation. But this means that the welled-up assertion of Reason’s supremacy, the expected 
demonstration of redemptive political authority, is ultimately promissory in nature, resembling a 
loan predicated on the good faith of an imminent return. The state, in other words, on pain of 
rhetorical ineffectivity must at some point make good on their tacit promise either to submit 
formlessness to the rational explanation, in the case of economic crises, for instance, or to 
demonstrate a power superior to objects possessing might, as instanced in so-called acts of war 
or terrorism. Good faith holds out only for so long before it turns into its opposite, that is, before 
the institution of sublime form retroactively unravels itself—which occurred at the heels of the 
bailout of the U.S. financial system circa 2008 but took more than a decade with respect to the 
U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
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When political authority fails to offer tangible, unambiguous proof of success—rationally 
or militarily—its status is effectively demoted from that of all-powerful Reason to the scrap yard 
of imaginative failure, leading to the possibility of enthusiasm’s re-emergence as an imaginative 
striving to attain to reason itself, that is, apart from political order. In the next chapter, I examine 
a third and final category of negative aesthetics, the uncanny, which, in contrast to the sublime, 
offers a way around the limits of form. By creating an environment of anxiety tied to a 
procession of unfalsifiable maleficence, the uncanny renders incomprehensible the very 
distinction between government failure and success, thus constituting perhaps the most resilient 
and easily renewable source of affective legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 4 – UNMAKING REALITY: 
UNCANNY FIGURES AND THE RETURN OF THE PERSONAL SAFETY STATE 
 
It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless 
we join together in a way against the barbarians, nor for 
the Hellenes to attain to concord until we wrest our 
material advantages from one and the same source and 
wage our wars against one and the same enemy. – Isocrates 
380 B.C.E. 
 
The people can always be brought to the bidding of the 
leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they 
are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of 
patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the 
same way in any country. – Gestapo Reichsmarschall 
Hermann Goring 1946 
 
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own 
reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, 
as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, 
which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort 
out. We’re history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left 
to just study what we do. – Senior adviser to former 
President George W. Bush, as quoted in the New York 
Times Magazine, October 17, 2004.  
 
Today, the uncanny is an accepted and popular concept in various disciplines of the 
humanities, recently crossing over to the “hard” science fields of robotics and artificial 
intelligence. Genealogically, however, the uncanny is unique among other aesthetic and anti-
aesthetic concepts. Compared to the tragic and the sublime, the uncanny as a distinct concept is 
still quite young. According to Anneleen Masschelein, “The term was not considered as an 
aesthetic category and there was no theoretical or philosophical discourse before the twentieth 
century” (2011, 3). A theory of the uncanny before the twentieth century can only resort to the 
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occurrence of the word or to descriptions of the phenomenon in literary texts and artistic sources. 
By common consent, writes Martin Jay, “the theoretical explanation for the current fascination 
with the concept is Freud’s 1919 essay, ‘The Uncanny’” (1998, 157), according to which the 
uncanny is the feeling of fear and unease that arises when something familiar becomes strange 
and unfamiliar. Despite earlier forays into the uncanny—e.g., attempts by Ernst Jentsch in the 
field of psychiatry, Friedrich Schelling in idealist philosophy, and Rudolf Otto in theology—
Freud’s essay was the first to elevate the phenomenon and the word “unheimlich” to the status of 
a concept.1 Moreover, his foundational essay remains the primary focus of attraction in the 
continuing fascination with the uncanny in both culture and theory (see Royle 2003, 14). At the 
same time, however, the Freudian uncanny exceeds the boundaries of a strict psychoanalytic 
framework, opening up onto the fields of philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, and literary 
criticism. Hence, the concept is unique not only among aesthetic or anti-aesthetic concepts but 
also among other Freudian, or at least Freudian-psychoanalytic, concepts.  
This popularity and polyvalence notwithstanding, the uncanny has yet to be articulated 
with the ends of rhetoric or considered seriously as a means of persuasion, political or other.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Freud himself was very much aware of these earlier attempts to theorize the uncanny and cites both Jentsch and 
Schelling in “The Uncanny.” Indeed, the essay, in part, reads as a critical response to Jentsch’s definition of the 
uncanny as “intellectual uncertainty.” 
2 Perhaps one of the reasons why the uncanny has yet to be articulated with rhetoric is its ambivalence vis-à-vis the 
classical rhetorical tradition. For, if by the uncanny, we understand “the opposite of what is familiar,” then it would 
seem that the uncanny both corroborates and contradicts fundamental principles of the classical rhetorical tradition. 
On the one hand, it confirms Aristotle       to make language unfamiliar as a means of achieving clarity, 
recommending the use of stylistic devices that defamiliarize language—so long as the writer or speaker arrives at the 
mean between ordinary speech and poetic language as appropriate to the subject. “To deviate [from prevailing 
usage],” he states, “makes language seem more elevated; for people feel the same in regard to word usage as they do 
in regard to strangers compared with citizens. As a result, one should make the language unfamiliar; for people are 
admirers of what is far off, and what is marvelous is sweet” (2007, 3. 2. 2–3; see also 1987a1458a18–58b5). On the 
other hand, it seems to conflict with Cicero, who writes, “[The] study of the other arts draws as a rule upon abstruse 
and hidden sources, whereas all the procedures of oratory lie within everyone’s reach, and are concerned with 
everyday experience and with human nature and speech. This means that in the other arts the highest achievement is 
precisely that which is most remote from what the uninitiated can understand and perceive, whereas in oratory it is 
the worst possible fault to deviate from the ordinary mode of speaking and the generally accepted way of looking at 
things” (2001, 1.12) Yet as in the case of the sublime, there is an important distinction between the uncanny as it 
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The most notable exception to this non-relationship is the French poststructuralist Jacques 
Derrida, who, in a series of lectures on the future of Marxism, explores the “political” dimension 
of Marx’s uncanny figuration. Nevertheless, the analysis does not treat of the uncanny as an 
instrument of political legitimacy or consensus making. Rather, it focuses on the “spectral” 
quality of Marx’s current status, insisting on the structure of uncanny haunting, which Derrida 
sees as exemplified by the ghost’s return or, more precisely, a sense of waiting for that return. 
Derrida’s uncanny is thus not so much a negative affect, or source of discomfort, as a trope 
signifying all that is excluded, denied, or ignored by the global hegemony of the capitalist state 
(e.g., the underemployed and the permanent members of a growing global diaspora but also the 
contradictions of the free market, the spread of nuclear weapons, inter-ethnic wars, and the 
hypocrisy of international law). In that capacity, Marx’s uncanny specter—his ghost’s return—
serves as a representative figure or bricolage of the many specters that necessarily haunt the 
structure of capital’s state-sanctioned, state-enforced hegemony. Given that hegemony, 
according to Derrida, “organizes the repression and thus the confirmation of a haunting” (1994, 
37), no interior can be made safe from the incursions of the alien other. Yet beyond serving as a 
watchword for radical critique or as a bulwark against the temptations of conjuring away the 
repressed, Derrida’s re-imagining of the Freudian uncanny appears to lack any real rhetorical 
power. This is an unfortunate oversight, since, as we have seen, threats to an interior—whether 
to a constitutional arrangement or way of life—can serve as effective means of creating and 
maintaining subjective adherence to the state and thus of instaurating political order. Hence, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
refers to a quality of language and the uncanny as an affect realized or made possible by means of language. As I 
argue in this chapter, the uncanny’s rhetorico-political value consists not in the use of unfamiliar language but in 
creating, via symbolic expression, a sense of unreality characterized by anxiety and fear. With respect to 
contemporary communication scholarship, virtually no precedent exists for analyzing the uncanny from a rhetorical 
perspective. Notable exceptions include Joshua Gunn’s Modern Occult Rhetoric, in which he acknowledges Freud’s 
“The Uncanny” in relation to occultism (241), and Bradford Vivian’s Being Made Strange, which attempts to 
defamiliarize the rhetorical tradition by reconsidering its principles in light of poststructuralism. 
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from a theoretical standpoint, the uncanny remains naïvely inexperienced vis-à-vis the ends of 
rhetoric, particularly the aim of securing political legitimacy.  
Although Freud did not speculate as to the political uses of the uncanny—much less 
develop it in the direction of political legitimacy and the rhetoric of the state—his insight into the 
affective nature of something familiar suddenly becoming unfamiliar highlights the uncanny’s 
potential to further the state’s rhetorical demands. This prospect, I argue, consists not in the 
return of the repressed but in the return of the surmounted. According to Freud, the uncanny 
admits of two species: the first, deriving from repressed childhood complexes, centers on the 
individual and involves a harking back to earlier, single phases in the evolution of the sense of 
self; the second, which originates in superseded stages of psychosocial development, evokes 
those surmounted, superannuated modes of thought belonging to “the old animistic view of the 
universe” (2003b, 147). In each case, the emergence of the sense of the uncanny is owing to the 
return of something once familiar but since “forgotten,” that is, either repressed by the individual 
psyche or surmounted by the social and its storehouse of common knowledge and belief. 
Consequently, argues Freud, the uncanny is in fact nothing new or alien. As a type of objectified 
displeasure, the uncanny refers to something that is familiar and old-established in the mind but 
whose familiarity has become alienated via a process either of individual repression or societal 
supersession. Although the first species has undoubtedly received more scholarly attention than 
the second one (Derrida’s “hauntology” included), only the psychosocial variety makes possible 
a certain rhetorical effect that by means of blurring the boundary between fantasy and reality 
raises the question of material reality and the possible suspension of belief in its actuality. Unlike 
the first species, which lays stress on psychical reality and the undifferentiated ego, the second 
rekindles surmounted modes of thought and thus translates the residua of outmoded beliefs as 
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newly fashioned animistic convictions. Hence, the return of the surmounted, as opposed to the 
repressed, is the return—in secular, post-Enlightenment guise—of the belief in a hostile universe 
replete with omnipotent, secret harmful forces and malefic, quasi-supernatural Others. That such 
animistic convictions are not consciously acknowledged or explicitly affirmed is no 
contradiction of the reality or likelihood of uncanny fear and dread. Indeed, the uncanny 
presupposes an active yet non-conscious conflict between animistic convictions and those 
belonging to a rational-scientistic worldview. Without it, the uncanny would simply lose its 
conditions of possibility.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how the state exploits the figure of the malefic, alien Other 
so as to give rise to a sense of the uncanny, specifically, to the emergence of an existential fear 
vis-à-vis the return of superannuated modes of thought. I argue that this existential quality of the 
uncanny, combined with the perceived omnipotence of the figural Other, facilitates an imminent 
shift in political legitimation by state power from the assurance of constitutional protection to 
that of the personal safety state, thereby reducing the state’s political legitimacy to a basic 
policing function. But unlike the rhetorical institution of the political sublime, which secures 
subjective adherence to state power negatively, by means of an implicit promise of future 
success, the figural dimension of the uncanny Other engenders and maintains the specter of an 
unfalsifiable threat, the reality of which can neither be independently verified nor denied. Hence, 
the procession of the uncanny Other, I argue, enables the state to nourish and exploit an 
environment of fear, one that is equal parts real and neurotic. At the same time, it grants the state 
monopolistic right to determine its own level of unfalsifiable success in combating the Other’s 
incursions.   
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4.1 FREUD’S UNCANNY: 
FEAR OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE RETURN OF THE SURMOUNTED 
By common consent, the theoretical inspiration for the twentieth-century’s fascination 
with the concept of the uncanny is Freud’s 1919 essay “The Uncanny” (“Das Unheimliche”). 
The essay, which purports to engage in an aesthetic investigation from the perspective of 
psychoanalysis, understands aesthetics not in the restricted sense of theories of beauty but as 
relating “to the qualities of our feeling” or affects. Accordingly, the psychoanalyst’s interest in 
aesthetics tends to focus on those particular areas that have been marginalized or neglected in the 
specialist literature, particularly those areas that elicit feelings of displeasure or create a sense of 
unease. Freud thus singles out the uncanny as the most representative of such aesthetic topoi. 
“On this topic,” he argues, “we find virtually nothing in the detailed accounts of aesthetics, 
which on the whole prefer to concern themselves with our feelings for the beautiful, the 
grandiose and the attractive—that is to say, with feelings of a positive kind, their determinants 
and the objects that arouse them—rather than with their opposites, feelings of repulsion and 
distress” (2003b, 123). As an aesthetic concept, the uncanny belongs to the realm of the 
frightening, of what evokes a sense of fear and dread.3 Yet, as Freud points out, the word is not 
always used in a clearly definable sense and is commonly confused with what arouses fear in 
general. Nevertheless, he insists that we may presume that there exists “a specific affective 
nucleus,” which would justify the use of a special conceptual term and distinguish the “uncanny” 
within the field of the frightening.4 In trying to isolate the nature of this nucleus from fear in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although Freud could just as easily have considered other negative aesthetic categories—such as the sublime, the 
tragic, or the grotesque—his choice to single out the uncanny is probably a result of marginal status in the history of 
aesthetics, though this status has significantly shifted as a result of the increasing popularity of the uncanny in 
scholarly discourse. 
4 Before attempting to isolate the uncanny’s so-called “affective nucleus,” Freud identifies what he sees as the 
primary difficulty attendant upon the study of the uncanny, viz., that people differ greatly in their sensitivity to this 
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general, Freud pursues two courses of inquiry: the first concerns the semantic content of the 
word “unheimlich,” while the second is essentially thematic in its orientation, examining a range 
of persons and things, sense impressions, experiences and situations that tend to evoke a sense of 
the uncanny and then inferring its affective nucleus from what all these have in common. Both 
approaches, argues Freud, lead to the same conclusion, namely, “that the uncanny is that species 
of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar” 
(2003b, 124).5 Thus, as a distinct type of fear, Freud understands the uncanny as the feeling of 
unease that arises when something familiar suddenly becomes strange and unfamiliar.  
Starting with an investigation into the semantic content that has accrued to the German 
word “unheimlich,” Freud follows Friedrich Schelling in defining it as the name for everything 
that ought to have remained hidden and secret and has become visible or come into the open 
(2003b, 132).6 At the same time, Freud observes, “[It] seems obvious that something should be 
frightening precisely because it is unknown and unfamiliar. But of course,” he adds, “the 
converse is not true: not everything new and unfamiliar is frightening.” In opposition to the 1906 
essay by Ernst Jentsch, according to which the essential condition for the emergence of a sense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
kind of feeling, acknowledging that in comparison with, say the sublime, the uncanny is exceptionally obtuse in this 
regard. In response to this potential problem, Freud points out that such affective variability is not unique to the 
uncanny but plays an important part in other areas of aesthetics, too. As we will, from a rhetorical standpoint, this 
obtuseness is not so much a theoretical shortcoming, or difficulty for aesthetics, as it is a resource of symbolic 
effectivity.   
5 In a work of around the same period, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (or. pub. 1921), Freud 
employs the concept of the uncanny to make sense of the phenomenon of mass formation, arguing, as he does in 
“The Uncanny,” that “the characteristic of uncanniness suggests something old and familiar that has undergone 
repression” (1959, 73). Indeed, as Anneleen Masschelein contends, “The Uncanny” is situated “at the intersection of 
different generic affiliations in Freud’s oeuvre” (2011, 20). In addition to figuring into Freud’s inquiry into group 
psychology, the uncanny also plays a role in his analysis, in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, of seemingly 
meaningful coincidences, déjà vu and superstitions, prophetic dreams, and presentiments (1901/1965, 330 ff.), and, 
in Totem and Taboo (1913/1950), of motifs from primitive societies and mythology. Earlier, in The Interpretation of 
Dreams, Freud includes a footnote on the uncanny feeling associated with the fear of being buried alive (1899/1955, 
400n3.).  
6 In English the nearest semantic equivalents for unheimlich are “uncanny” and “eerie,” though etymologically the 
word corresponds to “unhomely.” For Schelling’s definition and proposed origin of the uncanny, see Anthony 
Vidler’s The Architectural Uncanny (26–7). 
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of the uncanny is intellectual uncertainty, Freud argues that, “Something must be added to the 
novel and the unfamiliar if it is to be uncanny” (2003b, 124 –5; see Jentsch 1996). Likewise, if 
the theorist is to grasp the essence of the uncanny, then he or she must go beyond what Freud 
sees as “a mere equation of the uncanny with the familiar” and inquire into that which ensures an 
essential, or at least a non-accidental, link between the unfamiliar and the frightening (2003b, 
125). On Freud’s view, it is language that provides the basic, albeit preliminary, material for 
uncovering this relationship, especially given the linguistic negation of the prefix “un,” in both 
“unheimlich” and “uncanny.” Without any knowledge of the development of the German or 
English language, we can see that the lexical form of the uncanny derives from its linguistic 
contrary, “heimlich” or “canny” (read: “homey” or “homely).7 If we take things step further, 
Freud points out, and examine the semantic content of the word “unheimlich,” what we notice is 
the lexical ambivalence that word “unheimlich” shares with its linguistic contrary, “heimlich” or 
“homey.” Much like the etymological root of the word “taboo,” which encompasses the 
antithetical meanings of “sacred” and “unclean” (see Freud 1950, 24, 32, 84), “unheimlich” 
diverges in two contrary directions, comprising a sense both of the familiar (homely) and 
unfamiliar (unhomely). This semantic ambivalence, which, according to Freud is a residual trace 
of primitive language, suggests if not the immediate or representative cause of the uncanny then 
at least the linguistic substratum underlying those objects or motifs that may evoke in us a sense 
of the uncanny.8 Thus, in an unexpected reversal, Freud concludes that the uncanny does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 On the conceptual and linguistic derivation of words from definitional context or from words of opposite meaning, 
see Kenneth Burke’s notion of the paradox of substance (1969b, 21–6). 
8 In Totem and Taboo, Freud claims that it was common in primitive languages for words to encompass their 
negation or opposite meaning (e.g., “altus” means “high” and “deep,” “sacer” means “sacred” and “accursed”). 
Although the ambivalence of ancient languages disappeared in the course of cultural development, Freud maintains 
that its traces can still be found in modern languages. In accordance with such linguistic ambivalence, the reactions 
words like “taboo” are equally ambivalent, eliciting the simultaneous response of “awe” and “disgust,” attraction 
and repulsion. See Totem and Taboo, ch.2, “Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence.” As we will see, the experience of 
the uncanny is itself both disturbing and pleasurable on account of the residual ambivalence of heimlich-unheimlich. 
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stem from the sudden appearance of something alien or unfamiliar but “is in some way a species 
of the familiar” (2003b, 134). What was meant to remain secret and hidden is somehow related 
to a conflicted desire to return “home,” to what was once familiar, comfortable, or intimate. 
From a theoretical point of view, it would appear as though the sense of familiarity accomplishes 
two things: it establishes a non-accidental link, or affective predisposition, between the 
unfamiliar and the frightening; in so doing, it rounds out the affective core of the uncanny, 
distinguishing it as a special type of fear.  
Notwithstanding the theoretical advance afforded by the semantic content of heimlich-
unheimlich, language alone, Freud recognizes, cannot account for the conditions under which the 
familiar becomes uncanny and frightening, nor can it serve to identify those objects and 
situations liable to elicit a feeling of the uncanny. Thus, following Jentsch, Freud chooses the 
example of E.T.A. Hoffman’s 1817 short story “The Sandman” as an occasion for an exploration 
of uncanny effects as well as for an investigation into how the familiar could play midwife to a 
kind of fear or unease (see Hoffman 1982).9 According to Jentsch, “In story-telling, one of the 
most reliable artistic devices for producing uncanny effects easily is to leave the reader in 
uncertainty as to whether he has a human persona or rather an automaton before him in the case 
of a particular character. This is done in such a way that the uncertainty does not appear 
directly at the focal point of his attention, so that he is not given the occasion to investigate and 
clarify the matter straight away” (1996, 13). That is, Jentsch singles out intellectual uncertainty 
as the exemplar of uncanniness, specifically, the uncertainty, doubt, or hesitation concerning the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although not entirely convinced by Jentsch’s arguments, Freud takes them as a starting point for his own 
investigation, if only because Jentsch reminds Freud “of one writer who was more successful than any other at 
creating uncanny effects,” i.e. Hoffman (2003b, 135). Freud’s quotation of this passage, cited in “The Uncanny,” is 
altered to read: ‘One of the surest devices for producing slightly uncanny effects through story-telling…is to leave 
the reader wondering whether a particular figure is a real person or an automaton, and to do so in such a way that his 
attention is not focused directly on the uncertainty’ (135). 
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boundaries between our living selves and our dead, automaton-like simulacra.10 In this 
connection, he refers to the impressions made on us by waxwork figures, ingeniously constructed 
dolls, and automata. Hence, it is little wonder that in his analysis of “The Sandman” Jentsch 
focuses on the seemingly animate doll Olimpia, to the exclusion of all other potentially uncanny 
motifs. Without disputing the possibility either that such objects may tend to produce intellectual 
uncertainty or that such hesitancy may itself provoke “slightly uncanny effects,” Freud argues 
that this motif of the doll “is by no means the only one responsible for the incomparable uncanny 
effect of the story, or even the one to which it is principally due” (2003b, 136).11 Against this 
interpretation, Freud claims that the Sandman’s principal source of uncanniness attaches directly 
to the figure of the Sandman and therefore to the idea of being robbed of one’s eyes.12 Appealing 
to psychoanalytic experience, Freud traces the uncanny element of blindness back to castration 
anxiety, i.e., the anxiety caused by the infantile castration complex, whose displaced effects, he 
argues, account for the fear evoked by Hoffman’s Sandman figure (see Freud 1962, 61–2). In 
other words, Freud’s interpretive intervention results in ascribing the emergence of the sense of 
the uncanny to an infantile factor, specifically, the repressed childhood complex stemming from 
the fear of castration.13 Where infantile complexes that have been repressed return with vivid and 
real force, an uncanny effect is produced (as is the case with the sandman of Nathaniel’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Without acknowledging Jentsch’s influence, Todorov, unlike Freud, emphasizes hesitation as fundamental to 
uncanny experience (1975, 44–6). 
11 Indeed, Freud only takes issue with Jentsch’s privileging of intellectual uncertainty as the paradigmatic source of 
the uncanny. After critiquing Jentsch’s position, he even allows that “[An] uncanny effect often arises when the 
boundary between fantasy and reality is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something that we have until 
now considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full function and significance of what it symbolizes, and so 
forth” (2003b, 150–51).  
12 The relationship between the Sandman and the eyes is not unique to Hoffman but dates back to traditional 
Northern European folklore. As a mythical character appearing in many children’s stories, the Sandman is said to 
sprinkle sand or dust on or into the eyes of a child at night to bring on dreams and sleep.  
13 Freud suggests that there are possibly other examples of the uncanny, also present in “The Sandman,” which 
likewise derive from infantile factors. But rather than generalizing from this one example, Freud merely proposes an 
object-strategy whereby the theorist or critic inquires into those motifs that produce an uncanny effect to see whether 
they too can reasonably be traced back to infantile sources.  
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childhood who returns in the later figure of Dr. Copelius to reactivate the torturing fear from 
blindness harassing the hero of the story). 
On the basis of this discovery, Freud provisionally emends his definition of the uncanny 
so that the uncanny is “something familiar that has been repressed and then reappears, and that 
everything uncanny satisfies this condition” (2003b, 152). Hence, the conflicted desire to return 
“home,” to that which is familiar, manifests in the uncanny as an overcoming of the split or 
alienation that is expressed as anxiety about castration (either imagined in the past or feared in 
the future) (see Jay 1998, 157–8). At its deepest level, Freud suggests, the desire is for reunion 
with the mother’s body.14 Yet the experience of undergoing the return of the repressed is not 
straightforwardly pleasurable, since the desire for such overcoming is at once disturbing and 
pleasurable—never capable of achieving complete satisfaction or of discharging tension (see 
Ronen 2009, 42–8). If there is a secret nature to the uncanny, then it consists in the return of the 
repressed. For Freud, then, the uncanny names that species of the frightening in which “the 
frightening element is something that has been repressed and now returns” (Freud 2003b, 147). 
That is, the experience of the uncanny brings back something familiar that has undergone 
repression. Although Freud grants that not every motif capable of producing an uncanny effect 
may be as identifiable as the Sandman, he maintains that some of the most prominent of such 
motifs will tend to involve this “harking back to single phases in the evolution of the sense of 
self, a regression to times when the ego had not yet clearly set itself off against the world outside 
and from others” (143). And as the example of the Sandman illustrates, the uncanny materializes 
something of an impossible point of view: it is a point of view that combines the primary 
perspective of the infant with that of the adult who has already repressed his/her primary desire.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The desire for such reunion is heightened when the uncanny involves the womb fantasy. “Here too,” writes 
Freud, “the uncanny [the ‘unhomely’] is what was once familiar [‘homely’, ‘homey’]” (2003b, 151; see also 1955, 
399–400). 
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Despite the difference in approach between Freud’s thematic and semantic inquiries into 
the uncanny, his examination of the Sandman motif—or repression thesis—confirms his earlier 
supposition regarding the interrelationship between uncanny fear and the ambivalence of 
heimlich-unheimlich: “[If] psychoanalytic theory is right in asserting that every affect arising 
from an emotional impulse—of whatever kind—is converted into fear by being repressed, it 
follows that among those things that are felt to be frightening there must be one group in which it 
can be shown that the frightening element is something that has been repressed and now returns. 
This species of the frightening would then constitute the uncanny, and it would be immaterial 
whether it was itself originally frightening or arose from another affect.” Consequently, this 
explains “why German usage allows the familiar (das Heimliche, the ‘homely’) to switch to its 
opposite, the uncanny (das Unheimliche, the ‘unhomely’)” (2003b, 147–8). For the uncanny 
element is not so much what is new or strange but something that was long familiar to the psyche 
and was estranged from it only through being repressed. Indeed, according to Freud, the negative 
prefix “un-“ is not merely a linguistic negation but an indicator of repression (151; see 
Masschelein 2011, 8–9). At the same time, this linguistic sign parallels Freud’s hypothesis in 
Totem and Taboo concerning the residual traces of primitive or ancient languages in modern 
languages. Just as infantile factors continue to influence the individual psyche—cropping up 
incognito as symptoms in daily life and in pathology—so too, certain archaic remnants common 
to primitive languages maintain an active, albeit “clandestine,” presence in the normal, everyday 
commerce of social life.15 In the case of language, as in the case of the mind, the uncanny points 
to the return of something familiar that has been lost or made inaccessible either to the individual 
or collective unconscious.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Freud’s thesis in Interpretation of Dreams that the mechanisms of contradiction and negation do not operate in 
the unconscious provides a further, though retroactive, link between onto- and phylogenesis. Like the unconscious, 
primitive languages frequently included words that encompassed their negation or opposite (see 318, 326, and 337). 
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In addition to substantiating Freud’s conjecture about “unheimlich,” the connection 
between psychic repression and linguistic residua points up the convergence via the uncanny of 
the axes of ontogeny (the development of the individual) and phylogeny (the development of 
society), centered around the cornerstones of ambivalence, castration, repression, narcissism, 
death, and art. According to Freud, language not only signals the workings of unconscious 
mechanisms like repression but also carries the traces of earlier stages of psychosocial 
development, particularly, argues Freud, “the old animistic view of the universe” (2003b, 147).16 
In other words, the ambivalence that characterizes “unheimlich” is a vestige of the ambivalence 
that characterizes the primitive mind as well as its language; the conception of animism, Freud 
claims, is a direct consequence of this ambivalence. The complex etymology of the word 
“unheimlich” is an emanation of this ambivalence connected with the primitive mind, and, in 
keeping with Freud’s observations on the relationship of psychoanalysis to aesthetics, it elevates 
the notion of uncanniness (as well as the “aesthetic”) to a more general realm of the affect, rather 
than merely “artistic” or “literary.” Although the word is not in itself prone to elicit uncanny 
effects, it suggests the fundamental interrelatedness of onto- and phylogenesis, of individual and 
collective psychology. As Freud demonstrates throughout Totem and Taboo, culture and society 
develop according to the same mechanisms at work in the development of the child. As a living 
receptacle of earlier stages in human development, language thus preserves in fossilized form an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 According to Freud, this view is characterized “by the idea that the world was peopled with human spirits, by the 
narcissistic overrating of one’s own mental processes, by the omnipotence of thoughts and the technique of magic 
that relied on it, by the attribution of carefully graded magical powers (mana) to alien persons and things, and by all 
the inventions with which the unbounded narcissism of that period of development sought to defend itself against 
the unmistakable sanctions of reality” (op. cit.). See also the third chapter of Totem and Taboo, “Animism, Magic 
and the Omnipotence of Thoughts.” 
	   158	  
animistic conception of the world, one that corresponds to the “primitive” stage in infantile 
development and amounts to the phylogenetic equivalent of narcissism.17  
In light of this connection between the psyche and the social, Freud’s allusion to a 
primary phase when the ego has not yet been differentiated from the external world points to a 
second source of the uncanny: “It appears that we have all, in the course of our individual 
development, been through a phase corresponding to the animistic phase in the development of 
primitive peoples, that this phase did not pass without leaving behind in us residual traces that 
can still make themselves felt, and that everything we now find ‘uncanny’ meets this criterion 
that it is linked with these remnants of animistic mental activity and prompts them to express 
themselves” (2003b, 147).18 Different stages succeed one another but not without leaving traces, 
meaning that the advent of a new stage does not entail the complete disappearance of the 
preceding one. Hence, just as the experience of the uncanny brings back something familiar that 
has been repressed, so too, the uncanny can also emerge where primitive beliefs that have been 
superseded gain a sudden affirmation (for instance, when a wished-for death of a hated person is 
actualized soon afterward, taken as a proof that a wish of the heart can gain power in actual life 
as part of a primitive animistic view of the world surrounding the subject).19 Anything that 
reminds modern man of such superseded beliefs, such as ambivalence, projection, or the 
omnipresence of thought, is experienced as uncanny, just as the return of repressed childhood 
complexes. Consequently, argues Freud, “[The] uncanny element we know from experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Indeed, the primitive stage of animism—with its characteristics of ambivalence and the like—is the phylogenetic 
equivalent of narcissism, what Freud in “The Uncanny” refers to as “primordial narcissism” (142). 
18 As Anneleen Masschelein notes, this passage from “The Uncanny” summarizes the main elements of the third 
essay of Totem and Taboo, Freud’s most ambitious work and his only sustained attempt to explore the 
interrelatedness of onto- and phylogenesis (see Masschelein 2011, 27–35).  
19 This example, recapitulated by Freud in “The Uncanny,” is a story of “a patient” (i.e., the Rat Man) who ascribes 
his beneficial stay in a spa to a certain room adjacent to that of a beloved nurse. When he returns there and the room 
turns out to be occupied, he wishes for the new occupant to die. When this actually happens, he attributes it to the 
“omnipotence of his thoughts” (Freud 1909/1989, 312–13) and characterizes it as an “‘uncanny’ experience” (Freud 
2003b, 146)  
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arises either when repressed childhood complexes are revived by some impression, or when 
primitive beliefs that have been surmounted appear to be once again confirmed” (155). On this 
view on, then, the return of surmounted, superannuated modes of thought constitutes a second 
source of uncanny effects, a second species or variety of the uncanny. If in the return of the 
repressed, the uncanny derives from repressed childhood complexes, then in the return of the 
surmounted the emergence of a sense of the uncanny stems from the remnants or residual traces 
of animistic convictions. Whereas in the former the uncanny traces its origins back to an infantile 
factor, in the latter the uncanny results from what Freud comes close to calling the primitive 
factor.  
Despite the fairly obvious distinction between individual pathology and society or 
culture, Freud maintains that with respect to the uncanny the distinction between primitive and 
infantile origins is often a hazy one. Toward the close of “The Uncanny,” he writes, “[We] must 
not let our preference for tidy solutions and lucid presentation prevent us from acknowledging 
that in real life it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between the two species of the uncanny 
that we have posited. As primitive convictions are closely linked with childhood complexes, 
indeed rooted in them, this blurring of the boundaries will come as no great surprise” (2003b, 
155). At least one commentator, Anneleen Masschelein, affirms the significance of this 
qualifying move, arguing, “In the final analysis, it does not matter whether a topic belongs to 
individual or collective psychology, nor does it make a difference whether Freud is dealing with 
pathology or with phenomena from daily life, with anthropological data or with superstitions, 
with mythology or with literature.” Regardless, she concludes, “Psychoanalysis ultimately aims 
at the processes or the machinery behind certain phenomena and shifts” (2011, 33). And yet this 
claim begs the question, to what extent is the uncanny a psychoanalytic concept? Masschelein 
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herself raises doubt concerning the relationship between the uncanny as a concept (what she 
refers to as an “unconcept”) and the psychoanalytic framework, highlighting the fact that the 
uncanny was at no time a major psychoanalytic concept. What is more, argues Masschelein, 
“Even if the uncanny is the Freudian uncanny, it can no longer be considered a psychoanalytic 
concept and one may even wonder whether this was ever the case” (4). For that reason, she 
argues, the uncanny “was not so much tainted by the criticisms against psychoanalysis and could 
be rediscovered and reclaimed in the wake of the poststructuralist predilection for the marginal 
and the forgotten” (127).20 As Susan Bernstein puts it, the uncanny is ambulatory and frustrates 
efforts to pin it down (2003; see also Hook 2003).21 Even Freud—who in the classificatory 
opening remarks of “The Uncanny” takes great pains to demonstrate the suitability of 
psychoanalysis vis-à-vis the uncanny—repeatedly suggests that the uncanny in art (if not in life) 
exceeds the grasp of psychoanalytic inquiry and should be studied by aesthetics.22 Finally, when 
the essay is considered within the framework of Freud’s phylogenetic theory of art, the peculiar 
power of the writer to create or suppress uncanny effects is situated on a more primitive level 
than that of the ontogenetic approach to the modern psyche.23  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Notable poststructuralist appropriations of the Freudian uncanny include those by Hélène Cixous (1976), Jacques 
Derrida (1994), and Nicholas Royle (2003). Although each brings a unique perspective to bear on the uncanny, these 
perspectives are united in their attempt to reframe the concept as a style of thinking, writing, or teaching that 
perpetually postpones closure, one that questions and destabilizes the status and possibility of concepts. Nicholas 
Royle, whose work stands out for being the first monograph devoted to the subject, sums up this method of thinking 
as that which “is never fixed, but constantly altering…(the) unsettling (of itself)” (2003, 5). In a radical expansion of 
Freud’s concise definition, the uncanny thus amounts to a strategy and an attitude of defamiliarization and perpetual 
critique.  
21 In that respect, the uncanny calls to mind the itinerancy characteristic of both the Older Sophists and their practice 
of a “tactical” rhetoric, that is to say, “a calculated action [or procedure] determined by the absence of a proper 
locus” (de Certeau 1984, 37; see also Poulakos 1995, 25–32). Rhetoric also shares with the uncanny a resistance to 
easy definition. As Wayne Booth puts it, “No one definition will ever pin rhetoric down” (2004, 3).  
22 Nevertheless, given Freud’s reduction of aesthetics to the study of beauty and its effects, it is unclear how 
aesthetics as he understands it could adequately deal with the sense of the uncanny.  
23 On Freud’s theory of art as a phylogenetic phenomenon, see Totem and Taboo (113) and his analysis of literature 
in “The Creative Writer and Daydreaming” (2003a).  
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Regardless of whether the uncanny is a psychoanalytic concept, that is, of whether 
psychoanalysis is uniquely suited to account for uncanny effects, Freud makes a convincing case 
for why we ought to treat the varieties of the uncanny separately—or at least, why we would be 
justified in so doing—namely, “the reality test.” Unlike the uncanny effects associated with the 
castration complex, the womb fantasy, and other complexes stemming from a range of infantile 
factors and repressed desires, those associated with “primitive,” animistic convictions tend to 
involve a testing or questioning of the parameters of our given, taken-for-granted reality, the 
objectivity of established, agreed-upon reality. On this point, Freud remarks, “Where the 
uncanny stems from childhood complexes, the question of material reality does not arise, its 
place being taken by psychical reality. Here [at the level of desire and childhood complexes] we 
are dealing with the actual repression of a particular content and the return of what has been 
repressed, not with the suspension of belief in its reality” (my emphasis). Although one “could 
say that in the one case a certain ideational content was repressed, in the other the belief in its 
(material) reality…such formulation probably stretches the concept of ‘repression’ beyond its 
legitimate bounds” (2003b, 155). In place of repressed childhood complexes, the species of the 
uncanny that derives from superannuated modes of thought materializes via the production of 
effects associated with the omnipotence of thoughts, instantaneous wish fulfillment, secret 
harmful forces, unintended repetition, the return of the dead, and the double (or doppelgänger)—
virtually any superstition we believe we have surmounted. According to Freud, the conditions 
enabling such uncanny effects do not stem from something that was once familiar and then 
repressed; rather, they result from those jarring moments when we are faced with the apparent 
reality of something that we have until now considered to belong strictly to the realm of the 
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imaginative, that is, when the boundary between fantasy and reality is blurred, as in the case of 
the return of the dead:  
We—or our primitive forebears—once regarded such things as real possibilities; 
we were convinced that they really happened. Today we no longer believe in 
them, having surmounted such modes of thought. Yet we do not feel entirely 
secure in these new convictions; the old ones live on in us, on the look-out for 
confirmation. Now, as soon as something happens in our lives that seems to 
confirm these old, discarded beliefs [these animistic convictions], we experience a 
sense of the uncanny, and this may be reinforced by judgments like the following: 
So it’s true, then, that you can kill another man just by wishing him dead’ (2003b, 
154).24  
Thus, over against his reservation about whitewashing the convergence of onto- and 
phylogenesis, or the homology between the individual and collective psyche, Freud maintains 
that the division between “the primitive” and “the infantile” remains “an important and 
psychologically significant distinction,” from a theoretical point of view, to be sure, but also 
from the perspective of so-called “real-life experience.” Theoretically, as we have seen, the 
species of the uncanny that arises from superannuated modes of thought involves a question—or, 
more accurately, a questioning—of material reality, whereas the uncanny stemming from 
childhood complexes does not. Rather than approach the former from the standpoint of 
repression, it is more accurate to take account of “a perceptible psychological difference” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Literary critic Stanley Cavell, in his 1986 Tanner Lecture, devotes his attention to exploring “the uncanniness of 
the ordinary” in everyday experience (1988, 153–78). As something that happens in our lives, the uncanny is not so 
much a source of fear but a kind of “decreation” of ordinary reality, a receptivity to the “familiar invaded by another 
familiar,” which reveals it in a new light” (1989, 47). For a social-psychological account that sees the uncanny as 
arising from an admixture of differing senses of the familiar—i.e., of two familiars foreign to one another—see 
Brady Wagoner (2008). 
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describe the animistic convictions of “civilized man” as having been more or less completely 
surmounted. At the same time, the range of real-life experiences that give rise to this variety of 
the uncanny is wider, more diverse, than that which engenders a return of the repressed. For that 
reason, Freud concludes, the uncanny we know from experience belongs mainly to that species 
deriving from outmoded beliefs. For not only does the return of surmounted beliefs impinge on 
the modern mind’s rationalistic orientation toward the world but it also threatens to do so with 
relative frequency, insofar as such convictions have not been wholly and definitively rejected by 
the unconscious.   
At least three implications result from Freud’s dissociation of superannuated modes of 
thought from repressed desires vis-à-vis the uncanny, all three of which stem directly from his 
notion of the reality test. First, it reveals that condition which is necessary for securing the 
emergence of a sense of the uncanny. As Freud admits, the revised definition of the uncanny—
according to which the uncanny signals the reappearance of something familiar that has been 
repressed—is incomplete, and on two counts: a) it is couched only in terms of repression; b) it 
posits a necessary but by no means sufficient condition. But even if we were to expand the 
definition so that the familiar encompassed both repressed desires and outmoded beliefs, it 
would still lack a condition that, given a fear-inducing person, place or situation, could serve as a 
virtual guarantee for the production of uncanny effects. On this point, observes Freud, “Our 
proposition clearly does not admit of its logical converse. Not everything that reminds us of 
repressed desires, or of superannuated modes of thought belonging to the prehistory of the 
individual and the race, is for that reason uncanny” (2003b, 152; cf. 124–5). For that reason, he 
argues, “[We] should probably be prepared to assume that other conditions, apart from those we 
have so far laid down, play an important part in the emergence of the sense of the uncanny” 
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(153). Although Freud nowhere explicitly identifies such conditions, the type of fear elicited by 
the return of surmounted modes of thought provides one. When distinguishing between the two 
species of the uncanny, he describes the fear elicited by superannuated beliefs in terms of the 
reality test: the fear involved in this variety of the uncanny “is thus solely a matter of testing 
reality, a question of material reality” (154). Significantly, this condition would appear to be 
unavailable, or inaccessible, to that species deriving from childhood complexes and the excessive 
stress that is laid on psychical reality, an implication which once again raises the question of 
whether and to what extent the uncanny is a psychoanalytic concept—or even to what degree 
psychoanalysis is equipped to treat of it. For while the condition of “reality-disturbance” does 
not guarantee that everything reminding us of our prehistoric animistic convictions will engender 
uncanny effects, it suggests that only such reminders can produce a sense of the uncanny and, 
moreover, that the return of the repressed is uncanny only insofar as it is attached in some way to 
the return of a surmounted belief that disturbs our stable sense of reality.  
This condition of reality testing suggests a second implication resulting from Freud’s 
distinction between two species of the uncanny, namely, a renewed significance of Jentsch’s 
interpretation of the uncanny. In other words, Freud’s stipulation regarding the fear of the 
uncanny more or less directly corroborates Jentsch’s original hypothesis that the essential 
condition for the emergence of a sense of the uncanny is intellectual uncertainty. Without 
acknowledging any positive connection to Jentsch’s work, Freud ultimately defends the position 
that a sense of the uncanny “can arise only if there is a conflict of judgment as to whether what 
has been surmounted and merits no further credence may not, after all, be possible in real life” 
(2003b, 156). This summation of Freud’s argument thus reveals what “The Uncanny” has gone 
to great lengths to conceal: the ambiguity animating unheimlich-heimlich, which evokes a special 
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feeling of fear, does in fact issue from intellectual uncertainty, viz., from a conflict of judgment 
appertaining to the nature of reality and our belief in it. Even so, Freud’s tacit confirmation of 
Jentsch’s insight into the uncanny alters the determinant of intellectual uncertainty. Although 
Freud’s uncanny is triggered in the subject by an insoluble hesitation, this indecision is not 
finally grounded in a conflict of judgment as to whether a given object can be cognized as 
animate or inanimate (as in the case of the doll Olimpia); rather, fear of the uncanny stems from 
the appearance of indeterminacy, or the introduction of doubt, vis-à-vis the markers of agreed-
upon, common sense reality and from the intuition that such signposts are not as stable and 
reliable as we believe them to be.  
Tzvetan Todorov, in his structuralist approach to the genre of the fantastic, captures the 
sense of this uncertainty when describing what he considers the uncanny “in the pure state,” that 
is, as a distinct, albeit broad, literary genre: “In works that belong to this genre, events are related 
which may be readily accounted for by the laws of reason, but which are, in one way or another, 
incredible, extraordinary, shocking, singular, disturbing or unexpected, and which thereby 
provoke in the character and in the reader a reaction similar to that which works of the fantastic 
have made familiar” (1975, 46). The uncanny, in other words, produces a reaction of hesitation 
or indecision (the predominant response to the fantastic) mixed with feelings of fear and 
foreboding, one that, as Todorov claims, is shared by both protagonist and reader alike. Hence, 
the uncanny materializes in the perceived inability to dismiss with certainty the reality of some 
thing—whether object, event, or situation—which common sense holds to be an impossible 
unreality, and in combination with the fear that this uncertainty affords. In the final analysis, 
then, it is the suspension of belief in a common sense, doxastic reality that constitutes the 
essential condition for the emergence of the uncanny and its associated effects—the return of the 
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surmounted that unexpectedly appears as an ontological blip in our perceptions of phenomenal, 
empirical world.  As a result, objects embodying the ambiguity of animate/inanimate may very 
well cause the sense of the uncanny but only insofar as this intellectual uncertainty disturbs the 
parameters of accepted reality.      
Finally, in keeping with Todorov’s remarks about the uncanny in literature, Freud’s 
roundabout vindication of intellectual uncertainty has implications for the relationship between 
literature (fiction specifically) and life, between so-called “fictional reality” and what passes, for 
Freud, as “real life,” or “common reality.” According to Freud, “The distinction between what is 
repressed and what is surmounted cannot be transferred to the uncanny in literature without 
substantial modification, because the realm of the imagination depends for its validity on its 
content being exempt from the reality test” (2003b, 155). The paradoxical upshot, then, is that 
“many things that would be uncanny if they occurred in real life are not uncanny in literature,” 
and, vice versa, “that in literature there are many opportunities to achieve uncanny effects that 
are absent in real life” (155–6). Be that as it may, Freud’s strict demarcation between “common” 
and “fictional” reality (i.e., between real-life experiences and those of readers of imaginative 
literature) overlooks the extent to which the uncanny functions to complicate the division 
between these two realms of experience. Although fiction may indeed afford “possibilities for a 
sense of the uncanny that would not be available in real life” (2003b, 157), the sine qua non of 
the uncanny undermines if not the intelligibility of such a distinction then at least its claim to 
irrefutable, objective verity.   For if the emergence of the uncanny results from something akin to 
an ontological blurring effect, such that the impossible impinges on the real, then it is reasonable 
to assume that one of the possible byproducts of such ontological ambivalence would be the 
increasing resemblance of common, everyday reality to any number of the fictional realities with 
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which experience has furnished us. The opposite, of course, does not hold: the uncanny in fiction 
does not admit of a similar colonization on the part of real-life experience—even if the fiction 
under question is an uncanny example of social realism. Nevertheless, once we reject the rigid, 
naïve opposition between common and fictional reality, it becomes possible if not necessary to 
extract the concept of the uncanny from its purely psychological/psychoanalytic context and treat 
it as a category with larger social and cultural implications, indeed one with a certain political 
charge. And after Freud, this liberation is exactly what takes place. 
 
4.2 THE UNCANNY GROWS UP, SORT OF... 
JACQUES DERRIDA ON SPECTERS AND HAUNTINGS 
Jacques Derrida is perhaps the first theorist to pick up on this latter implication with the 
aim of expanding the concept so as to explore the nature of literature, reading and the dialogical 
text, conceptuality, mimesis, and, most important, the relation between reality, fiction, and truth. 
In a footnote to his 1970 “The Double Session” (included in his widely read collection, 
Dissemination), he frames the intellectual uncertainty characterizing the uncanny in terms of 
“undecidability,” which he sets apart from other forms of lexical ambivalence, e.g., that of words 
containing their opposite term: 
We are referring less to the text in which Freud is directly inspired by Abel (1910) 
than to Das Unheimliche (1919), of which we are here, in sum, proposing a 
rereading. We find ourselves constantly being brought back to that text by the 
paradoxes of the double and of repetition, the blurring of the boundary lines 
between ‘imagination’ and ‘reality,’ between the ‘symbol’ and the ‘thing it 
symbolizes’…. The reference to Hoffman and to the fantastic, the considerations 
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on the double meaning of words…(to be continued). (1981, 220 n32; see also 248 
n52 and 268 n67) 
The exact passage to which Derrida is referring emphasizes not the lexical ambivalence of 
heimlich-unheimlich (the lexical inquiry in “The Uncanny”) but the confusion that arises when 
the boundaries between fantasy and reality begin to blur—i.e., “when a symbol takes on the full 
function and significance of what it symbolizes” (Freud 2003b, 150). In other words, the 
undecidability that Derrida highlights vis-à-vis fiction and reality is a function of the 
ambivalence, initiated by the uncanny, between literary and referential language.25 This potential 
to create ontological ambivalence between the fictive and the non-fictive, between life and 
fiction, attracted a number of literary theorists to the Freudian uncanny, thinkers such as Samuel 
Weber (1973), Hélène Cixous (1976), Harold Bloom (1981), Neil Hertz (1985), Stanley Cavell 
(1988), and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1998). Their dense, complex, and imaginative 
discussions facilitated the concept’s dissemination into a broad range of disciplines and fields, 
each of which entailed new questions and perspectives—in architectural and visual studies 
(Vidler 1992; Donald 1995), cultural history (Castle 1995; Collins and Jervis 2008), sociology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 According to Anneleen Masschelein, Hélène Cixous’ “Fictions and Phantoms, written in 1972, just two years 
after Derrida’s “The Double Session,” is very much motivated by the same concerns and metaphors, “to the extent 
that it could be read as an elaboration of Derrida’s comments on ‘The Uncanny’” (2011, 112–13). Indeed, the word 
“undecidable” occurs with reference to the very same passage in Freud. Cixous writes, “We shall allow ourselves to 
be guided at times by and against Freud’s design, by what is certain and by what is hypothetical, by science and 
fiction, by the object that is symbolized and by that which ‘symbolizes.’ We shall be guided by ambivalence and in 
conformity with the undecidable nature of all that touches the Unheimliche: life and fiction, life-as-fiction, the 
Oedipus myth, the castration complex, and literary creation” (1976, 526). On the implications for the reception of 
the conceptual status of the word “unheimlich,” see Cixous (ibid., 528). Almost twenty years later, undecidability 
would prove crucial to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s understanding of the uncanny in Typographies: Mimesis, 
Philosophy, Politics, where he writes: “in its undecidability, the Unheimlich has to do not only with castration (this 
also can be read in Freud), the return of the repressed or infantile anxiety; it is also that which causes the most basic 
narcissistic assurance (the obsessional ‘I am not dead’ or ‘I will survive’) to vacillate, in that the differentiation 
between the imaginary and the real, the fictive and the non-fictive, comes to be effaced (and mimesis, consequently, 
‘surfaces’)” (1998, 195). 
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(Gordon 2008), religious studies (Jonte-Pace 2001), “trauma theory” (Heischman 2002; 
Connolly 2003), even robotics and artificial intelligence (Mori 1970/2012), to name only a few.26  
 Nevertheless, it is Derrida’s treatment of Marx in lectures he gave at the University of 
California, Riverside, in 1993, that deserves pride of place with respect to translating the 
uncanny to the realm of politics and thus to adding an explicitly political dimension to the 
uncanny. In his Specters of Marx, Derrida returns to the uncanny to place it at the heart of his 
study of what is left of the legacy of Marx after the fall of the Communist regime, foregrounding 
the uncanny, “spectral” quality of Marx’s current status. Remaining largely faithful to the 
Freudian framework, Derrida examines this legacy as a return of the repressed, while at the same 
time making the self-consciously untimely gesture of facilitating the resurrection of the legacy’s 
corpse, or more precisely its ghost. “At a time when a new world disorder is attempting to install 
its neo-capitalism and neo-liberalism,” Derrida remarks, “no disavowal has managed to rid itself 
of all of Marx’s ghosts. Hegemony still organizes the repression and thus the confirmation of a 
haunting. Haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony” (1994, 37). Thus for Derrida, 
the uncanny functions as a destabilizing concept that disturbs not readers of fantastic literature or 
neurotic patients but the ethical and political order, disrupting the triumphal discourse of liberal 
democracy and undermining, with a sense of worry, the euphoria of the market economy.  
As both Ernesto Laclau (1996) and Martin Jay (1998) argue, the significance of Derrida’s 
resuscitation of the Marxian legacy consists not so much in his analysis of the continuing 
relevance of Marx’s actual arguments as in his insistence on the structure of uncanny haunting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This dissemination coincides with a stabilization and relative reduction of meaning when the concept is 
canonized. The most common links established in this double-movement are either to Todorov’s theory of the 
fantastic or to the deconstructive-poststructuralist readings of the concept but “always,” according to Masschelein, 
“with Freud as the common denominator” (2011, 126).   
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which, according to Derrida, is exemplified by a sense of waiting for the ghost’s return.27 Over 
against the rhetoric of one-directional temporality—captured in the eschatological, sometimes 
celebratory, themes of the “end of history,” the “end of Marxism,” etc.—Derrida defends a 
repetitive time that is perpetually “out of joint,” one that inaugurates “a new thinking of borders, 
a new experience of the house, the home and the economy” (1994, 219). With recourse to 
Heidegger’s concept of Unheimlichkeit (unhomeliness), Derrida argues that the seemingly 
positive category of “heimlich”—itself deeply fraught in Freud’s discussion of its ambivalence 
with “unheimlich”—expresses the same ambivalent structure that characterizes Heidegger’s 
description of Dasein’s relation to the world, namely, the “structure of unfulfilled longing for an 
eerily familiar home that, however, was never really inhabited and therefore can never be 
regained” (Jay 1998, 160). In typical deconstructionist fashion, Derrida concludes by arguing 
that no interior can be made safe from the incursion of the alien, exterior other, that no inside—
whether that of a concept (e.g., being, time) or of an ethico-political order (e.g., liberal 
democracy)—can ultimately be protected against infiltrations originating in an excluded outside. 
Just as in the case of the doll Olimpia, where indeterminacy erodes the distinction between 
animate and inanimate, for Derrida, the alternative between the canny and the uncanny is 
likewise undecidable. However, by blending the uncanny with Heideggerian unhomeliness, he 
elevates undecidability from the domain of psychology (and literature) to that of ontology. On 
this view, the uncanny is not simply a psychological sentiment but also a fundamental dimension 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Although original (and somewhat notorious), Derrida’s redefinition of the uncanny in terms of a post-Marxist 
hauntology was nevertheless anticipated in 1977 by Jeffrey Mehlman, in his Revolution and Repetition. 
Marx/Hugo/Balzac. Focusing on the motif of the specter in the Communist Manifesto and relating it to Freud’s 
uncanny, Mehlman attempts to reveal what the text represses in a series of (compulsive) repetitions and 
displacements.  
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of Dasein, one that, according to Heidegger, “enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the ‘not-at-
home’” (2000, 233).28     
Rather than abandon the political import of the uncanny, Derrida articulates this 
existential-deconstructionist conclusion to what he refers to as Marx’s “spectrology.” According 
to Derrida, plural “specters” are needed to prevent the homogenization of the human project into 
“a totalized metaghost or singular Geist,” to disrupt the installation of a fundamental horizon, 
that which establishes both the limits and the terrain of any possible object and that, as a result, 
makes impossible any “beyond”; the specters of Marx—or those who are excluded from the 
abstracting, dominating power of Capital, the displaced and exiled—constitute just such a 
plurality and so deny the accomplishment of final closure, the presence of full emancipation. 
This preventative or disruptive capacity, Derrida, argues, is the hidden telos of Marx’s own 
project. In a pun on “ontology,” Derrida proposes a “hauntology,” by which he understands a 
philosophy of haunting, of the return of the repressed, in which the spectral takes precedent over 
being and existence, juxtaposing this hauntology to the more traditional ontology of metaphysics. 
He argues, “[It] is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of 
every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling 
here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in the movement of exorcism. Ontology is a 
conjuration” (1994, 161). Thus, the uncanny becomes not a source of fear and unease—or at 
least not that alone—but a bulwark against the dangerous temptations of conjuring away, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 As Heidegger writes in Being and Time:  “In anxiety, one feels ‘uncanny.’ Here the particular indefiniteness of 
that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the ‘nothing and nowhere.’ But 
here the ‘uncanniness’ also means ‘not-being-at-home’ [‘das Nicht-zuhause-sein’]…. On the other hand, as Dasein 
falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world.’ Everyday familiarity with the world collapses. Dasein 
has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the 
‘not-at-home.’ Nothing else is meant by our talk about ‘uncanniness’” (233).  
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exorcising, plural specters in the name of a redeemed and totally realized whole, the political 
(phylogenetic) equivalent of narcissistic wish-fulfillment—a restoration of a true Heimat.  
Of course, to introduce the word “Heimat” is to foreground the political stakes in 
Derrida’s resurrection of the uncanny, for, according to Martin Jay, “historians have long 
recognized the talismanic power of that word in a Germany that yearned for the secure, 
communal identity that modernization seemed to destroy.” Notwithstanding the occasional leftist 
appropriation, “Heimat served as a rallying cry for a nostalgic right that sought its home in a 
national or völkisch community” (1998, 161). Derrida’s Marxian reworking of the uncanny, with 
its valorization of hauntology as an alternative to the ontology of Western ethico-political order, 
is in fact aimed at the latest version of this desire for canny belonging, a nostalgia that, at the 
time of Derrida’s writing, had begun taking shape in the integral nationalisms that had emerged 
in the wake of Communism’s collapse. Seen in this light, the institution of the United States 
Department of Homeland Security was as much about exploiting and renewing the desire for 
communal identity as preventing terrorist attacks within the Hiemat. Certainly—and at the very 
least—the desire for an alleged lost moral wholeness and sanitized domesticity was instrumental 
in justifying the government’s widespread security efforts over the long-range.  
Despite the continued relevance and critical cachet of the uncanny, Derrida’s elevation of 
spectral uncanniness to an inherently benign solvent of homogeneity and totalizing closure is not 
without its difficulties. First, from a political or critical-theoretical point of view, there is an 
irony, and certain naïveté, in embracing the uncanny, wholesale, as an equally talismanic 
antidote to narcissistic, illusory notions of home (and of the homeland). As Jay points out, 
“[One] salient form of the return of the repressed in the current scene is, after all, precisely the 
purifying nationalism and ethnonarcissism that hopes to exorcise the alien within and achieve 
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authentic cultural integrity” (1998, 161). Likewise, the recurring campaign to re-empower the so-
called “moral majority” and restore respect for Victorian-Protestant values and solutions to social 
problems by the Ann Coulters and Glenn Becks of the world indicates a desire for the return of a 
phantasmatic home, for a familiar home that was never really occupied. Hence, argues Jay, “Not 
every ghost who comes back is like that of the anti-totalizing Marx whose untimely virtue 
Derrida now defends…. There is, in other words, a danger in the valorization of uncanny 
repetition without resolution and the power of haunting per se. For in celebrating spectral returns 
as such, the precise content of what is repeated may get lost” (161–2).29 Counterbalancing any 
potential unsettling effect of the uncanny—which, when realized, works to undermine fixed and 
definitive distinctions between the fictive and the non-fictive, the inside and the outside, the 
animate and the inanimate—is the uncanny’s potential to express the very homesickness, the 
same desire for ontological solidity, that Derrida’s hauntological project tries so hard to undo. It 
is as if for every specter signifying the return of Marx there is another specter either of equal or 
greater strength that is a testament to the conjuring power of anarcho-capitalism and the self-
enclosed narcissism of “free” markets.  
 This tension between the uncanny as bulwark against restorative, fundamentalist 
nostalgia and the uncanny as a presage of a redeemed ethico-political wholeness suggests 
another difficulty in Derrida’s hauntological reworking of the Freudian uncanny. From a 
rhetorical perspective, the indiscriminate valorization of the uncanny not only overlooks the 
content of what is repeated, conjured, or instantiated but also the rhetorical efficacy of political 
appeals to the uncanny as such. Martin Jay’s critical observations, though they hint at the 
unifying power of the uncanny in the hands of a nostalgic right, similarly fail to address the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 As Jeffrey Mehlman points out, “[What] is unheimlich about the unheimlich is that absolutely anything can be 
unheimlich” (1977, 6). 
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uncanny in terms of its symbolic effectivity. At most, his arguments concerning the appeal to a 
lost moral wholeness imply that the uncanny is politically persuasive only insofar as it rekindles 
and promises to satisfy the longing for the beautiful. To be sure, beauty, as we have seen, is 
foremost among the resources of persuasion. But, as we have also seen, the uncanny, while 
quasi-aesthetic in nature, is not a variation of the beautiful. Derrida’s analogical use of 
repression, coupled with his de-emphasis of the role of fear, conceals the affective nature of the 
Freudian uncanny. Unless we are to concede the uncanny to hauntology, we must agree with 
Ruth Ronen, who argues that the uncanny, as an aesthetic feeling “exceeds the distinction 
between beauty and its opposite, between the pleasing and the anxiety-provoking object” (2009, 
42). For that reason, consideration of the political uses (and abuses) of the uncanny will have to 
approach it apart from the beautiful. This, in turn, requires inquiring into the unique rhetorical 
effectivity of the uncanny, specifically, its pliancy vis-à-vis the manipulation of beliefs and the 
formation of attitudes for political ends. 
Derrida insights into the uncanny are nevertheless crucial to this investigation into the 
rhetorical fashioning of the political uncanny—i.e., the uncanny as a means of persuasion in the 
service of politics. Specifically, his fitting of the uncanny to questions of order and his 
articulation of uncanny effect to existential anxiety make significant strides in liberating the 
uncanny from its dubious relation to psychoanalysis and connecting it with concerns that go 
beyond those of a clinical setting. So too, Derrida’s earlier work on the undecidability between 
fiction and life assists in transporting the uncanny from the realm of literature, while 
simultaneously problematizing literature as a domain distinct from non-fictive, everyday life. 
Derrida, however, does not explicitly link up these two paths of inquiry, and his strides toward 
further conceptualizing the uncanny abandon Freud at those points where Freud’s thinking on the 
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uncanny could have advanced Derrida’s own, namely, “the primitive” factor (either alongside or 
in place “the infantile”) and the centrality of fear to the uncanny as quasi-aesthetic affect.  
Irrespective of Freud’s potential usefulness to hauntology or deconstruction in general, 
when considering the uncanny’s rhetorical efficacy in connection with politics, Freud’s 
understanding of the uncanny is also—despite the aporias and other shortcomings—
indispensible. Over against Derrida’s deconstructionist appropriation of the uncanny, according 
to which the uncanny is employed as just one more instrument in the ongoing critique of Western 
ontology, Freud’s investigation of unheimlich interprets the uncanny through the lens of the 
emotions. That is, Freud’s essay focuses on the emergence of a sense, an experience, of a special 
kind of fear, of having perceived something thought to be familiar suddenly appearing somehow, 
also, strange. What Derrida cannot account for, in any way, is the fact that Marx’s specters were 
frightening to no one in particular. Even if, retroactively, we were to consider the apparent spike 
in international terrorism as a manifestation of the spectrally excluded, this perception alone does 
not explain how or why it is frightening, to whom, to what extent, or to what end. In contrast, 
according to the Freudian model, the uncanny is primarily an affect, an emotion, i.e., a thing 
“through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgment and which are 
accompanied by pain and pleasure” (Aristotle 2007, 2.2.8). For these reasons, my approach to 
uncanny political rhetoric is guided by both Derrida and Freud, applying the Freudian uncanny in 
light of undecidability and the emphasis on political order, with, of course, the appropriate 
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4.3 ON THE ORDER OF PERSONAL SAFETY: 
FICTIONAL REALITY AND THE FIGURAL OTHER 
…something like a rhetoric or grammar of the numinous 
and the uncanny… – Siegbert Salomon Prawer 1963 
 
“Fear,” writes the French critical theorist Paul Virilio, “is very resourceful and can use 
anything at hand, but it has a very concrete explanation. The modern version of fear comes at a 
time in history when three major fears (the balance of terror with the atomic bomb, the 
imbalance of terrorism with informational bombs and the great ecological fear with the fear of 
the explosion of a genetic bomb) have displayed their incredible conditioning power” (2012, 42). 
The tendency to treat fear like cash ready for any kind of investment is a widely acknowledged 
phenomenon. So too, rhetoric’s capacity to turn the capital of fear to any kind of profit, 
commercial or political, is a justifiably popular belief, if not common knowledge. As one of the 
basic emotions, fear is a universally recognized subjective and physiological experience.30 
However, as Virilio’s comment suggests, the historical conditions and environmental triggers of 
fear admit of variety rather than uniformity (change as opposed to permanence), while the 
experience of fear in today’s “developed countries” is unique to its historical circumstances. Or 
rather, what is unusual about the distinctly modern version of fear, what changes, is not fear as 
such but a particular, and increasingly common, instantiation of fear, one that exists not in place 
of but alongside the more familiar, transcultural experiences.  
Notwithstanding the unprecedented proliferation of fear, the most distinctive aspect of the 
modern version of fear, argues sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, is the breakdown between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Today, as per discrete emotion theory, psychologists and neurologists speak of “basic emotions,” by which they 
mean a set of innate neurological packages (i.e., syndrome), distinguishable by an individual’s hormonal reactions, 
musculature, and facial expressions. Accordingly, such emotions are cross-culturally recognized. In a cross-cultural 
study of 1972, Paul Ekman and his colleagues concluded that there exist six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, sadness, and surprise (Ekman 1992). For a simultaneously charitable and critical account of this 
neurological understanding of emotions, see Robert C. Solomon’s The Passions (150–70).   
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measures or actions inspired by fear and the existential tremors that cause it. He writes, “The 
most seminal distinction of the present-day avatars of the fears that were otherwise familiar in all 
previously lived varieties of human existence is perhaps the decoupling of fear-inspired actions 
from the existential tremors that generate the fear which inspired them. In other words: the 
displacement of fear—from the cracks and fissures in the human condition where ‘fate’ is 
hatched and incubated, to the areas of life largely unconnected to the genuine source of anxiety” 
(2007, 13; my emphasis). Consequently, he adds, “No amount of effort invested in those areas is 
likely to neutralize or block the source, and so it proves impotent to placate the anxiety, however 
earnest and ingenious that effort might be. It is for this reason that the vicious circle of fear and 
fear-inspired actions rolls on, losing none of its impetus—yet coming no nearer to its ostensible 
object” (ibid. cf. 10, 16, 57).31 The existential tremors are, in themselves, not novel; “existential 
quakes” have accompanied humans throughout their history. However, attending these familiar 
tremors is the recognition of humans’ increasing inability to predict them, much less to prevent 
them or curb them. The reasons for this cognitive change are multiple—e.g., the dismantling of 
state-built and state-serviced defenses against individual misfortunes, the withering of 
arrangements for collective self-defense (trade unions and other instruments for collective 
bargaining), and the erosion of territorial sovereignty and state boundaries vis-à-vis trade and 
capital, crime and terrorism, violence and weapons, surveillance and information. 
Notwithstanding the diversity of such disconcerting tendencies, the cumulative effect is more or 
less uniform, both qualitatively and quantitatively; it is as though the “openness” of open society 
has given way to a proliferation of uncounted and uncountable dangers, intellectual and material, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 On the idea that modern society’s preoccupation with safety and security actually gives rise to risk, see the 
sociologist Anthony Giddens, who defines so-called “risk society” as “a society increasingly preoccupied with the 
future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk” (1999, 3).  
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of diffuse existential anxieties, ambient fears, and securitarian obsessions.32 Consequently, the 
“openness” of the open society comes to mean, simply, a society increasingly exposed to the 
blows of fate, more and more susceptible to events beyond the control of individual and 
collective action. The irony, as Bauman points out, is that the ubiquity of danger precludes the 
possibility of existential security, virtually assuring that fear-inspired actions only ever reproduce 
the very insecurities they are ostensibly meant to reduce, destroy, or prevent. Stockpiling 
supplies, installing alarms, buying insurance, driving armored vehicles, etc.—any of the number 
of security measures individuals undertake to cope with every fresh fear, every new insecurity 
only produces its opposite, an ambience of fear and an ever immediate and tangible obsession 
with all things related to security.   
In the United States at least, the unifying thread of these diffuse fears and securitarian 
anxieties is fear of the figural or tropological Other (see Monahan 2010, 150 ff.). Thus, while 
British journalist Anna Minton is surely right in maintaining that, “Fear breeds fear” (2011, 171), 
now as always, so too, the propagation of fear—as an attitude of mind—is accompanied by or 
caught up in certain rhetorical processes (e.g., performances, artifacts, and structures) that play 
both midwife and custodian to the cycle of fear and fear-inspired actions. Far from unfamiliar, 
this threading function of the Other is nevertheless made strange in that, in its modern form, the 
Other now serves as a rhetorical figure, or trope: a synecdoche that, by means of representing a 
range of present-day fears and of interconnecting them through a signifying “knot,” designates 
human maleficence and malefactors as such. According to Kenneth Burke’s “Four Master 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The ubiquity of floating and diffuse threats (both named and unnamed), ushers in a society whose openness—
once the touchstone political self-assertion—acquires a new gloss, undreamed of by Karl Popper (1971). Bauman 
captures this shift in meaning when he writes, “If the idea of an ‘open society’ originally stood for the self-
determination of a free society cherishing its openness, it now brings to most minds the terrifying experience of a 
heteronomous, hapless and vulnerable population confronted with, and possibly overwhelmed by forces it neither 
controls nor fully understands; a population horrified by its own undefendability and obsessed with the tightness of 
its frontiers and the security of the individuals living inside them” (2007, 7). 
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Tropes,” synecdoche works bilaterally, stressing “a relationship or connectedness between two 
sides of an equation, a connectedness that, like a road, extends in either direction, from quantity 
to quality or from quality to quantity” (509). The synecdoche, in other words, is a rhetorical 
process of associating part and whole in which “either the whole can represent the part or the 
part can represent the whole” (508).33 À la Thomas Farrell, the synecdochic Other embodies the 
standard rhetorical motive to “offer a provisional, but engaged, sense of meaning in particular to 
a changing complex of appearances” (1993, 28), to counterbalance the insecurity of the present 
and uncertainty about the future by making “ongoing sense of appearances” (25). By enabling 
the identification of the whole as a totality that is qualitatively identical with the parts that appear 
to make it up, the synecdochic Other integrates a wide range of diffuse existential anxieties by 
means of a common heading or identity (see White 1986, 73). In other words, the Other not only 
represents each of its parts but, in so doing, it also represents the attempt to give a human face 
and thus a determinable cause to any number of floating, diffuse threats (to one’s own person 
and its extensions), to trace back any case of malignance, genuine or putative, any failure to 
achieve full security against the human potential for destruction and harm, to some evil intention, 
plot, or conspiracy that, once discovered, can be rooted out and destroyed. In Bauman’s 
framework, then, the synecdochic Other works to bridge the cleft between measures inspired by 
fear and the tremors that caused them, undermining the self-reproducing capacity of fear and 
returning the “blows of fate” to their proper place within the cracks and fissures in the human 
condition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Historiographer Hayden White, drawing on Burke, emphasizes that synecdoche is an integrative process, useful 
for “identifying the whole as a totality that is qualitatively identical with the parts that appear to make it up” (1986, 
73). Or as Burke puts it, the synecdoche moves freely between microcosm and macrocosm, container and contained, 
sign and the thing signified, material and the thing made, cause and effect genus and species, etc” (1969a, 507–8). 
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Nevertheless, the synecdoche’s apparent capacity to render modern fears manageable 
belies its inherent tendency toward abstraction. Along with creating a dispersed and 
interconnected order, synecdoche also results in the (accidental) devaluation and (eventual) 
erasure of the corporeal (i.e., the phenomenal, empirical objects of experience). As the master 
trope of today’s otherwise familiar fears, the Other is no longer restricted to some individual, or 
even some category of individuals, suspected of carrying danger; it no longer designates those 
persons and groups of persons who have put themselves, or been forced, beyond the bounds of 
the community and denied the right of settlement or temporary stay. Once it is synecdochically 
refigured, the Other grants purchase to the incorporeal and abstract, substituting, for instance, the 
idea of “suspicious categories” in place of individual evildoers and interrelating them via a chain 
of equivalential, whole-for-part logic, i.e., by means of a specific figural process of associative 
meaning-making (Bauman 2006, 123). The Other thus comes to include every stranger—
foreigner, neighbor, passer-by, loiterer, etc.—and so expands the comprehensiveness of the 
grounds for mistrust and suspicion. On Burke’s view, this expansion of meaning is totally in 
keeping with the predominant tendency of synecdochic figures to convert meaning “upwards.” 
Depending on a network of symbolic associations and interrelated meanings, synecdoche, he 
claims, is “a one-way process of magnification, a writing large” (1984b, 134). Despite its 
capability to move bilaterally from quantity to quality or from quality to quantity, synecdoche’s 
upward conversion almost always lacks “a compensatory process of writing down” (ibid.), that 
is, to move from “quality” back down to “quantity,” from signifier to signified, from effect to 
cause, or from whole to part. This is not to say that the figure of the international terrorist or of 
an illegal immigrant, for instance, does not evoke a particularly acute fear within the newly 
configured discursive landscape, only that, as a rhetorical figure, the Other’s categories of 
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suspicion include these and other objects of fear without being (metonymically) reducible to any 
one or any one set.34 What is more, the synecdochic Other serves not only as a representation of 
scattered fears and diffuse dangers but also as a generic persona, or character, one that is readily 
adaptable to the needs of any situation calling for a culprit or criminal intent, which is to say 
virtually any instance of insecurity (real or imagined). For while the Other does not create these 
needs or securitarian obsessions per se, it enable the construction of a social reality in which any 
number of existential fears necessitates the identification of wickedness or evil intent as the 
origin.35  
In view of rhetoric’s constitutive capacity to make meaning possible—i.e., to disclose 
worlds and generate conditions of possibility—the figural, synecdochic Other is a “fiction” or 
condition of meaning that ushers into existence not a figure of the subject but the appearance of 
an object, one whose rhetorical power consists in repositioning the parameters of common, 
established reality according to the specter of malign intent, or the totality of secularized evil 
forces. In its tropological guise, the Other only ever points to relationships (between present-day 
fears), but relationships, argues Hayden White, that are nevertheless experienced “as inhering 
within or among phenomena but which are in reality relationships existing between 
consciousness and a world of experience calling for meaning” (1986, 72). Hence the Other is 
realized in discourse and experienced in thought not in terms of its potential associative use-
value but as a real (i.e., phenomenal, empirical) thing, as nebulous as it is concrete. The fear 
attending the Other, which enhances its reality effect while instilling a sense of urgency, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 On the difference between synecdoche and metonymy, see Kenneth Burke’s “The Four Master Tropes.” See also, 
Ned O’Gorman (2008), in which he links up these two tropes with the sublime vis-à-vis Eisenhower and his rhetoric 
concerning nuclear power. 
35 Hence, the reason why this kind of identification tends toward an upward conversion is twofold: not only is the 
whole (the Other) the go-to representation for a range of dispersed parts but also even in the event that one of these 
parts functions as stand-in for the whole such a part merely reflects the weight of the totality, referring its own 
content back to the whole.  
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transforms this object-which-is-not-one into an irresolvable exigence—an ineradicable surplus of 
existential fear. Instead of granting more control to human agents and institutions, the unifying 
power of the Other, by populating the universe with innumerable sources of malefic danger and 
evil intent, maxes out the human ability to manage those threats related to security and safety 
that stem from a genuinely or putatively social origin. Embodying the attempt to put a name and 
a face to certain of our modern fears, the synecdochic Other, which replaces individuals for 
suspicious categories, assures only that the representation of these fears will remain inexplicably 
faceless (which is not to say unnamed), aggravating rather than mitigating the sentiments of 
existential insecurity and scattered fears. The face of many of our modern fears is for that reason 
faceless. The villain is at once everywhere and no place in particular.  
This depiction of a distinctive modern version fear, with its emphasis on a newly 
configured Other, thus articulates a modern version of the uncanny. Zygmunt Bauman alludes to 
as much, when describing the diffuse but ubiquitous sense that the avatars of today’s fears are 
known yet unfamiliar. The surplus of existential fears, of fears uncoupled from their sources—
and, in the case of the Other, of fears whose potential causes are at once everywhere yet 
untraceable—signals not the Progress of Enlightenment thinking but a return of the animistic 
convictions that, according to Freud, characterized a primitive stage societal development. 
“‘Progress,’” writes Bauman, “once the most extreme manifestation of radical optimism and a 
promise of universally shared and lasting happiness, has moved all the way to the opposite, 
dystopian and fatalistic pole of anticipation: it now stands for the threat of a relentless and 
inescapable change that instead of auguring peace and respite portends nothing but continuous 
crisis and strain and forbids a moment of rest” (2007, 10). With the apparent expansion of “fate” 
over an increasingly broad swath of modern society and everyday life, the story of modern fear 
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reads as though Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos had taken up with or assumed control of scientific 
rationality, effectively undermining the tools and resources for adequately discovering and 
implementing solutions to socially produced troubles or for validating and sustaining the 
sentiment of security, along with self-confidence and self-assurance. Over against the many 
philosophical doctrines of fatalism—particularly Nietzsche’s, according to which fatalism refers 
to an attitude of resignation (“Mohammedan fatalism”) in the face of inevitability (1996, §61)—
the frightening power of today’s “fate” (or “Fates”) breeds an attitude of panic, agitation, and 
obsession with regard to everything related to security and safety.36 Of course, this is not to say 
that the present-day fears entail a belief in the reality of the Fates from Greek and Roman 
mythology. However, it is the case that the current milieu points to, is symptomatic, of a 
breakdown in those markers of certainty constitutive of common reality and essential to the 
division between the fictive and the non-fictive.37 
Unlike Derrida’s specters of Marx, which relies on a metaphorical rendering of 
repression, the insecurities of the present owe their uncanniness, primarily, to the reappearance, 
or reactivation, of superannuated modes of thought, residues or traces of the first primitive 
conception of the world, animism. Thus, modernity’s otherwise familiar fears are unfamiliar to 
the extent that they establish links to an outmoded sense of familiarity, i.e., to remnants of 
animistic activity and attitude of mind. As the immaterial embodiment of these uncounted and 
uncountable “new” fears, the Other contains, and so transfers to its contained parts, what is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This is what allows the Other to function as an irresolvable exigence: ineradicability notwithstanding, the effect is 
the obsessive-compulsive search for its, in Lloyd Bitzer’s phrase, “positive modification” (1968, 7). 
37 Incidentally, we can now say that the constitutive model of rhetorical effectivity proposed by Greene and 
company is inflected by a “subterranean” concern with rhetoric’s capacity to produce quasi-uncanny effects. For in 
constructing and remaking reality, rhetoric shifts the markers of certainty constitutive of what passes for common 
reality. Insofar as this process is productive of fear it would qualify as a properly uncanny technique. Bradford 
Vivian (2004), writing at the intersection of rhetoric, poststructuralism, and continental philosophy makes a similar 
point by arguing how rhetoric itself is “made strange” once it is liberated from the ontological assumptions of 
representation. 
	   184	  
perhaps the strongest residual trace of surmounted convictions: reviving, in attenuated form, the 
idea that the world is peopled not by human spirits, per se, but evil intent, hostile machinations.38 
But this associative feature of recalling fears from the primitive past is more expansive than it 
may appear. For insofar as fear of the Other serves as the unifying thread for a range of diffuse 
fears and anxieties (something on the order of a representative anecdote for today’s insecurities), 
it not only interrelates these unpleasant emotions but also redoubles their affectivity by means of 
the uncanny. Moreover, if the Other is at once representative of the present-day avatars of fear 
and an uncanny representation, then uncanniness is not incidental but definitive of modern fear. 
So, for example, the three major fears cited by Virilio are heightened by a similarly animistic 
conviction, the fear of each bomb (atomic, informational, genetic) involving something akin to 
the attribution of magical powers (mana) to alien persons and things, powers that are rendered all 
the more frightening on account of the Other’s malefic intent and evil designs. Likewise the 
more general fear attending the “openness” of open society is frightening, first and foremost, by 
virtue of the apparent ubiquity of ill will, an animosity believed to stem from criminal alterity 
(inasmuch as the concept of origins remains even vaguely intelligible). The added twist is that 
today’s openness, both in its intellectual and material forms, is already uncanny, harking back to 
a pre-individuated state of mind and a corresponding state of society, in which boundaries were 
believed to be susceptible to any number of foreign invasions and fear was attached to the ever-
present threat of alien, inimical objects and forces. Thus, in a sense, we return to Derrida’s basic 
insight into the nature of heimlich-unheimlich, its undecidability—in this case, the undecidability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For Freud, the strongest example of evil intent is the so-called “evil eye,” according to which the evil intentions 
that are ascribe to someone reach such intensity that they are considered harmful in reality according to the 
mechanism of the “omnipotence of thought” (see 1950, 107–13). 
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between inside and outside, since no interior can be made safe from the incursions of an alien 
and therefore dangerous other.39   
 The figural Other is thus an uncanny figure that, in its confirmation of surmounted beliefs 
related to a primitive past, both promotes and ensures the vicious cycle of fear and fear-inspired 
actions—if not the continued separation of fear-inspired actions and their root causes. If evil 
intent comprises the semantic core of a totality that is identifiable with, or representative of, any 
number of our modern existential fears, then the uncanny acts as the rhetorical guarantor of the 
ineradicability of the fear. For the belief in an immanent, secularly inflected evil is no less 
metaphysical or magical than a transcendent one: any gain in security—assuming, that is, that 
such a gain could ever meet objective standards and be verifiably measured—is immediately 
occulted and superseded by the painful remembrance of evil’s indestructibility. As a form of 
signification relying on imagery and association, the Other is not a useful concept—not even a 
concept at all; rather, it is an impossible object, or meta-object, one that supplies conditions of 
impossibility with regard to positive modification and successful resolution. As both Freud and 
Derrida acknowledge, the comforts of heimlich (of a predictable and therefore manageable 
world) are always already fraught with dangers, the intuition of which, if not the “reality, ”is 
automatically and perpetually renewable. Moreover, the ontological distinction between words 
and things makes probable that any attempt to exorcise, conjure away, or extirpate the malefic-
synecdochic Other will result in failure, and for the very simple reason that figural relationships, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Indeed, speed theorist Paul Virilio, writing outside the influence of deconstruction, has devoted much of his work 
to analyzing the erosion of the inside-outside distinction and the effect of this development on the political and 
cultural categories of the domicile, the city, and the nation-state. Of his many works, see in particular City of Panic. 
In a recent interview with David Lyon, Zygmunt Bauman focuses on this blurring in connection with modern cities, 
arguing that guarding the city no longer means guarding against the dangers oozing from outside the city: “The 
urban citadels of security have turned through the centuries into greenhouses or incubators of genuine or putative, 
endemic or contrived dangers. Built with the idea of cutting out islands of order from a sea of chaos, cities have 
turned into the most profuse fountains of disorder, calling for visible and invisible walls, barricades, watchtowers 
and embrasures—and innumerable armed men” (2013, 103). 
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however meaningful they may be, do not correspond to phenomenal, empirical relationships. 
From a rhetorical standpoint, however, the constitutive power of the Other works to dissimulate 
this basic ontological difference, disclosing and making possible a fictional reality that takes on a 
life of its own, at once encouraging and frustrating the constant pursuit of achieving full security 
against all the world’s bogeymen.  
 “Like liquid cash ready for any kind of investment,” writes Bauman, “the capital of fear 
can be turned to any kind of profit…. And it is.” Nevertheless, the rhetorical pull of the uncanny 
Other favors certain avenues of exploitation rather than others. By expanding the categories of 
mistrust and suspicion, the Other works to sap the ability to trust in the constancy and reliability 
of human companionship and association, thereby undermining the collective foundations that 
make possible anything resembling existential security. At the same time, it identifies within a 
totality a range of scattered fears and diffuse dangers that are in no way diminished, or perceived 
to be, by institutionalized, communally endorsed, and state-supported insurance policies against 
individual misfortunes (i.e., the social “welfare” state). “And so,” Bauman continues, “it is 
personal safety that has become a major, perhaps even the major selling point in all sorts of 
marketing strategies. ‘Law and order,’ increasingly reduced to the promise of personal (more to 
the point, bodily) safety, has become a major, perhaps the major selling point in political 
manifestos and electoral campaigns…constantly replenishing the capital of fear and adding still 
more to the success of both its marketing and political uses ” (2007, 12–13).40 To put the matter 
in familiar terms, this means that the vicious circle of fear and fear-inspired actions has been 
“displaced/shifted from the area of security…to that of safety,” with the result that the discourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Paul Virilio, ever the kindred spirit to Bauman, makes a similar point. He writes, “On top of national security, 
based on the armed forces, and social security, underdeveloped as it is in a number of democratic states, we must 
now add the crucial issue of human security [i.e., safety], which would extend the old public interest of the state” 
(2007b, 66). The author would like to note that in the middle of writing out this quotation, he was interrupted by an 
automated telemarketing call on his cellular phone, alerting him about the FBI’s statistics regarding home break-ins. 
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of the former is increasingly hegemonized by the latter (13). Although Bauman does not connect 
this rendition of the politics of fear to the Freudian uncanny, much less to the figural Other, he 
correctly identifies one of the predominant tendencies in the political management of present-day 
fear: facilitating the imminent shift in legitimation by state power from the assurance of 
constitutional protection against the vagaries of the market, and of social degradation in general, 
to that of the personal safety state. However, given the uncanny Other’s definitive role both in 
the modern variety of fear and in the emergence of a corresponding, alternative legitimation of 
state authority, it should come as no surprise that rhetorical strategies based on this figure are 
indispensable to replenishing the political coffers of fear, and thus vital to reharnessing popular 
existential anxieties to the new political formula of the “personal safety state.”41  
Thus, in the service of state authority—of adding to the success of a form of legitimation 
based on safety—the uncanny Other functions as both a trope and topos. It thereby designates a 
rhetorical or “argumentative” strategy as much as an associational, imagistic form of 
signification. As such, it admits of a two-pronged rhetorical strategy, one that by helping to 
sustain a sense of the uncanny, both tropologically and argumentatively, reinforces belief in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This shift itself has something uncanny about it—since the “new” source of state legitimation is really the return 
of the state’s most basic function (since Hobbes’ Leviathan): protection of the “existential” rights of citizens. 
Indeed, despite Bauman’s well-reasoned arguments on this point, this legitimating function remains the basis for any 
libertarian or individualist anarchist argument against the so-called social welfare state (in all of its varieties). See 
for instance Robert Nozick’s classic (and in some circles infamous) libertarian critique in Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia. According to Jacques Rancière, “the protectionist police state” is the state reduced to “the purity of its 
essence,” by which he understands an archaic and, from the state’s perspective, optimal form of consensus (i.e., the 
presupposition according to which every part of a population, along with its specific problems, can be incorporated 
into a political order and taken into account) (2010, 111). Like Bauman, he argues that such a state is supported by 
“a community of sentiment,” or community of fear, whose emergence is linked to the weakening of social systems 
of protection and the establishment of a new relation between individuals and “a state power that is made for 
security in general” (112). Even more recently, Brad Evans has argued that the real triumph of liberal reason is not 
evidenced by some universal ascription to liberal values but through a “global imaginary of threat which, casting 
aside once familiar referents that previously defined the organization of societies, now forces us to confront each 
and every potential disaster threatening to engulf advanced liberal life” (2013, 2). The contemporary period is thus 
marked not by exceptional moments of crises but by a new terrifying normality, a psychosocial state of affairs that 
ushers in a new leviathan-like political state.  
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necessity of a personal safety state as well as in the eventuality of such a state’s achieving full 
“security.” The two parts comprising this operation are metonymic applications of the Other, 
combined with a non-rational variant of what Kenneth Burke calls “administrative” rhetoric. 
From the standpoint of rhetoric’s constitutive or meaning-making capacity, each of these parts 
functions to hypostatize a fictional reality (i.e., a set of quasi-animistic convictions tied to an 
inimical Other), but a reality that is conducive not only to legitimating specific actions of a state 
authority whose function is increasingly reducible to the protection of personal safety but also to 
legitimating the very grounds on which the state bases its claim to legitimation. For a world rife 
with human maleficence and malefactors is one in constant need of protective assurance. In the 
context of safety, the issue is not whether such a hypostatized reality is “really real,” somewhat 
real, or not at all—the rhetoric of Other having already rendered such distinctions undecidable; 
rather, the fundamental rhetorical exigence—that which can be “positively” modified (positively, 
that is, from the state’s perspective)—concerns the reproduction of the tangle of fear and fear-
inspired actions or, more specifically, the preservation of an attitude of mind in which both the 
reserves of existential fear are inexhaustible and the theoretical and experiential distinction 
between real and neurotic fear/anxiety is undecidable.42 
For that reason, the rhetorical strength of the synecdochal Other to unify a range of 
scattered fears is also, from the State’s viewpoint, its greatest weakness: in tending toward the 
abstract and incorporeal, the uncanny Other runs the risk of diluting its fear-inducing capacity—
of producing a sense of mundane unease rather than a species of fear—and of encouraging an 
attitude of fatalistic acquiescence, resignation in the face of inevitable doom. As such, the 
Other’s figural signification is at some odds with its potential to give rise to a sense of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 By “real” fear or anxiety, I understand a reaction to the perception of a danger, coming from the outside world or 
reality—an expression of the drive to self-preservation. In contrast, neurotic fear is a general condition of worry and 
anxiety that is no longer connected to a danger.  
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uncanny, its representative danger matched, in the last instance, by the danger of being perceived 
for what it really is—an unalterable, un-modifiable obstruction to full safety. In contrast to this 
tendency toward upward conversion, metonymy, argues Burke, converts downward, conveying 
“some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible,” an “‘archaicizing 
device” (1969a, 506), or “terminological reduction” (507), which stresses a unilateral 
connectedness, e.g., from quality to quantity, container to contained, signifier to signified, and so 
forth.43 That is to say, as an associative model of signification, metonymy’s tendency is to assign 
priority to the parts for the ascription of meanings to any putative whole appearing to 
consciousness, rather than assigning priority to the whole for the identification of a totality that is 
identical to the parts. In realizing this opposing tendency, metonymy thus serves as a potential 
counterbalance or rhetorical corrective to the incorporeal, abstracting excesses of synecdoche. 
Nevertheless, instead of constituting two separate meaning-making (meaning-guiding, meaning-
enabling) models, “Metonymy,” claims Burke, “may be treated as a special application of 
synecdoche” (509), as a shift in perspective from one type of figural (non-scientized) explanation 
to another. As Ned O’Gorman has recently argued, “The difference between metonymy and 
synecdoche is consequently a matter of emphasis, direction, and intensity within the process of 
associating part and whole” (2008, 50). Whereas the synecdochic Other places emphasis on the 
ever-present specter of human maleficence as a totalized whole, metonymic applications of the 
Other “reduce” this amorphous threat to apparently specific and slightly more corporeal 
instances of evil intent. In that way, metonymy compensates for the gradual and potential loss, 
over time, in the immediacy and tangibility of fear as it relates to the uncanny Other.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In something of a happy coincidence, Burke, drawing implicitly on Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lying in a Non-
Moral Sense,” describes the representative tendency of metonymy as “a second ‘carrying over’ from the spiritual 
back into the material” (1969a, 506; see Nietzsche 1999).  
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In the context of subserving the legitimating function of the personal safety state, 
metonymy and synecdoche work in conjunction, preserving and aggravating the uncanny fear of 
the Other. On one side of the equation, the synecdochic Other, in constituting the Other as an 
integrating, uncanny figure, provides the conditions of possibility for any metonymic 
instantiations. As “quality,” or “container,” it points to a reserve of uncanniness that by virtue of 
its potentially all-inclusive suspicious categories can be applied to any person or class of 
persons—whether real or fictive. It contains, in other words—in its associative configuration of 
the Other—un-individuated Otherness, a reserve of uncanniness, that at once includes and is 
representative of any specific or specifiable “quantity,” any would-be individuated Other; it is 
the condition of possibility for malign human agents and malefactors. On the other side of the 
equation, metonymic applications of the Other, in drawing upon this reserve of uncanny (and 
criminal) alterity, reinvigorate the grounds of this Other-based uncanny fear. The synecdochic 
Other, because of its tendency toward the abstract, is constrained not in its capacity to produce 
but to sustain its rhetorical effects. It tends to empty its signifying function of any symbolic 
value, becoming as it were an empty signifier. To be sure, empty signifiers do not by virtue of 
their emptiness automatically cease to exert influence, to produce rhetorical effects. (The history 
of politics and political theory would be nonexistent or amount to experiments in absurdity if the 
principles of freedom, justice, and equality, in the last instance, ever really meant anything.) 
However, the rhetorical effectivity of empty signifiers, or pure signs, presupposes their 
articulation with particular, concrete signifieds. Metonymy, in representing the whole for the 
part, provides the raw material for such meaningful (meaning-making, meaning-enabling) 
articulations, recasting the empty signifiers as reality, objectifying the signs and making the word 
flesh. Unlike political disputes over beauty, the metonymic instantiation of the uncanny Other 
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does not end in or even encourage stalemate; rather, these metonymic applications, both 
separately and together, re-stimulate the coffers of fear, effectively realizing the big 
(synecdochic), malevolent, and uncanny Other. Metonymy not only induces a species of fear, it 
not only depends for its effectivity on the resources of synecdoche but also works backward, so 
to speak, to instaurate the grounds of its own rhetorical power. The dialectic between the 
metonymic and synecdochic Other thus results in an apparent paradox, for in taking from the 
synecdochic Other, metonymy gives back (like love, like Apollo) in spades. For that reason, the 
relationship is not merely dialectic but also symbiotic. 
Aside from replenishing the capital of uncanny fear, metonymic applications of the Other 
have a direct role to play in producing that species of uncertainty which is definitive of the 
uncanny, namely, the blurring of the boundary between reality and fantasy. Like the synecdochic 
Other, metonymy rekindles the superannuated workings of our cognitive faculties. But whereas 
the signifying power of synecdoche consists in an upward conversion culminating in an abstract 
Other, metonymy performs a second, “archaicizing” maneuver that articulates the Other as 
signifier with an apparent signified, atavistically transferring reducing the Other into a material 
sign or corporeal manifestation of evil intent. With each metonymic reduction—Islamic terrorist, 
illegal immigrant, double agent—the particularized Other assumes a representative function vis-
à-vis the totality of human maleficence, hegemonizing the Other just as safety comes to occupy 
the place of security. Crucially, however, this rhetorical process does not diminish any 
potentially uncanny effect related to instantiated Other, for the simple reason that the process 
does not substitute thing for symbol so much as it substitutes one kind of symbol, or symbolic 
relationship, for another, one differing in direction and emphasis. Indeed, the rhetorical 
effectivity of the metonymic Other to give rise to a sense of the uncanny advances on that of its 
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synecdochic counterpart to the extent that it grants to the Other (now terrorist, now immigrant, 
now pedophile, now spy, etc.) the appearance of material reality. In so doing, metonymy 
dissimulates the fact of its own rhetoricity, rendering undecidable the distinction between fantasy 
and reality. But something else occurs as a result of this archaicizing: the symbolic reduction of 
an abstract totality to one of its quantifiable parts performs the generically uncanny function, 
articulated by Freud, of “a symbol [taking on] the full function and significance of what it 
symbolizes” (2003b, 150–51).44 However, in the case of the metonymic applications of the 
Other—and the same could perhaps be said for metonymy in general—the thing symbolized 
does not correspond to an objective, empirical object but is instead just another signifier in a 
chain of increasingly corporeal or reductive symbols—e.g. from the Other to the terrorist, from 
global Islamic fundamentalism-based terrorist to Al-Qaeda agent or sleeper cell—and, most 
recently, the so-called self-radicalized American. (The point is perhaps more evident if we 
substitute the noun-forming suffix “ism” for that of “ist,” since the former, in denoting an action, 
a system, or an ideological movement, reveals the abstracting power inherent yet concealed in 
metonymic translations.)   
Nevertheless, such inverse subreptions—in which the symbol or idea is substituted for 
phenomenal, empirical reality—are not for that reason unbelievable, nor are they any less 
uncanny, less impossible, than the abstract, unquantifiable Other. Although metonymy, like any 
trope, deals in relationships that are in reality relationships existing between consciousness and a 
world of experience, these relationships are experienced, as Hayden White reminds us, as 
inhering within or among phenomenal, empirical objects of experience. Thus, in particularizing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 As a trope, metonymy cannot escape its inherent rhetoricity: although experienced as inhering within phenomena 
or among empirical objects, metonymy is only ever a relationship existing between consciousness and a world of 
experience. Hence, its corporeality is only apparent, fictionally real relative to the less corporeal figure of 
synecdoche, yet not for that reason experienced as any less real. 
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totality of human maleficence, metonymy not only makes possible the perception of a corporeal 
uncanny Other but also gives immediacy and tangibility to our fear/s of that Other that is not one. 
In the 2004 documentary The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear, writer and 
produce Adam Curtis argues that global terrorism is, by and large, “a fantasy that has been 
exaggerated and distorted by politicians. It is a dark illusion that has spread unquestioned 
through governments around the world, the security services, and the international media.” The 
same can be said regarding the seeming eternal return of nuclear threats in connection with so-
called “rogue states” and of the unmedicated mass shooter: they are dark illusions made real by 
their dissemination and subsequent production of material effects (see McHoul and Grace 1997, 
21–2); they are uncanny fictions that make possible a world of meaning and experience—at once 
hostile and inhabitable—one that is otherwise unavailable because nonexistent. Undoubtedly, the 
threat of global terrorism and other similarly frightening Others is assisted by material, real-
world events and their publicity; nevertheless such objects of fear are only ever believable, albeit 
unbelievably dark, fictions, i.e., figurations effectively masquerading either as empirically 
determinable objects or as material relationships existing essentially and permanently within 
phenomena. Ultimately, the phenomenal existence of metonymic evil is, in Karl Popper’s 
language, “unfalsifiable” (1959). Yet such quasi-supernaturalism is not in itself rhetorically 
impotent. As Rumsfeld understood all too clearly—arguing vis-à-vis weapons of mass 
destruction that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence—falsifiability does not 
necessarily translate into rhetorical inefficacy.45 As Aristotle realized long before logical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Speaking at a press conference held at NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, June 6, 2002, former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld addressed the absence of evidence linking the government of Iraq with the supply of 
weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups, repeating comments made earlier at a Department of Defense news 
briefing on February 12 of the same year: “Now what is the message there? The message is that there are no 
"knowns." There are thing we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that 
we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't 
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positivism and present-day spin doctoring, “[Even] if we were to have the most exact knowledge, 
it would not be very easy for us in speaking to use it to persuade [some audiences]” (2007, 
1.1.12).  
Contributing to the rhetorical efficacy of such fictional realities is the undecidability of 
fear itself, as it is experienced in relation to an unfalsifiable object. In accordance with the 
ambivalent register of metonymic Others, the fear felt in response to such figural objects is at 
once real and neurotic, with the result that the distinction between real and neurotic fear is as 
undecidable as the fictional reality of the objects themselves. Although the paradoxical nature of 
this impossible fear would seem merely to undermine the believability or rhetorical efficacy of 
the Other, in truth, both the object and the resultant fear mutually reinforce one another: the 
Other qua an uncanny and therefore ineradicable figure constitutes, via the symbiosis of 
metonymy and synecdoche, an ever-renewable or ever-present source of fear, while the fear of 
the Other, once instituted, serves as an affective rationalization (in the absence of falsifiability) 
for belief in the Other’s existence. Each side of the equation, in other words (the object and the 
object of fear), laminates the other’s reality. Rather than weakening belief in the existence or 
extensiveness of elusive yet ubiquitous malefactors, real-neurotic fear recreates or props up the 
reality of those impossible objects that give rise to it. What is more, this fear—because its causal 
objects do not admit of any criteria for determining their claim to phenomenal, empirical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information together, and we then say well that's basically 
what we see as the situation, that is really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we 
discover a few more of those unknown unknowns. … It sounds like a riddle. It isn't a riddle. It is a very serious, 
important matter. … There's another way to phrase that and that is that the absence of evidence is not evidence of 
absence. It is basically saying the same thing in a different way. Simply because you do not have evidence that 
something exists does not mean that you have evidence that it doesn't exist. And yet almost always, when we make 
our threat assessments, when we look at the world, we end up basing it on the first two pieces of that puzzle, rather 
than all three.” According to this tripartite typology, the uncanny Other would qualify as the second type of known, 
a known unknown. Recently, Slavoj Žižek has extrapolated from these three categories a fourth, the unknown 
known, by which he understands that which we intentionally refuse to acknowledge that we know, “the disavowed 
beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of 
our public values” (2004). 
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reality—proves to be exceedingly recalcitrant, not only immune to counterargument but entirely 
independent of and unaffected by rational argumentation. It is an attitudinal state of mind that 
becomes increasingly unshakable as it becomes a mass phenomenon, that is, once the reality of 
its objects enters into the storehouse of common belief and opinion, redrawing—or rather un-
drawing—the long-established categories that made possible the demarcation of common, 
everyday reality from fantasy.  
This blurring both of reality and fantasy and of real and neurotic fear subserves the 
personal safety state because it enables the state to sustain, indefinitely, belief in the possibility 
of achieving security even as it continually repackages and reconditions the fear of an uncanny 
and therefore absolutely ineradicable Other. With regard to the signifying power of metonymy, 
the avatars of modern evil combine the specter of an ever-present inimical Other with the “If it 
bleeds, we can kill it” rationality of American blockbuster action movies. The state and its 
subsidiaries are thus able to successfully promulgate the idea that the evil, fear-inducing Other is 
manageable but only insofar as citizens are willing to endorse any number of extreme police-like 
measures, including torture, domestic spying, gun control, rendition, preemptive warfare (and 
now pre-emptive cyberwarfare),46 assassinations, the expansion of martial law power and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 In the spring and summer of 2012, President Obama signed two executive orders which expanded the state’s 
emergency powers. Executive Order 13618, signed in the summer, provides the Department of Homeland Security 
with emergency powers over civilian telecommunications, including private telephone, cellular, and wireless 
networks. Signed earlier in the spring, The National Defense Resources Preparedness (NDRP) Executive Order 
gives the president virtually complete control over the entire U.S. economy—including energy, transportation, 
human resources, raw materials—upon his or her declaration that "national defense" requires doing so. Concerning 
cyberwarfare, The New York Times reports that a secret legal review on the use of America’s growing arsenal of 
cyberweapons, concluded that the president can authorize pre-emptive cyberwar attacks, “if the United States 
detects credible evidence of a major digital attack looming from abroad” (Sanger and Shanker 2013) The move is 
part of efforts to expand the ability of the American military to use new technologies to carry out acts of 
aggression—with Iran and China the most immediate targets. Apparent novelty notwithstanding, this expansion of 
executive power is not simply the doing of a particular administration; rather, it points up a trend inherent in the 
modern state. As Mary L. G. Theroux claims, writing in The Huffington Post, “[When] we pause to consider every 
‘unprecedented’ extension of executive power, we find precedents galore.” Obama's (NDRP) is “simply an 
extension of the Defense Production Act of 1950, which has been reauthorized and amended to be continuously in 
force ever since,” just as former President George W. Bush’s “oft’-decried USA PATRIOT Act was itself rooted in 
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militarization of domestic police forces, etc. The list goes on and on and will continue to grow 
for the simple reason that the uncanny Other cannot be extirpated; for one cannot destroy that 
which technically does not exist, an un/real object, an idea. And as Bernard Stiegler recently 
emphasized, “[An] idea does not exist, has not existed, and will never exist (2011, n30, 169). 
Nevertheless, as a metonymy, or metonymic construction, the uncanny Other will persist as so 
many corporeal yet no less malefic fictions, reconfiguring the parameters of reality and 
reconstituting the grounds of fictional reality, so long as people continue to believe in it. And 
given that the motivating conditions of such belief (i.e., the real fears that are also neurotic) are 
virtually unassuageable and, from the onset, self-reproducing, the burden of proof for any 
metonymic Other shifts away from the positing of belief to pronouncements of—to use Stiegler’s 
rhetorically salient phrase—“disbelief and discredit,” effectively displacing the default position 
from unbelief, or nonbelief, to incontrovertible (because common) knowledge. At the same time, 
however, and by virtue of its apparent corporeality/mortality, the particularized uncanny Other 
will encourage the corresponding belief, typically present only in the form of an unstated 
assumption, that the destruction of any or all agents of malice is eventual if not inevitable, 
provided that the state dedicates itself to the task of implementing the policies necessary to 
securing the conditions of safety and of restoring the existential assurances of heimlich—despite 
the ontological impossibility of ever completing such a project. By promulgating the uncanny 
figural Other, the state makes possible the appearance of a believable exigence—that is, a thing, 
other than it should be, and capable of modification—thereby inoculating the citizenry against 
the “dangers” of resignation, or, conversely, maintaining an attitude of expectancy, viz., the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Clinton-era ‘anti-terrorist’ legislation, which weakened individual privacy protections and loosened judicial 
oversight of domestic spying activities (2012). 
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anticipatory fulfillment of an unfulfilled longing for a familiar home, the restoration, at long last, 
of a true Heimat.  
Thus, beyond legitimating the function of the personal safety state, the uncanny Other 
commands—to the point that it almost automates—a consensual process vis-à-vis state-built, 
state-endorsed, and state-supported protections against the incursions of the malefic alien Other. 
And this operation of widespread general agreement is as multi-directional as it is an inbuilt 
function of the rhetorical Other—integrating, along a horizontal axis, political leaders from 
opposing parties, separate branches of state-power, media outlets perceived to represent 
competing biases, differences within the sensus communis, etc., and, upwardly, along the vertical 
axis, the collective organization of the body politic, or demos, and the corporate organization of 
the state. The protective measures resulting from such agreement, however, amount to something 
more than the material traces of rhetorical effectivity; they, too, participate in sustaining the fear-
inducing fictional reality of the uncanny Other. In other words, the safety assurances sought in 
any number of state-serviced or state-subsidized security regulations, which run the gamut from 
the now quasi-defunct color-coded advisory system to preemptive war, constitute part of the 
consensus-making process itself. For that reason, they instantiate what Kenneth Burke refers to 
as the administrative mode of rhetorical effectivity, a mode consisting of all those “devices 
which have a directly rhetorical aspect, yet include operations not confined to sheerly verbal [or 
symbolic] persuasion,” such as the display of force as a mode of persuasion (1966b, 301).47 As 
Bauman demonstrates, the state’s defensive fear-inspired measures perform an administratively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For Burke’s original formulation of administrative rhetoric, see his discussion, in A Rhetoric of Motives, of 
Machiavelli’s political theory (158–66). Burke’s originality notwithstanding, in the Poetics Aristotle anticipates 
such an administrative function, when suggesting that there is a rhetoric of action as well as of works. He writes, “In 
the incidents too [the poet] clearly should use some of the same elements when he needs to make things [e.g.] 
pitiable, dreadful, important or probable” (1987a, 1456b2–4). 
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rhetorical function by recasting “the somber premonitions as daily reality, making the word 
flesh” (2007, 9), thereby brining about that ironic state of affairs wherein today’s security 
generates forms of insecurity, either as a by-product or as deliberate policy. The process, 
however, is not for that reason illogical, since by hypostatizing the figural Other—i.e., by 
reaffirming the reality of the Other as object of fear—such measures reproduce the cognitive-
affective conditions that result in the demand for a state dedicated to the office of maintaining 
personal safety, often at all costs, and so provide for or reinforce the grounds of their own 
legitimation, in advance and in the absence of public argument or debate.48  
 In hypostatizing the uncanny Other, the state not only automates the process of its own 
legitimation but also gives rise to a set of secondary uncanny effects (specifically, those effects 
associated with the omnipotence of thought, e.g., repetition compulsion and wish-fulfillment), 
each of which helps to sustain the self-propagating capacity of fear and thereby also helps to 
preserve the automated rhetorico-political efficacy of uncanny fear. Whereas the uncanny Other 
laminates the reality both of fear and its object (both the affect and its conditions), the state’s 
protective assurances against the imaginaries of human maleficence serve as a rhetorically 
administrative sealant or guarantor of the laminating process; that is, they underwrite both the 
signifying conditions of uncanny fear and the affective, reifying conditions of the figural Other. 
Simultaneously, however, these measures—which are not merely legitimated but dictated by the 
community of fear—cannot but succeed in demonstrating if not their success then at least the 
necessity of an increasingly police-like safety state or unchecked executive power. Just as there 
nowhere exists criteria either for assessing the reality of the particularized Other or measuring its 
potential to inflict harm, so too, it is equally impossible to determine the relative failure/success 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The critical social theorist David L. Altheide makes a similar argument, albeit from a social-interactionist 
perspective (2006, 113–32). 
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of any given security measure undertaken in response to such alien, inimical Others. Whether 
any new set of safety measures is objectively successful is irrelevant from the standpoint of state 
strategy—assuming for argument’s sake that such objective standards are even possible; they are 
rhetorically effective, independent of extra-rhetorical results—even if such results were 
somehow demonstrably shown to be unsuccessful or even counterproductive—because they are 
themselves uncanny, i.e., compulsive repetitions, or “real-world” wish-fulfillments and self-
fulfilling prophecies, that ceaselessly self-reproduce their own conditions of necessity. In so 
doing, they ensure two things, simultaneously: first, that “success,” or the achievement of full 
security, will only ever be asymptotic but, second, that people will continue to invest in the 
illusion or fictional reality that such victory is attainable—albeit only by the saving grace of the 
personal safety state. This result, which amounts to the state’s true accomplishment, not only 
secures the assent of the governed but also promotes the expansion of state power, justifying or 
necessitating the unlimited and for the most part uncontested extension of state-endorsed security 
to the domain of social life. And insofar as growth is a necessary sign (tekmērion) of health, this 
expansion works to assure state authority, indefinitely, over the long-range.  
 Thus, the figural and administrative resources of rhetoric undergird the personal safety 
state by making possible and available to the state the authorial license and privilege that fiction 
enjoys in arousing and inhibiting a sense of the uncanny. Indeed, the widespread approval of this 
retrograde state function relies on the state’s capacity to exploit the rhetorical potential of the 
uncanny, that is, to create a fictional reality based in and contributing to an administration of fear 
involving the ever-present threat of an unfalsifiable or undecidable Other—but one that is 
nevertheless realized, again and again, in thought, word, and deed. Given the widespread and 
overpowering effects of this fiction, Stiegler’s remark that “a fiction…only lasts as long as 
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people believe in it” is anything but superfluous; it is a timely response and a reminder of a half-
remembered truth. For the uncanny in politics is nothing but a ruse, a rhetorical setup—or, less 
euphemistically, a conspiracy, but one that is enacted not by human agents so much as by the 
agency of state-sponsored rhetoric: a conspiracy that consists solely in a believable fiction, a 
story that without ever ending nevertheless endlessly repeats itself and is for that reason always 
already believable.    
     
4.4 “REAL” MAGIC 
In this chapter, I have focused on Freud’s concept of the uncanny, raising the question of 
its rhetorical efficacy vis-à-vis the state’s claim to legitimacy. I have shown that the Freudian 
uncanny, conceived as both rhetorical instrument and subjective effect (or affect), lends itself to 
the themes of animism, the specter of the malefic alien Other, and the blurring of the boundary 
between reality and fantasy, real and neurotic fear. Addressing these themes raises the question 
of why the state would have recourse to a mode of negative aesthetics when the latter threatens 
to subvert the rationalistic worldview upon which political legitimacy itself depends. In answer 
to this question, I have argued that the uncanny’s capacity to subvert the parameters of 
established reality simultaneously undermines the ability of the body politic either to verify or 
contradict the reality of state-confirmed maleficence as well as the state’s assurance of personal 
safety in the face of such perceived danger. Like the sublime, the efficacy of the uncanny relies 
on a kind of good faith in the state and in state-issued proclamations. But unlike the limits of 
sublime form and the prospects of retroactive failure, the uncanny eludes or short-circuits the 
assuredness of rational judgment, renewing—indefinitely, and again and again—the people’s 
good faith in the state apparatus and the non-rational hope for the eventual end of existential 
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fears of the Other’s incursions. Whether the state is lying is almost beside the point. The 
uncanny, empowered by the twin engines of hope and regenerative fear, sabotages not just 
Enlightenment thinking but the very distinction between reality and fiction, real-world and 
fantasy, reason and unreason. Freud, it seems, came very close to realizing something of the 
societal and political implications of the uncanny. “Towards real experience,” argues Freud, “we 
generally adopt a uniformly passive attitude and succumb to the influence of our material 
environment. To the writer, however, we are infinitely tractable; by the moods he induces and 
the expectations he arouses in us he can direct our feelings away from one consequence and 
toward another, and he can often produce very different effects from the same material” (2003b, 
157–8). But Freud’s thinking here is not sufficiently uncanny. Rather than demonstrating the 
veracity of the real-fictive distinction, the uncanny makes possible the transplanting of such 
authorial control to the domain of everyday social reality, including the domain of politics—
often to great rhetorical effect. In this chapter, I have shown that one of these great effects 
consists in facilitating the shift in political legitimation by state power from the assurance of 
constitutional protection to that of the personal safety state. In this endeavor, the state is assisted 
by a general climate of uncanny fear, which, like the neurotic fear it nourishes, is seemingly self-
perpetuating and answerable to no one or thing in particular.  
Commenting on anthropologists’ “discovery” of the rhetorical function in magic, 
Kenneth Burke argues that notwithstanding rhetoric’s possible beginnings in magic (e.g., 
Gorgias and Plato’s notion of rhetoric as a form of psychagogia or soul leading), rhetorical 
effectivity has always consisted in the hortatory or realistic function of language: “But now that 
we have confronted the term ‘magic’ with the term ‘rhetoric,’ we’d say that one comes closer to 
the true state of affairs if one treats the socializing aspects of magic as a ‘primitive rhetoric’ than 
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if one sees modern rhetoric simply as a ‘survival of primitive magic.’ For rhetoric as such is not 
rooted in any past condition of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of language 
itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a 
symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (1969c, 
43).49 For that reason, he concludes, “The use of symbols, by one symbol-using entity to induce 
action in another (persuasion properly addressed) [and to form attitudes in other human agents] is 
in essence not magical but realistic” (46). Nevertheless, and I think Freud is right on this, the 
efficacy of a certain practice of rhetoric (perhaps not straightforward exhortation), may be rooted 
in an animistic view of the world, what Burke refers to as the primitive orientation. Indeed, 
Burke himself acknowledges this, or at least allows for it, when he dissociates persuasion to 
attitude from persuasion to action. The fact that as a culture or species we may no longer give 
credence to animistic beliefs does not do away with residual traces—the indelible imprint—left 
by our pre-or early history. Although exhortation appears to be a rational endeavor, attested to by 
the rationality of debate and public forums, the power of non-rational appeals, as well as the 
reliance on such appeals by any number of rhetors, calls into question rhetoric’s claim to 
“realism.” And while aesthetics in general serves such a non-rational function—and is for that 
reason often aligned with or made to serve political purposes—the uncanny enjoys the added 
benefit of blurring the lines between fantasy and reality, of real-izing the hidden, secreted 
connections between a range of phenomena that are rationally believed to have no causal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Despite such realist claims, in an earlier work, Burke sings a somewhat different tune, arguing, “The magical 
decree is implicit in all language; for the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out 
as such-and-such rather than as something-other. Hence, I think that an attempt to eliminate magic, in this sense, 
would involve us in the elimination of vocabulary itself as a way of sizing up reality. Rather, what we may need is 
correct magic, magic whose decrees about the naming of real situation is the closes possible approximation to the 
situation named (with the greater accuracy of approximation being supplied by the ‘collective revelations’ of testing 
and discussion)” (1973b, 4; see also 1984b, 59–65 and 1966c).  
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relationship to one another. We do not need a Manchurian candidate to see how words continue 
to work their magic and to work like magic in today’s political environment. The uncanny, as I 
have demonstrated, is one such means of working “real” magic. Yet the rhetorical 
implementation of the uncanny and of various uncanny figures raises an additional question, 
namely, “What are the long-term consequences of a state form of power that relies on negative 
aesthetics, on the emotive efficacy of the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny? What is 
ultimately at stake in the state’s circumvention of beauty?” The next chapter takes up this 
question and suggests an uncomfortable albeit speculative conclusion.
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CHAPTER 5 – CONTROLLING AESTHETIC VIOLENCE: 
RHETORIC’S VEIL OF APPEARANCE AND THE RATIONALITY OF CIVIL 
DISSUASION 
 
Control: To control a bad situation, you seek either to 
eradicate the evil or to channelize the evil. Elimination vs. 
the ‘lightning rod principle,’ whereby one protects against 
lightning not by outlawing lightning but by drawing it into 
a channel where it does not damage. – Kenneth Burke 
1937/1984a  
 
The paradox of success is based on the tendency of some 
valuable common good, trait or bond to fade. The 
inevitable crisis thus plays a redemptive role, which brings 
about the revival of the very thing whose demise it was that 
put the ‘system’ into a downturn and delivered the crisis 
itself…. [Crisis] is a prerequisite for the next upturn, for a 
revitalization of the whole ‘ecology’ of power, wealth and 
domination.  – Yanis Varoufakis 2011  
 
Whereas republican opinion rested, from the very 
beginning, on the art of oratory and reading, post-
republican emotion rests, for its part, on sound and light. 
In other words, on the audio-visibility of a spectacle or, 
rather, of an incantatory liturgy that is only apparently 
secular… – Paul Virilio 2007 
 
This study began by considering an alluring political dream—the vision of an 
aestheticized, beautiful state—and the inevitable souring of that dream. Although dating back as 
early as the pre-Socratic notion of celestial order or cosmos, the wedding of beauty to politics 
began in earnest in the modern era. According to the eighteenth century British moral sense 
theorists as well as a range of German poets and philosophers, aesthetics offers a mediating 
device whereby the state could secure its political legitimacy and hence its dominion over the 
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social order, as well as the political process determining that order. Over against the state’s 
frequent appeal to rational-legal authority, the efficacy of which derives from the popular 
perception that the state’s power is based in established law and custom, aesthetic power—its 
persuasive “authority”—consists in what Santayana describes as the objectification pleasure, that 
is, the immediate perception of an intrinsic positive value (beauty or the beautiful) in either an 
intelligible or phenomenal, empirical object. Anchored in our most primordial instincts, beauty 
constitutes an emotive force, requiring no further proof of existence—no further 
“legitimation”— than the pleasurable excitation it causes in the observer. At the same time, this 
anchoring renders beauty immune from all rational analysis and so from all rational criticism, 
short-circuiting the possibility of effective discursive contention. Aesthetics thus affords the state 
an efficient and efficacious mode of political rhetoric, one that ensures and virtually automates 
widespread adherence to the prevailing political order. What is more, beauty’s immediacy 
assumes the adjunct responsibilities of mystifying the rules that regulate the socio-political order 
and concealing the suasive action guaranteeing subjective adherence to the state’s political 
authority.   
 Appealing though it may be—from the perspective of political power, anyway—this 
vision of an aesthetically grounded political order is spoiled by the emergence of at least two 
difficulties, both of which involve rhetoric’s limitations vis-à-vis aesthetic sensibility and 
judgment. The first constraint, which revolves around the possibility of inducing aesthetic 
judgment, originates in what is prima facie a rhetorical advantage, namely, beauty’s immunity to 
logos. To be sure, the aesthetic is a distinctive and powerful mode of persuasion, one that is 
capable of positively uniting society through a species of mental taste. But, as we have seen, this 
potential strength runs up against the reality that aesthetic taste or judgment simultaneously is 
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and is not rhetorical, properly speaking. On the one hand, the sense of beauty is necessarily 
contingent, admitting of variety such that any particular aesthetic judgment of taste could always 
be otherwise, that no judgment of taste is ever necessary or logical. Rhetoric, which, among 
other things, is a technē that both influences and effects judgment, presupposes contingency and 
so concerns itself with things that are capable of being other than they are. For that reason, 
aesthetic judgment is potentially rhetorical, that is, open to or susceptible of persuasive 
technique. On the other hand, aesthetic sensibility, which admits of variety, tends toward 
dogmatic absolutism. Whether or to what extent the claim to universality is warranted or correct 
is irrelevant; aesthetic judgments of taste are felt and thus believed to be both incontrovertible 
and exclusively true. 
The first rhetorical constraint on the politics of aesthetics results from the tendency of 
aesthetic judgment toward dogmatic absolutism. In terms of absolutism, the simple fact of 
aesthetic variety ensures the likelihood of aesthetic conflict while precluding a viable standard by 
which to resolve it. At the same time, the dogmatism of any given aesthetic judgment serves to 
inoculate that judgment against the force of argument, thereby rendering rhetoric’s capacity to 
influence such judgments, as well as the sensibility on which they are based, unrealizable and 
effectively meaningless. A thing or idea can be made beautiful, but it is either immediately 
perceived to be beautiful or not, and no amount or variety of suasive action can alter that fact of 
perception. This applies equally to instances of rhetorical discourse: a persuasive speech, for 
instance, can be eloquently wrought and perceived as beautiful, but it cannot convince someone 
of its beauty, neither can anyone else. The same holds true for the state: a prevailing political 
order may very well objectify aesthetic pleasure and thereby acquire an intrinsic value; however, 
if David Hume is right in claiming that “the sentiments of men…differ with regard to beauty and 
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deformity,” then the state searches in vain “for a standard, by which we can reconcile the 
contrary sentiments” (1998, 150). Hence, while in theory aesthetic sensibility and aesthetic 
judgments of taste guarantee the effectiveness of political legitimacy—comprising, in effect, the 
necessary subjective basis of all forms of legitimacy—the likelihood of irreconcilable aesthetic 
conflict combined with the recalcitrance of aesthetic judgment to persuasive action ensure 
against the realization of that promise. In short, they void the warranty, theoretical assurances 
notwithstanding. 
 The second difficulty in the aesthetics of politics, which involves an additional limitation 
on rhetoric’s effectivity in relation to beauty, stems from what the Greek economist Yanis 
Varoufakis refers to as the paradox of success. According to Varoufakis, “The paradox of 
success is based on the tendency of some valuable common good, trait or bond to fade,” 
producing at first entropic effects and then a crisis of value (2013, 35). If, in the case of aesthetic 
disagreement, the limitation consists in irresolvable stasis born of a certain close-mindedness, in 
the context of the paradox of success the limiting condition appertains to beauty’s tendency to 
produce entropic effects. Like all values, but also all living or dynamic things, beauty is subject 
to the natural process of degeneration and decay. So while beauty may function as a powerful 
tool in the instauration of authority—helping to overcome the inevitable problem of entropy—it 
can do so only until it, too, begins to suffer from entropy, at which point beauty finds itself 
caught up in the paradox of its own success, in need of some restorative instrument or action. 
Such a “boost,” if it exists, must originate outside of beauty, since the addition of “more” beauty 
would be ineffectual. Given the subjective basis of aesthetic sensibility the solution would 
necessarily have to consist in amplifying or in some way strengthening a community’s sense of 
beauty. Yet just as aesthetic conflict is rhetorically intransigent, so too is aesthetic entropy. 
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Certainly, attempts to effect a positive modification of aesthetic decay fare better than efforts at 
resolving disagreements in aesthetic judgments of taste. But the successful reinvigoration of 
beauty cannot go on indefinitely. Over time, beauty’s newly acquired energy or strength 
becomes weaker, less vigorous—entropic—until, eventually, at an undisclosed and unpredictable 
future date, the bottom drops out completely. Consequently, even if the state were to enjoy 
aesthetic consensus, the subsequent emaciation of that harmony and accord would render it and 
the body politic itself utterly effete. What is more likely, however—given the unlikelihood of 
perfect consensus—is that the state would discover itself to be in a situation in which the 
segments of the population motivated to political action would be those in possession of or 
animated by aesthetic sensibilities antithetical to the sense of beauty objectified in the prevailing 
political order. Put simply, in this context the byproduct of the paradox of success amounts to a 
clearing the way for a potentially effective dissensus—singular or polyvalent—against the state.     
Together or individually, these rhetorical impossibilities signal a crisis in the aesthetics of 
politics, souring all attempts to ground the state’s political legitimacy in the sense of beauty. 
However, with respect to the crisis of aesthetic entropy, Varoufakis identifies a cyclical process 
that while not resolving the crisis once and for all promises to restore or reinvigorate the 
appreciative perception of the state’s beauty. Drawing on Richard Goodwin’s pioneering work 
on the prey-predator dynamic of class struggle (1967), he argues that the paradox of success is of 
a piece with a cyclical narrative in which crises play both a retributive and a redemptive role. 
Within this boom to bust (to boom again) dynamic, the crisis, in its redemptive function, “brings 
about the revival of the very thing whose demise it was that put the ‘system’ into a downturn and 
delivered the crisis itself. From fluctuations in the relative size of prey and predator populations 
in the world…to the wage and employment dynamics in our market societies, crises deliver both 
	   209	  
retribution and redemption” (2013, 35). For that reason, concludes Varoufakis, “crisis is a 
prerequisite for the next upturn, for a revitalization of the whole ‘ecology’ of power, wealth and 
domination” (36). What is more, the process is “natural”—simultaneously accidental 
(unplanned) and recurrent—and autonomous, requiring nothing outside of the system or 
“ecology” in which it occurs. Even so, despite the attractiveness of this model, the situation is 
qualitatively different when the thing at issue is not the fluctuation of a system (open or closed) 
or the values within that system but a fall in the appreciative or affective perception of value as 
such. While fluctuations can and do occur with respect to the perception of value, such variation 
is not self-regenerative, meaning to say that the crisis of a particular sense of value, say, beauty, 
in no way guarantees its own healthy recovery, much less a regularly recurring one. Sometimes a 
value simply withers away or undergoes radical transformation, such that it is no longer 
recognizably the same. But even if the self-reproductive cyclical process coming out of the 
paradox of success were applicable to aesthetics, inasmuch as political legitimacy is caught up in 
aesthetics, it must either come to terms with its aesthetic finitude or find some means whereby to 
overcome the crises in the rhetoric of aesthetics. 
To be sure, the state has recourse to types of legitimacy that do not involve direct appeals 
to beauty, that is, to legitimation strategies that do not consist in objectifying pleasure in the state 
apparatus of government. Nevertheless, even allowing that the non-aesthetic modes are subject to 
their own limitations, aesthetic consecration—i.e., the acquisition of intrinsic value or aesthetic 
coloring—is an implicit, non-conscious aim of all strategies for securing and maintaining 
political authority. As George Santayana suggests, and others like George Kateb and Elaine 
Scarry have more recently affirmed, this unacknowledged tendency toward aesthetic value is an 
impulse innate to political philosophy as well as to the efforts of regimes to stake out their 
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political legitimacy—a tendency that is no less in force if it fails to actualize or succeed, either in 
the short-term or over the long-range. Hence, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a 
distinctive “aesthetic mode” or type of legitimacy. Insofar as such a mode is intelligible it 
functions simply as a shorthand for an impulse basic to the human condition of labor, work, and 
action, one that, in any mode of human activity, can be more or less refined or predominant, 
explicit or intentional.1 Regardless of this classificatory issue, the fact remains that the 
effectiveness of any type of political legitimacy presupposes successful aestheticization, such 
that the extent and intensity, among the body politic, of the appreciative perception of beauty 
serves as the universal standard for measuring subjective adherence to the state’s claim to 
legitimate domination. That being the case, we may reasonably infer that all governing regimes, 
especially the successful ones, must at some point come to terms with the inevitable crises in the 
aesthetics of politics—both the paradox of success and the stasis of aesthetic disagreement. Each 
constitutes a foreboding presence, a spectral haunting, looming large over the project of political 
legitimacy, even in its most rational guise.  
In view of these risks to legitimacy, which are as problematic for the prevailing political 
order as they are unavoidable, the state finds itself in the situation of having to discover the 
means either of weathering beauty’s delegitimating effects or—better, if possible—of 
aggressively managing the aesthetic crisis, such that its entropic effects are slowed, its 
divisiveness held in abeyance, muted, or indefinitely concealed. In the present study, I have 
focused on the latter possibility, the combative option, arguing that one of if not the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As is typical in academic scholarship, my use of “the human condition” draws on Hannah Arendt’s tripartite 
classification of activity: labor, work, and action. By “labor,” she understands the activity corresponding to the 
biological process of the human body (“The human condition of labor itself”); “work,” that which correlates to the 
unnaturalness of human existence; and “action,” the activity consistent with the human condition of plurality, i.e., 
the fact that “men [sic] live on the earth and inhabit the world” together (1998, 7; for the distinction between “earth” 
and “world,” see Martin Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art). 
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advantageous strategy for controlling the crisis in the aesthetics of politics consists in 
circumventing beauty to the greatest extent possible. In effectuating this policy or plan of action, 
the state, I claimed, has recourse to certain rhetorical weapons (i.e., modes or processes) that not 
only bypass the aesthetic impulse toward immediate, intrinsic value but also secure the affective 
basis of legitimate domination. These suasive weapons, we have seen, comprise those categories 
of experience indicative of aesthetic violence, categories that I have variously labeled negative, 
quasi-, or mediated aesthetics, because they imply the sense of beauty through the suggestion of 
aesthetic evil. To that extent, each category constitutes a possible gain in rhetorical effectivity, 
commanding the emotive power of beauty while avoiding the quagmire of aesthetic 
disagreement and decay—rhetoric’s impossibilities vis-à-vis the aesthetic domain. By the same 
token, these processual categories enjoy relative autonomy in relation to the more rational modes 
of discourse, in particular the logos of argument and law.  
Among the range of possible anti-aesthetic legitimation strategies, I identified three that 
could be said to constitute a distinct class, three unique but complementary rhetorical processes 
advantageous to securing adherence to the prevailing political order: the tragic (or tragically 
cathartic), the sublime, and the uncanny. What sets them apart as a class is a common reliance on 
fear and the transformation of fear into a powerful yet simultaneously complex, even 
contradictory, mental movement. By means of tragic clarification, fear of a communal threat 
merges with pity for the political community to create a widespread fearing for, an 
intersubjective feeling of anxiety concerning the safety and well-being of a collective way of life. 
Through the institution of the sublime as formalized affect, fear of boundless or mighty objects 
gives way to a sense of awe and amazement, one that is likewise experienced collectively, by the 
public, but in relation to a transcendent power that simultaneously elevates and disciplines a 
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reverentially submissive body politic. With the agency of the uncanny, existential fears 
concerning figures of human malevolence bring about and then become indistinguishable from a 
neurotic fear/anxiety that simultaneously instaurates and hypostatizes a malefic yet secularized 
universe. Coming out of this reliance on the polyvalence of fear is the capacity to affect political 
judgment, that is, to manipulate appearances relating to the state, the body politic, and any 
number of real or imaginative objects of fear and to do so in such a way so as to engender and 
maintain the affective basis of the state’s political legitimacy, regardless of type.   
With respect to overcoming beauty, from the state’s perspective these modes of anti-
aesthetic persuasion provide what amounts to a back door means to achieving the spontaneously 
consensual effects associated with beauty. Rather than directly appealing to beauty—or eliciting 
aesthetic judgments of taste, in some way—the strategy of aesthetic circumvention hinges on a 
basic rhetorical technique: transforming a crisis of political legitimacy into a crisis affecting 
either the body politic as a whole or the mass of real individuals that make up that body. The 
potency of this transformation—its center of power—consists in substituting for the exigence of 
political authority the urgent need or demand for preserving the existing state of affairs, an 
undetermined yet qualitative way of life that is widely felt to be synonymous with life itself. 
Although the shift may appear to be slight, somewhat trivial or superficial, substituting 
preservation for political legitimacy is an understated yet artful maneuver in getting around the 
aesthetics of politics and thereby in overcoming, even perhaps avoiding, an otherwise inevitable 
crisis. Insofar as the aesthetics of politics implies a rhetorical situation, it necessarily involves—
as a constitutive operation—an artful (i.e., productive) presentation of an exigence. This 
production, in its turn, entails an act of dissimulation, one that either conceals the exigence of 
political authority behind the public appearance of preservation or superimposes the two, such 
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that preservation of life and preservation of the regime are regarded as effectively and apparently 
interchangeable. If, in the domain of political philosophy, we may follow John Rawls in 
postulating a hypothetical veil of ignorance—behind which parties to a social contract are 
without information that would enable them to tailor principles of justice favorable to their 
personal circumstances—then, in the domain of political rhetoric, and on condition of the 
efficacy of negative aesthetics, we may assume the functional existence of a veil of 
appearances—behind which the exigence of preservation surreptitiously displaces that of 
political legitimacy (see Rawls 1999, §24: 118–23).2 In responding to the need for preservation, 
the state is in fact reacting to the crisis of its own legitimacy, whether the crisis is in full swing or 
at the beginning stages of need. In the context of political legitimacy, the aesthetic circumvention 
afforded by the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny is essentially a matter of bringing about 
unity of effect by means of exigence control.  
The resulting consensus, which at its core is affective in nature, is thus of a piece with the 
more or less indirect instauration of the state’s political authority.3 Of course, since each of the 
negative aesthetic categories furnishes the state with a range of distinctive politico-rhetorical 
possibilities, the indirectness of the legitimating effects varies from one to another. For 
convenience’s sake, we may represent this variability on a scale from most to least direct. In the 
context of tragic clarification (the most direct means of instaurating the state), a collective way of 
life or a community’s ethos is so thoroughly identified with the current regime/state that the 
constitutional arrangement becomes coterminous with the community and to such an extent that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See Ajume Wingo’s Veil Politics in Liberal Democratic States for an earlier and similar play on Rawls’ famous 
concept of the veil of ignorance. See also Michael Huemer (2013, 116–23). 
3 For that reason, the movement from the tragic to the sublime also manifests a decreasing overtness with respect to 
constitutionality or “politicalness.” If in the context of the tragic the good state is hegemonized by a particular 
constitution or principle of justice, then by the time we move through the sublime to the uncanny the state is 
divested of any political content beyond that of the most basic police function, i.e., the assurance of individual 
safety. 
	   214	  
that the political community is—i.e., is perceived to be—the community. For that reason, 
preserving the community against threats of corruption is equivalent to preserving the existing 
political order. Although the sublime also involves a positive identification between state and 
society, through the institution of sublime form (i.e., the movement from inhibition and 
debasement to elevation and freedom), the state is negatively revealed as a political agency 
transcendent of both the sensible world and civil society. No longer coextensive with the 
community, the state emerges as the collective’s sole redeemer, performing the role of a real-
world deus ex machina, which, appearing at the eleventh hour, promises safety from the ever-
present dangers of chaos and finitude.  
Finally, there is the uncanny, whose subjective fortification of the state is at the furthest 
remove from the effort to restore affective political legitimacy. And yet what the uncanny lacks 
in terms of direct support vis-à-vis the state’s claim to legitimate domination, it more than makes 
up for in terms of its visceral impact. Compared to the tragic and the sublime—both which 
command, to a considerable extent, affective power—the uncanny comprises a primal force and 
in a double sense of being both primeval and basic to inner experience. By means of a malicious 
and figural other, the uncanny renews, under any number of secular guises, the “primitive” and 
fearful belief in an animistic universe fraught with malign, omnipresent forces. Instantiations of 
this Other thus work to replace or supplement a widespread concern for collective security with 
an obsessive concern for personal safety, according to which existential fears centering on 
individuals and their “possessions” supersede the higher or more sublimated fears pertaining to a 
way of life. However, as in the case of sublime form, the uncanny’s separation from the state and 
its struggle for legitimacy is not for that reason politically (i.e., rhetorically) ineffective. Just as 
the sublime subserves legitimacy by renewing belief in the savior state, so too, through the 
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agency of the uncanny Other the state emerges as the sole guarantor of individual safety. The 
political status quo is thus reduced to the prerogative of the state, newly refurbished in its most 
essential guise: the personal safety state.   
Although one can clearly see that a parallel drop in overt politicalness occurs as a result 
of the decrease in direct instauration—witness the movement from constitutional concerns to 
existential panic—less obvious, perhaps, is the simultaneous reduction in the state’s capacity to 
maintain effective control over the suggestion of aesthetic violence or evil. Through the agency 
of tragic clarification, the state enjoys a maximum of control, since it administers or presides 
over those institutions responsible for undertaking the process of civic purgation. To be sure, the 
state does not create its own forces of corruption or the embodiments of those forces—or rather, 
we do not need to assume total manipulation (or “blowback”) to understand the rhetorical 
effectiveness of political catharsis. In the context of Greek ostracism, state control of the tragic is 
relatively passive, relying as it does on the automatic functioning of a state-sanctioned but 
ultimately democratic practice, that of ostracism. Passivity, however, should not conceal the fact 
that ostracism serves to strengthen commitment to the apparent constitutional arrangement, 
thereby reinforcing the affective basis of the state’s political legitimacy, irrespective of whether 
the political appearance corresponds to the actual governing apparatus and its operative principle 
of justice. Indeed, the contrary perception—that ostracism was or is a spontaneous democratic 
practice, relatively independent of state influence—works to the state’s advantage, dissimulating 
the extent to which the state controls the tragic function of civic purgation, without actually 
modifying that magnitude. Of course, the state need not take a backseat role in effecting the 
tragic but can take active charge of the process. With or without the institution of ostracism, the 
state may initiate the tragic through prosecuting certain federal cases, or, as in the case of 
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whistleblowers like Edward Snowden, by simply labeling certain domestic persons as enemies of 
the state—who, despite self-imposed exile, must be extradited so as to be ostracized within and 
in accord with a state-sanctioned juridico-political process. In contrast, the sublime and the 
uncanny require materials beyond the control of the state. But whereas the sublime is in need 
only of objects (real or imagined), the uncanny presupposes an already existing climate of 
uncertainty and fear. More than likely, the environment that lends itself to uncanny images and 
associations is one conditioned by the sublime—those intense, collective experiences set in 
motion by the threat of overwhelming or overpowering phenomena. Nevertheless, just as the 
state cannot control the emergence of sublime “objects,” so too, the state is forced to make do 
with the subjective history—the mood or overall pervading tone—of its citizenry, a state of mind 
or feeling that is always in some excess of the mind of the state. Even so, the uncanny and the 
sublime compensate for their relative incapacity to manage the first appearance of non-artistic 
aesthetic violence—i.e., to manufacture a community’s initial aesthetic disturbance—by 
supplying the state with, on the one hand, an unsurpassable emotive force (the sublime) and, on 
the other hand, an ever-renewable source of hopeful anxiety (the uncanny). 
Yet the question regarding the state’s capacity to control the emergence of aesthetic 
violence suggests another—one that I have not directly addressed but which, based on the 
preceding arguments, I can now concisely answer—namely, the question of control regarding the 
long-term effects of negative aesthetics, that is, of how long the processes may be expected to 
remain rhetorically effective before a decrease in rhetorical value or a curvilinear effect comes 
into force. For it would seem that in circumventing beauty the boost in affective legitimacy 
afforded by negative aesthetics leaves the underlying crisis untouched and that the crisis in 
aesthetics, rather than being overcome, is simply held in a temporary state of abeyance, lying in 
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wait and ready to reassert itself “the morning after,” that is, once the intoxicating effects of the 
tragic, the sublime, or the uncanny have begun to wear off. The question, then, is “How long 
until sobriety kicks in, until the spell loses its effectiveness? And then what?” The question, 
however, while important, overlooks or downplays what is really at stake. 
First, owing to its emotive power, the rhetoric of negative aesthetics does not merely 
suspend the question of legitimacy, nor does it simply circumvent beauty and the crisis in 
aesthetics. Rather, in accomplishing both, rhetoric configures or, in the context of a rational-legal 
order, fundamentally alters the sensus communis, bringing about something akin to Nietzsche’s 
demand for a transvaluation of values, albeit without the need or compulsion (see esp. 2002, 
§203). Specifically, it effects in the body politic an apparently secularized version of Pascal’s 
wager, transposing it from its intended religious context to the civic domain of public opinion 
and common belief: “Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate 
these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without 
hesitation that He is…. There is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of 
gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. And so our 
proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are equal 
risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain” (1995, §233). To be sure, once secularly 
transposed, all of the wager’s key elements undergo a writing down, or downward conversion, 
such that He becomes the State and the infinitely happy life is converted into a life safe from 
existential fear or a collective way of life secure against threats to the community. Nevertheless, 
the nature of the wager, including its cognitive effect, remains the same: belief in a higher power 
is more advantageous than disbelief. So too, in each context (religious and secular) this belief 
goes beyond the acceptance of a truth-claim or probability, implying trust, faith, and confidence 
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in that power: in a word, submission. Hence, the object of belief is at once a capacity—the power 
to do—and the authority or exclusive right to exercise that power. In the context of political 
legitimacy, the rhetoric of negative aesthetics functions to reactivate this “pragmatic” belief and 
in so doing gives it pride of place among society’s political values—irrespective of the type of 
legitimacy embraced either by civil society or the state. Individually or together, the tragic, the 
sublime, and the uncanny cut across the different types of legitimacy, as well as the different 
types of government, short-circuiting the ongoing process of legitimation while simultaneously 
circumventing the irresolvable crisis in the aesthetics of politics that would otherwise be 
unavoidable. Although this (dys)functional belief may be subject to a recurrent pattern of decline 
and regrowth, it never simply disappears from the storehouse of common feeling. Rather, 
inasmuch as it takes root in the body politic, its emotive force exerts a permanent conditioning 
effect, such that even in dormancy it remains in force as a living potentiality, one that can be 
continually exploited simply by means of the suggestion or appearance of aesthetic violence.  
Second, this wager—which is also shared by the state—reveals something else about the 
impact of negative aesthetics over the long-range, namely, that the rhetorical effectivity of 
circumventing beauty consists, in part, in civil dissuasion, specifically, in dissuading society 
from a belief in its own autonomy vis-à-vis the state apparatus of government.4 Indeed, the 
acceptance and recognition, by the people, of the state’s practical necessity presupposes while 
enacting what, in a different context, Paul Virilio terms “civil deterrence” (2007b), a negative 
form of persuasion, whereby the body politic is discouraged from freely pursuing the project of 
self-determination. Embodied in a secularized version of Pascal’s wager, this deterrence seems 
reasonable enough. However, as critics of the wager have pointed out, the reasoning and thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 That is, the state, for its part, makes a similar wager, supposing that the possible gains afforded by effective 
political legitimacy are well worth the possible costs.  
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reasonableness of the wager is specious; it relies on an assumption (i.e., that the state is at worst 
a necessary evil) that by its very nature is non-demonstrable, merely hypothetical. In the hands of 
early social contract theorists like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, it achieves a near mythical 
status, immortalized as it is in the figural state of nature. But above all—casuistry 
notwithstanding—the supposition is effective, a resource easily exploitable and regularly utilized 
by the state and its rhetoric. Adding to this effectiveness is the fact that civil dissuasion is non-
ideological, in the sense that its capacity to deter society from self-rule is independent of those 
systems of ideas and ideals which form the basis of economic or political theory and policy, such 
as the ideology of republicanism. This is why the state does not need to lose sleep over the 
occasional unpopular administration and why it can easily withstand governments widely 
perceived to be borderline illegitimate or corrupt. In the final analysis, the state is not so much 
ideological as it is a rhetorical substratum, reducible to a wager, which is transversal of all 
political ideology. So long as the citizenry is made to remember the stakes of the wager—that the 
state’s raison d'être is not “political” (i.e., not a raison d'état) but necessary—the state may rest 
assured that the vast majority of its citizens will continue to make the “safe” bet. As I have 
demonstrated, the categories of negative aesthetics, particularly those involving fear, provide the 
state with a singular and powerful means of reanimating the basic supposition upon which 
political legitimacy ultimately depends and, thereby, of reactivating a primordial affective 
condition of civil deterrence.  
And this dissuasive effect points up a hidden truth about the rationality of the state form 
as such: over against the apparent rationality of the state’s claim to legitimacy—a rationality that 
is not limited to rational-legal authority—the state engenders and maintains its actual legitimacy 
by means of non-rational persuasion. And this mode of persuasion, which proceeds via the 
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suggestion and control of aesthetic violence, throws into question the meaningfulness of 
juxtaposing consent with coercion. The rhetoric of the state thus raises the question, “How does 
the state maintain its rule?” and, consequently, “How does it order society?” George Santayana, 
in a letter dating from 1950s, suggests a possible answer when he writes, “[There] are three 
Orders of Society: the Generative, that grows up of itself: the Militant, which is imposed on 
mankind in all sorts of contradictory ways by bandits, conquerors, prophets, reformers, and 
idealists; and the third, the Rational order, which doesn't exist except in the imagination of 
philosophers” (2008, 189). Given the non-rationality of the state’s legitimacy, and assuming, like 
the anarchists, that the state is an artificial superstructure apart from the spontaneous 
organization of society, we are left with a provocative hypothesis, namely, that the state is 
inherently militant, that it rules by fiat disguised as rational consensus. Necessarily complicit in 
this rule are those modes of quasi-aesthetic experience that, springing from the sources of our 
being, ensure and account for the state’s transcultural longevity. And rhetoric, for its part, 
succeeds where only it can, concealing the extent to which reason and emotion can be parlayed 
into an effective mechanism of coercive consensus, consensual submission.
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